U.S. Supreme Court MOORE v. CHESAPEAKE & O. RY. CO., 291 U.S. 205 (1934)

[Page 291 U.S. 205, 208]

at Russell, ky. In his complaint he set forth two 'paragraphs' or counts, both being for the same injuries. In the first paragraph, petitioner alleged that at the time of the injuries he was employed in interstate commerce and that he brought the action under the acts of Congress known as the Federal Employers' Liability Act1 and the Safety Appliance Acts,2 and the rules and orders which the Interstate Commerce Commission had promulgated under the latter. [Footnote 3] In the second paragraph, he alleged that, at the time of the injuries, he was employed in intrastate commerce, and he invoked the Safety Appliance Acts enacted by the Congress, and the rules and orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission thereunder, and the Employers' Liability Act of Kentucky. The provisions of the laws of Kentucky which were alleged to govern the rights of the parties at the time and place in question were set forth. [Footnote 4] In each count petitioner stated that the injuries were received while he was engaged as a switchman in attempting to uncouple certain freight cars and were due to a defective uncoupling lever.

[Page 291 U.S. 205, 211]

may thus be brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in connection with the Safety Appliance Acts. [Footnote 5]

[Page 291 U.S. 205, 217]

plaintiff to recover was left to be determined by the law of the state.'

We are of the opinion that the second paragraph of the complaint set forth a cause of action under the Kentucky statute, and, as to this cause of action, the suit is not to be regarded as one arising under the laws of the United States. In view of the diversity of citizenship and the residence of petitioner, the District Court of the Northern District of Indiana had jurisdiction.

As the Circuit Court of Appeals did not consider any questions save those relating to the jurisdiction of the District Court, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals will be reversed, and the cause remanded to that court, with directions to consider such other questions as may be presented by the appeal. It is so ordered. Footnotes

Footnote 1 Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq. ( 45 USCA 51 et seq.); Act of April 5, 1910, c. 143, 36 Stat. 291, 45 U.S.C. 56 (45 USCA 56).

Footnote 2 Acts of March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. 1 et seq. ( 45 USCA 1 et seq.); April 1, 1896, c. 87, 29 Stat. 85, 45 U.S.C. 6 (45 USCA 6); March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943, 45 U.S.C. 8, 9, 10 (45 USCA 8-10); April 14, 1910, c. 160, 36 Stat. 298, 45 U.S.C. 11 et seq . (45 USCA 11 et seq.).

Footnote 3 Order of March 13, 1911; Roberts' Federal Liabilities of Carriers, vol. 2, pp. 2010, 2016.

Footnote 4 Ky. Acts, 1918, c. 52, 1-3, p. 153; Carroll's Ky. Statutes, 820b-1, 820b-2, 820b-3.

Footnote 5 See Southern Railway Co. v. Crockett, 234 U.S. 725, 727, 34 S.Ct. 897; St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Conarty, 238 U.S. 243, 248, 35 S.Ct. 785; Great Northern Railway Co. v. Otos, 239 U.S. 349, 350, 36 S.Ct. 124; San Antonio & Aransas Pass R. Co. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 484, 36 S.Ct. 626; Spokane & Inland E.R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 498, 36 S.Ct. 683; Atlantic City R. Co. v. Parker, 242 U.S. 56, 58, 37 S.Ct. 69; St. Joseph & G.I.R. Co. v. Moore 243 U.S. 311, 312, 37 S.Ct. 278; Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Gotschall, , 37 S.Ct. 598; Great Northern R. Co. v. Donaldson, 246 U.S. 121, 124, 38 S.Ct. 230, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 581; Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.S. 239, 240, 44 S.Ct. 64; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521, 528, 45 S.Ct. 169; Chicago, Great Western R. Co. v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287, 289, 45 S.Ct. 303; Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie R. Co. v. Goneau, 269 U.S. 406, 407, 46 S.Ct. 129.

Footnote 6 In Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, , 36 S.Ct. 482, the action was brought in the state court and was removed to the federal court upon the ground that the defendant was a federal corporation.

Footnote 7 In St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 285, 28 S.Ct. 616, 617, the court said: 'The accident by which the plaintiff's intestate lost his life occurred in the Indian territory, where, contrary to the doctrine of the common law, a right of action for death exists. The cause of action arose under the laws of the territory, and was enforced in the courts of Arkansas.' The question whether the action was triable in those courts was held not to present a federal question, but the question as to the interpretation of the Safety Appliance Act of 1893 did present the federal question which was reviewed by this Court.