U.S. Supreme Court TAYLOR v. U.S., 286 U.S. 1 (1932)

286 U.S. 1

TAYLOR v. UNITED STATES. No. 693. Argued April 11, 12, 1932. Decided May 2, 1932.

Mr. R. Palmer Ingram, of Baltimore, Md., for petitioner.[ Taylor v. U.S. 286 U.S. 1 (1932) ]

[Page 286 U.S. 1, 6]

Although over a considerable period numerous complaints concerning the use of these premises had been received, the agents had made no effort to obtain a warrant for making a search. They had abundant opportunity so to do and to proceed in an orderly way even after the odor had emphasized their suspicions; there was no probability of material change in the situation during the time necessary to secure such warrant. Moreover, a short period of watching would have prevented any such possibility.

We think, in any view, the action of the agents was inexcusable and the seizure unreasonable. The evidence was obtained unlawfully and should have been suppressed. See Carroll v. United States, , 45 S. Ct. 280, 39 A. L. R. 790; United States v. Lefkowitz and Paris, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S. Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. -, decided April 11, 1932, and cases there cited.

Prohibition officers may rely on a distinctive odor as a physical fact indicative of possible crime; but its presence alone does not strip the owner of a building of constitutional guaranties (Const. Amend. 4) against unreasonable search. This record does not make it necessary for us to discuss the rule in respect of searches in connection with an arrest. No offender was in the garage; the action of the agents had no immediate connection with an arrest. The purpose was to secure evidence to support some future arrest.

Reversed.