U.S. Supreme Court ALFORD v. UNITED STATES, 282 U.S. 687 (1931)

[Page 282 U.S. 687, 689]

proper cross-examination, and that the jury was entitled to know 'who the witness is, where he lives and what his business is.' Relevant excerpts of the record are printed in the margin. [Footnote 1]

[Page 282 U.S. 687, 694]

The extent of cross-examination with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court. It may exercise a reasonable judgment in determining when the subject is exhausted. Storm v. United States, 94 U.S. 76, 85; Rea v. Missouri, 17 Wall. 532, 542-543; Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308, 312, 14 S. t. 924. But no obligation is imposed on the court, such as that suggested below, to protect a witness from being discredited on cross-examination, short of an attempted invasion of his constitutional protection from self incrimination, properly invoked. There is a duty to protect him from questions which go beyond the bonds of proper cross- examination merely to harass, annoy or humiliate him. President, etc., of Third Great Western Turnpike Road Co. v. Loomis, 32 N. Y. 127, 132, 88 Am. Dec. 311; Wallace v. State, supra; 5 Jones, Evidence (2d Ed.) 2316. But no such case is presented here. The trial court cut off in limine all inquiry on a subject with respect to which the defense was entitled to a reasonable cross examination. This was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error. Tla-koo-yel-lee v. United States, supra; Nailor v. Williams, supra; King v. United States, supra; People v. Moore, supra; cf. People v. Becker, supra. Other grounds for reversal were set up in the petition for certiorari, but we do not find it necessary to pass upon them.

Reversed. Footnotes

Footnote 1 Q. Where do you live, Mr. Bradley?

Mr. Armstrong: That is objected to as immaterial and not proper cross- examination.

The Court: I cannot see the materiality.

Mr. Friedman: Why, I think the jury has a perfect right to know who the witness is, where he lives and what his business is, and we have the right to elicit that on cross-examination. I may say that this is the first witness the Government had called that they have not elicited the address from.

The Court: I will sustain the objection.

Q. By Mr. Friedman: What is your business, Mr. Bradley? A. My profession is an accountant, public accountant.

Q. What is your occupation now? A. I am not doing anything at the present time on account of this case.

Q. On account of this case? A. Yes.

Q. Do you live in Los Angeles?

Mr. Armistrong: That is objected to as immaterial and invading the Court's ruling.

The Court: I have ruled on that question.

Mr. Friedman: I will temporarily pass on to something else. I would like leave to submit authorities on may right to develop that on cross- examination. I haven't them with me.

The Court: All right. ...

The jury were thereupon excused by the court until 9:30 o'clock on the morning of July 24, 1929, whereupon the jury retired after which the following proceedings were had relative to the materiality of the testimony, as to the residence and place thereof of Cameron Bradley.

The Court: So ordered. In what particular do you think that evidence is material?

Mr. Friedman: I think it is material for this purpose, first, not only on the general grounds I urged in asking the question, but on the additional grounds that I have been informed and caused to believe

that this witness himself is now in the custody of the Federal authorities.

Mr. Armstrong: You mean Mr. Bradley? You mean by the Federal authorities here?

Mr. Friedman: I don't know by what authorities, but that is my impression, that he is here in the custody of the Federal authorities. If that is so, I have a right to show that for the purpose of showing whatever bias or prejudice he may have.

The Court: No; I don't think so. If you can prove he has ever been convicted of a felony, that is a different thing.

Mr. Friedman: I realize that is the rule. I may impeach him if he has been convicted of a felony.

Th Co urt: No. You may prove that fact as going to his credibility, but you can't merely show that he is detained or in charge of somebody. Everbody is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty.

Mr. Friedman: It is a violent presumption sometimes, I know.

The Court: Your defendant is certainly to be given the benefit of that presumption.

Mr. Friedman: I have no doubt of that.

The Court: If that is all you have, I will have to stand on the ruling. ...

Mr. Friedman: I would like, if the Court please, our exception noted to the Court's ruling made yesterday after the jury retired to the effect that we could not inquire as to the present address and residence of the witness.

The Court: Very well.