U.S. Supreme Court DESIST v. UNITED STATES, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) 394 U.S. 244

DESIST ET AL. v. UNITED STATES. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 12. Argued November 12, 1968. Decided March 24, 1969.

The decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, which held that the reach of the Fourth Amendment "cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure," and that every electronic eavesdropping upon private conversations is a search and seizure which, as a general rule, can comply with constitutional standards only when authorized by a magistrate on a showing of probable cause under precise limitations and safeguards, to the extent that it departed from previous holdings of the Court, is to be applied prospectively only. Pp. 246-254.

384 F.2d 889, affirmed.

Abraham Glasser argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were David M. Markowitz and Irving Younger.

Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, Ronald L. Gainer, and Roger A. Pauley.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioners were convicted by a jury in the District Court for the Southern District of New York of conspiring to import and conceal heroin in violation of the federal narcotics laws.[Footnote 1] An important part of the Government's

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evidence consisted of tape recordings of conversations among several of the petitioners in a New York City hotel room. The tapes were made by federal officers in the adjoining room by means of an electronic recording device which did not physically intrude into the petitioners' room.[Footnote 2] Because there was no "trespass" or "actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected

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area," the District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected the petitioners' argument that this evidence was inadmissible because the eavesdropping had violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The convictions were affirmed,[Footnote 3] and we granted certiorari to consider the constitutional questions thus presented.[Footnote 4]

Last Term in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, we held that the reach of the Fourth Amendment "cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id., at 353. Noting that the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," id., at 351, we overruled cases holding that a search and seizure of speech requires some trespass or actual penetration of a particular enclosure. We concluded that since every electronic eavesdropping upon private conversations is a search or seizure, it can comply with constitutional standards only when authorized by a neutral magistrate upon a showing of probable cause and under precise limitations and appropriate safeguards. The eavesdropping in this case was not carried out pursuant to such a warrant, and the convictions must therefore be reversed if Katz is to be applied to electronic surveillance conducted before the date of that decision. We have concluded, however, that to the extent Katz departed from previous holdings of this Court, it should be given wholly prospective application. Accordingly, and because we find no merit in any of the petitioners' other challenges to their convictions, we affirm the judgment before us.[Footnote 5]

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We are met at the outset with the petitioners' contention that Katz does not actually present a choice between prospective or retroactive application of new constitutional doctrine. The Court in that decision, it is said, did not depart from any existing interpretation of the Constitution, but merely confirmed the previous demise of obsolete decisions enunciating the distinction between "trespassory" searches and those in which there was no physical penetration of the protected premises. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438.[Footnote 6] But this contention misconstrues our opinion in Katz. Our holding there that Goldman

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and Olmstead "can no longer be regarded as controlling," 389 U.S., at 353, recognized that those decisions had not been overruled until that day.[Footnote 7] True, the principles they expressed had been modified. The belief that an oral conversation could not be the object of a "search" or "seizure" had not survived.[Footnote 8] And in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, we had cautioned that the scope of the Fourth Amendment could not be ascertained by resort to the "ancient niceties of tort or real property law." 365 U.S., at 511. But the assumption persisted that electronic surveillance did not offend the Constitution unless there was an "actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area."[Footnote 9] While decisions before Katz may have reflected growing dissatisfaction with the traditional tests of the constitutional validity of electronic surveillance,[Footnote 10] the Court consistently reiterated those tests and declined invitations to abandon them.[Footnote 11] However clearly our holding in Katz may have been foreshadowed, it was a clear break with the past, and we are thus compelled to decide whether its application should be limited to the future.

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new constitutional rules affecting criminal trials, the Court has viewed the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of such decisions as a function of three considerations. As we most recently summarized them in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297,

"The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."[Footnote 12]

Foremost among these factors is the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule.[Footnote 13] This criterion strongly supports prospectivity for a decision amplifying the evidentiary exclusionary rule. Thus, it was principally the Court's assessment of the purpose of Mapp v. Ohio, , which led it in Linkletter to deny those finally convicted the benefit of Mapp's extension of the exclusionary rule to the States:

"all of the cases . . . requiring the exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police action. . . . We cannot say that this purpose would be advanced by making the rule retrospective. The misconduct of the police . . . has already occurred and will not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved." 381 U.S., at 636-637.[Footnote 14]

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We further observed that, in contrast with decisions which had been accorded retroactive effect,[Footnote 15] "there is no likelihood of unreliability or coercion present in a search-and-seizure case"; the exclusionary rule is but a "procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt," and "the fairness of the trial is not under attack." 381 U.S., at 638, 639. Following this reasoning of Linkletter, we recently held in Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, that the exclusionary rule of Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, should be accorded only prospective application. Analogizing Lee to Mapp, we concluded that evidence seized in violation of 605 of the Federal Communications Act[Footnote 16] was "no less relevant and reliable than that seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment," and that both decisions were merely "designed to enforce the federal law." 393 U.S., at 81.

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fully justified reliance on their continuing validity. Nor had other courts theretofore held that the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment encompassed "non-trespassory" electronic surveillance. On the contrary, only a few months before the eavesdropping in this case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had upheld the introduction of electronic evidence obtained by the same narcotics agent with a virtually identical installation. United States v. Pardo-Bolland, 348 F.2d 316, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944.

Although there apparently have not been many federal convictions based on evidence gathered by warrantless electronic surveillance,[Footnote 17] we have no cause to doubt that the number of state convictions obtained in reliance on pre-Katz decisions is substantial.[Footnote 18] Moreover, the determination of whether a particular instance of eavesdropping led to the introduction of tainted evidence at trial would in most cases be a difficult and time-consuming task, which, particularly when attempted long after the event, would impose a weighty burden on any court. Cf. Alderman v. United States, ante, at 180-185. It is to be noted also that we have relied heavily on the factors of the extent of reliance and consequent burden on the administration of justice only when the purpose of the rule in question did not clearly favor either retroactivity or prospectivity.[Footnote 19] Because the deterrent purpose of Katz overwhelmingly supports nonretroactivity, we

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would reach that result even if relatively few convictions would be set aside by its retroactive application.

The petitioners argue that even if Katz is not given fully retrospective effect, at least it should govern those cases which, like the petitioners', were pending on direct review when Katz was decided. Petitioners point out that in Linkletter, the only other case involving the retroactivity of a Fourth Amendment decision, the Court held Mapp applicable to every case still pending on direct review on the date of that decision. A similar approach was adopted in Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, with respect to the prospectivity of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609. In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, however, we abandoned the approach taken in Linkletter and Tehan and concluded that "there are no jurisprudential or constitutional obstacles" to the adoption of a different cut-off point. Id., at 733. We explained that

"[o]ur holdings in Linkletter and Tehan were necessarily limited to convictions which had become final by the time Mapp and Griffin were rendered. Decisions prior to Linkletter and Tehan had already established without discussion that Mapp and Griffin applied to cases still on direct appeal at the time they were announced." Id., at 732.[Footnote 20]

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Here, on the other hand, as in Johnson, "the possibility of applying [Katz] only prospectively is yet an open issue." Ibid.

All of the reasons for making Katz retroactive also undercut any distinction between final convictions and those still pending on review. Both the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule and the reliance of law enforcement officers focus upon the time of the search, not any subsequent point in the prosecution, as the relevant date. Exclusion of electronic eavesdropping evidence seized before Katz would increase the burden on the administration of justice, would overturn convictions based on fair reliance upon pre-Katz decisions, and would not serve to deter similar searches and seizures in the future.

Nor can it sensibly be maintained that the Court is foreclosed by Linkletter in this case, as it was not in Johnson, simply because Katz, like Mapp, was a Fourth Amendment decision.[Footnote 21] In neither Linkletter nor Johnson was it intimated that the cut-off points there adopted depended in any degree on the constitutional provision involved. There is, moreover, a significant distinction between the Mapp and Katz decisions. Mapp dealt solely with the applicability of the exclusionary rule to the States; "the situation before Mapp . . . [was that] the States at least knew that they were constitutionally forbidden from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures under Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)."[Footnote 22] Before Katz on the other hand, "non-trespassory" electronic surveillance was not thought to fall within the

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reach of the Fourth Amendment.[Footnote 23] Therefore, this case lacks whatever impetus the knowingly unconstitutional conduct by the States may have provided in Linkletter to apply Mapp to all pending prosecutions.

In sum, we hold that Katz is to be applied only to cases in which the prosecution seeks to introduce the fruits of electronic surveillance conducted after December 18, 1967.[Footnote 24] Since the eavesdropping in this case occurred before that date and was consistent with pre-Katz decisions of this Court, the convictions must be

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when a device was installed in a Florida restaurant. The surveillance was directed at the owner of the restaurant rather than at any of the petitioners, but petitioner Dioguardi was overheard talking about the operations of the restaurant. The log sheets covering the entire period of surveillance were turned over to the District Judge for in camera inspection, and those relating to any conversations of Dioguardi were furnished to the defense. The second instance was an attempted bugging of a rented car used by petitioners Nebbia, Desist, and LeFranc in furtherance of the conspiracy. Again all records pertaining to this episode were turned over to the defense.

District Judge Palmieri, after holding an extensive hearing at which the petitioners were granted unrestrained opportunity to introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses, concluded that none of the "evidence used against [the petitioners] at the trial was tainted by any invasion of their constitutional rights." 277 F. Supp. 690, 700. Judge Palmieri found that the Dioguardi conversations overheard in 1962-1963 were totally unrelated to the events of the conspiracy, which transpired over two years later. With regard to the second instance, he found that the device in-installed in the rented car "did not function and that nothing coherent was obtained." Id., at 692. The Court of Appeals held that these findings were supported by the evidence and that the petitioners were accorded all the procedural rights to which they were entitled. We agree. See Alderman v. United States, ante, p. 165.

Footnote 6 See also On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747.

Footnote 7 See also 389 U.S., at 362 (HARLAN, J., concurring); 389 U.S., at 367, 372 (BLACK, J., dissenting).

Footnote 8 See, e. g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485; Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142; Silverman v. United States, ; Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128.

Footnote 9 Silverman v. United States, supra, at 512.

Footnote 10 In Katz, 389 U.S., at 353, for example, we referred to our previous observation in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304, that "[t]he premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited."

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by enhancing the reliability of the fact-finding process in the area of identification evidence"; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730, where it was recognized that "Escobedo and Miranda guard against the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation"; and Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414, where it was stated that "the `purpose' of the Griffin rule is to be found in the whole complex of values that the privilege against self-incrimination itself represents," including "our realization that the privilege, while sometimes `a shelter to the guilty,' is often `a protection to the innocent.'" Id., at 414-415, n. 12.

Footnote 15 Jackson v. Denno, ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12.

Footnote 16 48 Stat. 1103, 47 U.S.C. 605.

Footnote 17 The Government has informed us in its brief that "[i]nstead of a wholesale release of thousands of convicted felons, only a relatively small number would probably be affected [by a retroactive application of Katz], since electronic surveillance has played a part in a limited number of federal cases."

Footnote 18 We noted in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 48-49, that only a handful of States have prohibited or regulated electronic surveillance by law enforcement officials.

Footnote 19 See DeStefano v. Woods, ; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719. Cf. cases cited in n. 13, supra.

Footnote 20 In Linkletter itself the Court noted that it dealt only with the narrow issue whether Mapp should be applied to final as well as nonfinal convictions:

"[Mapp] has also been applied to cases still pending on direct review at the time it was rendered. Therefore, in this case, we are concerned only with whether the exclusionary principle enunciated in Mapp applies to state court convictions which had become final before rendition of our opinion." 381 U.S., at 622.

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judicial tradition. Unfortunately, the Court does not even attempt this task.

For the reasons stated in Part I of this opinion I cannot subscribe to the affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I would remand the case to that court for reconsideration in light of Katz v. United States.

[Footnote 1] In one instance this doctrine has been applied to a nonconstitutional decision. See Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), and its aftermath in Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968).

[Footnote 2] An exception to this general rule was made, however, when the habeas petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the state statute under which he had been convicted. See, e. g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880). Since, in this situation, the State had no power to proscribe the conduct for which the petitioner was imprisoned, it could not constitutionally insist that he remain in jail.

[Footnote 3] Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).

[Footnote 4] After Silverman was decided, we were careful to frame our decisions in such a way that a direct consideration of the "trespass" doctrine could be avoided. In Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963), we noted that: "The validity of [Olmstead and Goldman] is not in question here. Indeed this case involves no `eavesdropping' whatever in any proper sense of that term. The Government did not use an electronic device to listen in on conversations it could not otherwise have heard. Instead, the device was used only to obtain the most reliable evidence possible of a conversation in which the Government's own agent was a participant . . . ." In Berger v. New York, , the Court found that New York's eavesdropping statute contained impermissibly vague standards even with regard to the authorization of electronic surveillance requiring a trespass. It concluded that "[t]his disposition obviates the necessity for any discussion of the other points raised." Id., at 44. Moreover, Berger made it clear that we had rejected Olmstead's declaration that the Fourth Amendment did not protect the integrity of private conversations. Such an action would hardly strengthen a lawyer's or lower court's confidence in the continuing vitality of the "trespass" doctrine, which is also rooted in Olmstead.

Finally, the Court's suggestion that our unexplicated per curiam reversal in Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964), was premised upon the "trespass" doctrine, see ante, at 248, n. 11, is not supported by the opinion in that case. Only Mr. Justice Clark expressly predicated his decision upon the doctrine. The other seven members of the majority did not state the ground upon which the reversal was based.

[Footnote 5] While I do not question much that my Brother FORTAS says in his dissenting opinion, I am unable to adopt the extreme position

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on retroactivity he proposes. Before Silverman was decided in 1961, no decision of this Court had undermined the conceptual basis of the Olmstead rule. Before 1961, even the most conscientious police department or judge had no reason to doubt the validity of the "trespass" rule. Nevertheless, MR. JUSTICE FORTAS would grant habeas corpus to prisoners whose convictions became final before Silverman. This result cannot be justified even if one assumes that it is proper for a habeas court to require "conceptual faithfulness" to our opinions and "not merely decisional obedience" to the rules they announce. See post, at 277.

[Footnote 6] Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).

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uncontrolled police eavesdropping to the bitter end, despite the clear, though undelivered, verdict. They add this Court's approval to those who honor the Constitution's mandate only where acceptable to them or compelled by the precise and inescapable specifics of a decision of this Court. And they award dunce caps to those law enforcement officers, courts, and public officials who do not merely stand by until an inevitable decree issues from this Court, specifically articulating that which is clearly immanent in the fulfillment of the Constitution, but who generously apply the mandates of the Constitution as the developing case law elucidates them.

The full realization of our great charter of liberty, set forth in our Constitution, cannot be achieved by this Court alone. History does not embrace the years needed for us to hold, millimeter by millimeter, that such and such a penetration of individual rights is an infringement of the Constitution's guarantees. The vitality of our Constitution depends upon conceptual faithfulness and not merely decisional obedience. Certainly, this Court should not encourage police or other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to adopt a let's-wait-until-it's-decided approach.

The best evidence of the moribund state of Olmstead at the time Katz was decided is the Court's opinion in Katz itself. That opinion acknowledged and relied upon the fact that Olmstead had long ceased to have vitality. In Katz, the Court said:

"It is true that the absence of [physical] penetration was at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466; Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-136, for that Amendment was thought to limit only searches and seizures of tangible property. But `[t]he premise that property interests control the right of the Government

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to search and seize has been discredited.' Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304. Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard without any `technical trespass under . . . local property law.' Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511. Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people - and not simply `areas' - against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.

"We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the `trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling. . . ." 389 U.S., at 352-353.

Since Katz itself recognized that Olmstead had been "eroded by our subsequent decisions" and that we had "since departed from the narrow view on which [it] . . . rested," how can the Court now say that because Katz overruled Olmstead it "was a clear break with the past"? The issue presented by Desist and Kaiser is not whether the petitioners will be given the benefit of Katz. The issue is not whether Katz is "retroactive." The issue is whether because in Katz we formally announced that the "reach of [the Fourth Amendment] . . . cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure," persons claiming the benefit of

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this principle prior to that date must be denied its protection. It is, I submit, entirely appropriate to state the issue in these terms because there can be no doubt whatever that if the present cases had been presented to this Court a day, a year, or a number of years before Katz, we would have held that the petitioners' constitutional rights had been violated, and that the petitioners were entitled, like any other citizens, to their constitutional rights. In these circumstances, I utterly fail to see how today's decisions can be justified. It is indeed a paradox that Katz, whose role it was to bury the corpse of Olmstead, is here being used to revive it.

[Footnote *] [This opinion applies also to No. 62, Kaiser v. New York, post, p. 280.]

[Footnote 1] Linkletter held that the Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, (1961), that illegally seized evidence was not admissible in state prosecutions, should not be applied "retroactively." In Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), the Court held that its decision in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), that it violates the privilege against self-incrimination for the prosecution or the trial judge to comment on a criminal defendant's failure to testify in his defense, should not apply "retroactively." Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), held that Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), should not apply "retroactively." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), held that United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), both of which related to the right to counsel at a pretrial lineup, should not be applied "retroactively." In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), the Court held that the right to trial by jury in state criminal prosecutions that had been established in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), was not "retroactive." Finally, the Court held in Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968), that Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), was not "retroactive." Lee ruled that evidence obtained in violation of 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1103, 47 U.S.C. 605, was inadmissible in state criminal prosecutions.

[Footnote 2] The meaning of "prospectivity" or "non-retroactivity" has varied in the Court's decisions. In Linkletter v. Walker, supra, n. 1, and

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Tehan v. Shott, supra, n. 1, Mapp and Griffin were said not to apply to convictions that had become final prior to the announcement of those decisions. But Mapp and Griffin were applied to cases pending on direct review at the time of those decisions. Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, n. 1, by contrast, held Miranda and Escobedo applicable only to trials begun after Miranda and Escobedo were announced. Stovall v. Denno, supra, n. 1, held that the Wade and Gilbert decisions should apply only to cases in which the illegal official conduct took place after the date of decision. DeStefano v. Woods, supra, n. 1, held that Duncan and Bloom should apply only to cases where the trial commenced after the date of decision, a date which, since these cases involved the right to jury trial, was apt to coincide with the date of the official conduct. Fuller v. Alaska, supra, n. 1, held that Lee v. Florida, supra, n. 1, would apply only in cases in which the illegally obtained evidence was introduced after the date of decision. In all of these cases, the new rule was applied also in the case in which it was announced.

[Footnote 3] Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (rules concerning in-custody interrogation); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule).

[Footnote 4] Cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968).

[Footnote 5] If the evidence introduced in Desist had been obtained by telephone wiretap, I assume the majority would have to agree that it could not be used at trial. This is a federal case, and as early as

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1937 this Court held that evidence obtained in violation of 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1103, 47 U.S.C. 605, may not be received in evidence in a federal court. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379. The fact that a telephone wiretap would not be admissible in the circumstances of this case further elucidates the whimsicality of the present decision. As a result of the chance sequence of decisions, the Court gives less scope to the Federal Government's violation of constitutional mandate than the Court would permit in the case of disregard of a statutory command.

[Footnote 6] The Court did apply the Olmstead doctrine in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). See also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).

[Footnote 7] See, e. g., Hearing pursuant to S. Res. 62 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, 1034-1035, 1036 (1959); Hearings on S. 1086, S. 1221, S. 1495, and S. 1822 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 372-373 (1961); Hearings on S. 2813 and S. 1495 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 11-46 (1962); Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 39 before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, 1154-1165 (1965); Hearings on S. 2187 and other bills before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 33-35 (1966); Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 25 before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 48-58 (1967); Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 Cornell L. Q. 195 (1954); Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 Yale L. J. 792 (1954).

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