U.S. Supreme Court ELECTRICAL WORKERS v. ROBBINS & MYERS, INC., 429 U.S. 229 (1976) 429 U.S. 229

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2. The existence and utilization of grievance procedures does not toll the running of the limitations period that would otherwise begin on the date of the firing, Title VII remedies being independent of other pre-existing remedies available to an aggrieved employee. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454. Pp. 236-240.

(a) Petitioner Guy, by pursuing the grievance procedures, was asserting an independent claim based on a contract right and was in no way thereby prevented from filing her charge with the EEOC within 90 days of her discharge. Application of equitable principles to toll the 90-day period pending completion of the grievance procedures is therefore inappropriate here. Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, distinguished. Pp. 237-238.

(b) Congress clearly intended to retain other remedies "against private employment discrimination separate from and independent of the more elaborate and time-consuming procedures of Title VII," Johnson v. Railway Express Co., supra, at 465-466. Pp. 239-240.

3. The 1972 amendments and their legislative history demonstrate that Congress intended to apply the 180-day period to a charge such as that filed by Guy where the charge was filed with the EEOC before these amendments became effective, was still pending when the amendments became effective, and alleged a discriminatory occurrence within 180 days on the enactment of the amendment. Pp. 241-243.

4. Lifting the bar of a statute of limitations so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is not per se unconstitutional. Cf. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 311-312. Pp. 243-244.

525 F.2d 124, reversed and remanded.

REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., post, p. 244, filed a separate statement.

[Footnote *] Together with No. 75-1276, Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., also on certiorari to the same court.

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behalf in accordance with the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement then in force between petitioner Local 790 of the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (Local 790) and respondent. That agreement's dispute-resolution procedure, which is to be commenced within "five (5) working days of the commission of the act originating the grievance," consists of three grievance steps followed by one arbitration step. Guy's grievance was processed through the third step of the grievance procedure where it was denied on November 18, 1971, with the finding that her termination had been in accordance with the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement.

On February 10, 1972, a date 84 days after the denial of her grievance at the third stage, but 108 days after the date of her discharge, Guy, who is black, filed a charge of racial discrimination with the EEOC directed against both respondent and Local 790. The EEOC in November 1973 issued its determination and "right to sue" letter, finding that there was "no reason to believe that race was a factor in the decision to discharge" Guy. Her suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5, was met by a motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that it was barred because of her failure to file a charge with the EEOC within 90 days of her discharge, 706 (d), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (d).[Footnote 1] The District Court dismissed her action,[Footnote 2] and the

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Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment by a divided vote, 525 F.2d 124 (1975). That court felt that it would be "utterly inconsistent" with our opinions in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, (1975) and in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), to hold that the pursuit of a contractual grievance procedure operates to toll a Title VII remedy "which the employee has a right to resort to concurrently." 525 F.2d, at 126. Then, noting the question of the applicability of the 1972 amendments to Title VII raised by the EEOC as amicus curiae (also noting without more that "[s]ince this issue was not raised in the District Court by any party to the case, we are not required to consider it"), the Court of Appeals stated:

"Plaintiff Guy's claim was barred on January 24, 1972. She did not file her charge with EEOC until February 10, 1972. The amendments to Title VII, increasing the time within which to file her charge to 180 days, did not become effective until March 24, 1972. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (e) [1970 ed., Supp. V]. The subsequent increase of time to file the charge enacted by Congress could not revive plaintiff's claim which had been previously barred and extinguished." 525 F.2d, at 128.

The dissenting judge disagreed on this point, believing that the case should be remanded for consideration of the effect of the 1972 amendments.

We granted certiorari, 425 U.S. 950, to resolve an apparent Circuit conflict on two of these issues: tolling during the pendency of a collective-bargaining-contract's grievance mechanism,[Footnote 3] and the applicability of the 1972 amendments

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to charges filed more than 90 days from the date of the alleged discriminatory act but less than 180 days before the time the amendments became effective.

II

Before reaching either of those questions, however, petitioners Guy and Local 790 assert that the complaint with the EEOC was timely filed, not because of any tolling concept, but simply because the date "the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred" is the date of the conclusion of the collective-bargaining agreement's grievance-arbitration procedures. Until that time, we are told, the October 25 discharge of Guy (although itself an "occurrence" allowing immediate resort to the EEOC) was "tentative" and "non-final," and remained so until she terminated the grievance and arbitration process, at which time the "final" occurrence transpired.[Footnote 4] As a consequence, according to petitioners, the unfavorable termination of the grievance procedures, making the discharge "final," constituted an "occurrence" enabling Guy to start the 90-day period running from that date.

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procedures resulted in her reinstatement, she would not be entitled to be paid for the period during which the grievance procedures were being implemented.[Footnote 5] The grievance lodged on October 27, 1971, protests the "unfair action of Co. for discharge" (emphasis added), while the complaint filed in the District Court alleges Guy's disagreement, after learning of her discharge, "with the Company's determination that she had `voluntarily quit,'" (emphasis added). Throughout the proceedings both in the District Court and in the Court of Appeals, both sides appear to have assumed, as did the courts, that the date of discharge was October 25, 1971. There being no indication that either party viewed the October 25 discharge as anything other than "final,"[Footnote 6] there is certainly no reason for us to now torture this mutual understanding by accepting the bare assertions to the contrary raised by petitioners for the first time before this Court.[Footnote 7]

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III

We think that petitioners' arguments for tolling the statutory period for filing a claim with the EEOC during the pendency of grievance or arbitration procedures under the collective-bargaining contract are virtually foreclosed by our decisions in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), and in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). In Alexander we held that an arbitrator's decision pursuant to provisions in a collective-bargaining contract was not binding on an individual seeking to pursue his Title VII remedies in court. We reasoned that the contractual rights under a collective-bargaining agreement and the statutory right provided by Congress under Title VII "have legally independent origins and are equally available to the aggrieved employee," 415 U.S., at 52,[Footnote 8] and for that reason we concluded:

"[I]n instituting an action under Title VII, the employee is not seeking review of the arbitrator's decision. Rather, he is asserting a statutory right independent of the arbitration process." Id., at 54.

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other remedies, we noted that such independence might occasionally be a two-edged sword,[Footnote 9] but "in the face of congressional emphasis upon the existence and independence of the two remedies," we were disinclined "to infer any positive preference for one over the other, without a more definite expression in the legislation Congress has enacted," 421 U.S., at 461.

Petitioners insist that notwithstanding these decisions, equitable tolling principles should be applied to this litigation, and that the application of such principles would toll the 90-day period pending completion of the grievance procedures. This is so, they say, because here the "policy of repose, designed to protect defendants," Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965), is "out-weighed [because] the interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiff's rights."

But this is quite a different situation from Burnett, supra.[Footnote 10] There the plaintiff in a Federal Employers' Liability Act action had asserted his FELA claim in the state courts, which had concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts, but he had

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the misfortune of filing his complaint in an Ohio State court where venue did not lie under Ohio law. This Court held that such a filing was sufficient to toll the statutory limitations period, even though the state-court action was dismissed for improper venue and a new complaint ultimately filed in the United States District Court. The Court said:

"Petitioner here did not sleep on his rights but brought an action within the statutory period in a state court of competent jurisdiction. Service of process was made upon the respondent notifying him that petitioner was asserting his cause of action." Id., at 429.

Here petitioner Guy in the grievance proceedings was not asserting the same statutory claim in a different forum, nor giving notice to respondent of that statutory claim, but was asserting an independent claim based on a contract right, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra, at 53-54, 56-58. Burnett cannot aid this petitioner, see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, at 467, and n. 14.[Footnote 11]

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Petitioners also advance a related argument that the danger of possible conflict between the concurrent pursuit of both collective-bargaining and Title VII remedies should result in tolling the limitations period for the latter while the former proceeds to conclusion. Similar arguments to these, albeit relating to 42 U.S.C. 1981 and not to private labor agreements, were however, raised and rejected in Johnson. We think the language we used in that case is sufficient to dispose of this claim:

"[I]t is conceivable, and perhaps almost to be expected, that failure to toll will have the effect of pressing a civil rights complainant who values his 1981 claim into court before the EEOC has completed its administrative proceeding. One answer to this, although perhaps not a highly satisfactory one, is that the plaintiff in his 1981 suit may ask the court to stay proceedings until the administrative efforts at conciliation and voluntary compliance have been completed. But the fundamental answer to petitioner's argument lies in the fact - presumably a happy one for the civil rights claimant - that Congress clearly has retained 1981 as a remedy against private employment discrimination separate from and independent of the more elaborate and time-consuming procedures of Title VII." 421 U.S., at 465-466.

Petitioners contend at some length that tolling would impose almost no costs, as the delays occasioned by the grievance-arbitration process would be "slight,"[Footnote 12] noting that the maximum delay in invoking the three-stage grievance procedure (although not including the arbitration step) under the collective-bargaining agreement in force in this

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case would be 35 days. But the principal answer to this contention is that Congress has already spoken with respect to what it considers acceptable delay when it established a 90-day limitations period, and gave no indication that it considered a "slight" delay followed by 90 days equally acceptable. In defining Title VII's jurisdictional prerequisites "with precision," Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S., at 47, Congress did not leave to courts the decision as to which delays might or might not be "slight."[Footnote 13]

Congress did provide in 706 (b) one exception for this 90-day limitations period, when it provided that the limitations period should run for a maximum additional 120 days when there existed "a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof." Where Congress has spoken with respect to a claim much more closely related to the Title VII claim than is the contractual claim pursued under the grievance procedure, and then firmly limited the maximum possible extension of the limitations period applicable thereto, we think that all of petitioners' arguments taken together simply do not carry sufficient weight to overcome the negative implication from the language used by Congress, cf. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S., at 461.[Footnote 14]

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from David L. Norman, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, to Senator Dominick, quoted in EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067, 1074 (WD Va. 1974). However, the explicit statutory language used applies to all amendments made by the Act to 706, not simply to the new enforcement provisions. As Senator Javits did not limit his remarks on the floor so as to indicate that 14's retroactivity was designed to apply only to the new enforcement provisions,[Footnote 15] the legislative history does not make this one of those unusual cases in which a court may infer, contrary to the language actually used, that Congress intended to so limit the scope of 14, cf. also S. Rep. No. 91-1137, p. 31 (1970).

Respondent also contends that the amendment is not applicable to the charge filed by Guy with the EEOC, since, being untimely when filed, her charge could not have been "pending with the Commission on the date of enactment of this Act." This reading of "pending" - confining it to charges still before the Commission and timely when filed - is not the only possible meaning of the word, is largely rebutted by the legislative history,[Footnote 16] and renders the language of 14 virtually meaningless insofar as the enlarged limitations period is concerned. Since Congress also applied the enlarged limitations period to charges, whether or not untimely on March 24, "filed thereafter," we should not presume Congress created this odd

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hiatus in retroactivity suggested by respondent unless congressional intent to do so was conveyed by language more precise than "pending," cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972). "Pending" is simply not a term of art that unambiguously carries with it a meaning precisely suited for this situation; equally logical, for example, would be an interpretation that read "pending" to mean "filed and not yet rejected," cf. Leg. Hist., supra, n. 16, at 1851. We hold that Congress intended the 180-day period to be applicable to charges such as that filed by Guy, where the charge was filed with the EEOC prior to March 24, 1972, and alleged a discriminatory occurrence within 180 days of the enactment of the Act.[Footnote 17]

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McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 277-278 (1976), but had not been decided in the lower courts, and was not presented for us to decide.

Footnote 4 This assertion, which is also adopted by the EEOC as amicus curiae, is premised on the proposition that "[u]se of the grievance resolution process is not an `appeal' of a `final' decision, but is a method of obtaining the judgment of higher management on whether the employee should be retained," Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21; Brief for Petitioner Local 790, pp. 17-18.

Footnote 5 Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. Nor is there any indication that, should the grievance mechanism not be utilized, any sort of "formalized" final determination by management was required before Guy's discharge would have been considered final. As the EEOC acknowledges, "the employer's foremen usually can fire an individual employee such as Guy," Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19.

Footnote 6 Even while raising the contrary arguments in their briefs before this Court, petitioners place the October 25 discharge as the action of respondent. See, e. g., Brief for Petitioner Local 790, p. 4 ("The following day [October 25, 1971] the Company discharged her on the ground that she had not complied with procedures embodied in the collective bargaining agreement pertaining to return from leaves of absence"); Brief for Petitioner Guy 5 ("The Company discharged Guy on October 25 for having `voluntarily quit'").

Footnote 7 At oral argument, we were told that while this assertion was not articulated as a separate argument before the Court of Appeals, pertinent language in Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (CA7 1972), was cited to that court, Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. This is hardly a precise way to get an issue before a Court of Appeals, and there is no indication that the Court of Appeals recognized any such implicit contention, assuming, arguendo, that petitioners thought they were raising it.

Footnote 8 See also 415 U.S., at 48-49: "Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination." We felt that the legislative history was quite clear in this respect, see, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 7205, 13650-13652 (1964); H. R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H. R. Rep. No. 92-238 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 24 (1971).

Footnote 9 "Conciliation and persuasion through the administrative process [e. g., Title VII], to be sure, often constitute a desirable approach to settlement of disputes based on sensitive and emotional charges of invidious employment discrimination. We recognize, too, that the filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter efforts at conciliation, that lack of success in the legal action could weaken the Commission's efforts to induce voluntary compliance, and that a suit is privately oriented and narrow, rather than broad, in application, as successful conciliation tends to be. But these are the natural effects of the choice Congress has made available to the claimant by its conferring upon him independent administrative and judicial remedies. The choice is a valuable one," 421 U.S., at 461.

Footnote 10 In no way is this a situation in which a party has "been prevented from asserting" his or her rights, Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U.S., at 429. There is no assertion that Guy was "prevented" from filing a charge with the EEOC within 90 days of October 25, 1971; indeed, it is conceded and even urged that she could have filed it the following day, had she so wished.

Footnote 11 We concluded in Johnson that "[o]nly where there is complete identity of the causes of action will the protections suggested by petitioner necessarily exist and will the courts have an opportunity to assess the influence of the policy of repose inherent in a limitation period," 421 U.S., at 468 n. 14. See n. 14, infra.

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