U.S. Supreme Court LINDGREN v. U. S., 281 U.S. 38 (1930)

[Page 281 U.S. 38, 48]

the right under the old rules to recover indemnity for injuries occasioned by unseaworthiness'-were omitted from the second clause of section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act, relating to the right of the personal representative to recover damages for the seaman's death, since there was no right to indemnity under the prior maritime law which he might have elected to pursue. And, for the reasons already stated, and in the absence of any right of election, the right of action given the personal representative by the second clause of section 33 to recover damages for the seaman's death when caused by negligence, for and on behalf of designated beneficiaries, is necessarily exclusive and precludes the right of recovery of indemnity for his death by reason of unseaworthiness of the vessel, irrespective of negligence, which cannot be eked out by resort to the death statute of the State in which the injury was received.

3. It is suggested in argument that if the statutes of the several States are superseded by the Merchant Marine Act it would follow that the Death on the High Seas Act,8 which had been previously adopted, would likewise be superseded. That Act, however, concededly has no application here, since Barford's death did not occur on the high seas but within the territorial limits of the State of Virginia. We have no occasion to consider its scope and effect here and do not determine what effect, if any, the Merchant Marine Act has upon it; and nothing stated in this opinion is to be considered as having any reference to those questions. Nor do we consider or determine the effect of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act,9 upon which, although incidentally referred to in argument, neither the administrator nor the United States here relies.

The decree is affirmed. Footnotes

Footnote 1 41 Stat. 988, c. 250; U.S.C. tit. 46, 688 (46 USCA 688).

Footnote 2 38 Stat. 1164, c. 153.

Footnote 3 35 Stat. 65, c. 149; U.S.C. tit. 45, 51 (45 USCA 51).

Footnote 4 41 Stat. 525, c. 95; U.S.C. tit. 46, c. 20 (46 USCA 741-752).

Footnote 5 The Shipyard was also impleaded as a codefendant; but at the hearing in the District Court, pursuant to a concession made by counsel for the administrator, the libel was dismissed as against it. This is not here in question.

Footnote 6 Code of Virginia, 5786 et seq.

Footnote 7 In each of these cases the death had occurred before the adoption of the Merchant Marine Act; in the Garcia Case in 1916 (238 of 257 U. S., 42 S. Ct. 89); and in the Kierejewski Case in 1919 (see (D. C.) 280 F. 125, 126).

Footnote 8 41 Stat. 537, c. 111, U. S. C., tit. 46, c. 21 (46 USCA 761-768).

Footnote 9 39 Stat. 742, c. 458, U. S. C., tit. 5, c. 15 (5 USCA 751-795).