U.S. Supreme Court U S v. WURZBACH, 280 U.S. 396 (1930)

[Page 280 U.S. 396, 399]

kind, while they retain their office or employment. If argument and illustration are needed they will be found in Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 1 S. Ct. 381, Id. (C. C.) 12 F. 824. See United States v. Thayer, 209 U.S. 39, 42, 28 S. Ct. 426. Neither the Constitution nor the nature of the abuse to be checked requires us to confine the all embracing words of the Act to political purposes within the control of the United States.

It is argued at some length that the statute, if extended beyond the political purposes under the control of Congress, is too vague to be valid. The objection to uncertainty concerning the persons embraced need not trouble us now. There is no doubt that the words include representatives, and if there is any difficulty, which we are far from intimating, it will be time enough to consider it when raised by some one whom it concerns. The other objection is to the meaning of 'political purpose.' This would be open even if we accepted the limitations that would make the law satisfactory to the respondent's counsel. But we imagine that no one not in search of trouble would feel any. Wherever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each other on opposite sides. The precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no one can come near it without knowing that he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so, it is familiar to the criminal law to make him take the risk. Nash v. United States, , 33 S. Ct. 780

It is said to be uncertain which of several sections imposes the penalty and therefore uncertain what the punishment is. That question can be raised when a punishment is to be applied. The elaborate argument against the constitutionality of the Act if interpreted as we read it, in accordance with its obvious meaning does not need an elaborate answer. The validity of the Act seems to us free from doubt.