U.S. Supreme Court JAMISON v. ENCARNACION, 281 U.S. 635 (1930)

281 U.S. 635

JAMISON et al. v. ENCARNACION. No. 390. Argued April 22, 1930. Decided May 26, 1930.

Messrs. Theodore H. Lord, of Brooklyn, N. Y., and James B. Henney and Daniel Miner, both of New York City, for petitioners.[ Jamison v. Encarnacion 281 U.S. 635 (1930) ]

[Page 281 U.S. 635, 640]

The reports of the House and Senate committees having the bill in charge condemn the fellow-servant rule as operating unjustly when applied to modern conditions in actions against carriers to recover damages for injury or death of their employees, and show that a complete abrogation of that rule was intended. [Footnote 1] The act, like an earlier similar one that was held invalid because it included subjects beyond the reach of Congress,2 is intended to stimulate carriers to greater diligence for the safety of their employees and of the persons and property of their patrons. Second Employers' Liability Case, 223 U.S. 1, 51, 32 S. Ct. 169, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44; Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Rock, 279 U.S. 410, 413, 49 S. Ct. 363.

[Page 281 U.S. 635, 641]

liable, in the absence of any tortious act, for the payment of compensation for personal injuries or death of employees arising in the course of their employment. 'Negligence' is a word of broad significance and may not readily be defined with accuracy. Courts usually refrain from attempts comprehensively to state its meaning. While liability arises when one suffers injury as the result of any breach of duty owed him by another chargeable with knowledge of the probable result of his conduct, actionable negligence is often deemed-and we need not pause to consider whether rightly include other elements. Some courts call willful misconduct evincing intention or willingness to cause injury to another gross negligence. Bolin v. Chicago, etc., Railway Co., 108 Wis. 333, 84 N. W. 446, 81 Am. St. Rep. 911, and cases cited. And see Peoria Bridge Association v. Loomis, 20 Ill. 235, 251, 71 Am. Dec. 263; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hamler, 215 Ill. 525, 74 N. E. 705, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 674, 106 Am. St. Rep. 187, 3 Ann.Cas. 42, and cases cited. Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind. 450, 20 N. E. 132, 3 L. R. A. 221, 10 An. St. Rep. 76. And it has been held that the use of excessive force causing injury to an employee by the superintendent of a factory in order to induce her to remain at work was not a trespass as distinguished from a careless or negligent act. Richard v. Company, 79 N. H. 380, 381, 109 A. 88, 8 A. L. R. 1426. While the assault of which plaintiff complains was in excess of the authority conferred by the employer upon the foreman, it was committed in the course of the discharge of his duties and in furtherance of the work of the employer's business. As unquestionably the employer would be liable if plaintiff's injuries had been caused by mere inadvertence or carelessness on the part of the offending foreman, it would be unreasonable and in conflict with the purpose of Congress to hold that the assault, a much graver breach of duty, was not negligence within the meaning of the act. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., supra; Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester, etc., Ry., 205 U.S. 1, 9, 10 S., 27 S. Ct. 407.

Judgment affirmed. Footnotes

Footnote 1 Senate Report No. 460, pp. 1-2, 60th Congress, 1st Session. House of Representatives Report No. 1386, p. 2, 60th Congress, 1st Session.

Footnote 2 Act of June 11, 1906, 34 Stat. 232, held unconstitutional in Employers' Liability Cases, , 28 S. Ct. 141.