U.S. Supreme Court, (March 05, 1934)
Docket number: 290
/us/291/431/case.html
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U.S. Supreme Court - Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996)
U.S. Supreme Court - Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Cir. - Lake Shore Asset v. CFTC (7th Cir. 2007)
U.S. Supreme Court CHASE NAT. BANK v. CITY OF NORWALK, OHIO, 291 U.S. 431 (1934)
[Page 291 U.S. 431, 437] sion merely makes explicit as to them that which the law already implies. See Ex parte Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 17 S.Ct. 658. But by extending the injunction to 'all persons to whom notice of the injunction should come,' the District Court assumed to make punishable as a contempt the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights have not been adjudged according to law. [Footnote 3] See Alemite Mfg. Co. v. Staff (C.C.A.) 42 F.(2d) 832. Under the clause inserted in the decree, officials of the state of Ohio might be proceeded against for contempt, if they should apply to the state court to enforce its judgment, although acting solely in the performance of their official duty. To subject them to such peril violates established principles of equity jurisdiction and procedure. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 117, 17 S.Ct. 262; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 234, 38 S.Ct. 65, L.R.A. 1918C, 497, Ann.Cas. 1918B, 461.4 Those principles require that the clause be limited to confederates or associates of the defendant. [Page 291 U.S. 431, 441] through fraud or mistake, or is being used fraudulently, such a showing of diligence is ordinarily required. Crim v. Handley, 94 U.S. 652; Brown v. Buena Vista County, 95 U.S. 157; Knox County v. Harshman, 133 U.S. 152, 10 S.Ct. 257; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 12 S.Ct. 62.7 Compare Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175, 41 S.Ct. 93. But here the injunction is sought on the ground that the judgment is inoperative as against the plaintiff because it was neither party nor privy thereto. Compare Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101, 44 S.Ct. 469; Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 35 S.Ct. 255; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U.S. 100, 33 S.Ct. 967.8 The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger. Whether under the Ohio practice it would have been possible for the trustee to intervene, we have no occasion to determine. [Footnote 9] Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered therein will not affect his legal rights. The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed. As it did not pass upon the merits of the trustee's claim, the cause is remanded to that court for further proceeding in conformity to this opinion. Reversed. Footnotes Footnote 1 Sec. 265. 'The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.' Footnote 2 The prayer is that 'the City of Norwalk, and the officers, officials, agents, employees and representatives of said defendant' be enjoined 'from in any manner interfering with or interrupting the continued operation of the plant and electrical distribution system of the Ohio Electric Power Company, in the streets, alleys and other public places of the City of Norwalk and from taking any steps or doing any act to dismantle, wreck or remove any part of said system ...' and 'from taking any steps or action of any kind whatever to cause the enforcement or carrying out by the Sheriff of Huron County, Ohio, or any of his deputies, or by any other officer of any of the courts in the State of Ohio, of the judgment of ouster. ...' (The later prohibition to apply also to the attorneys of the City.) Footnote 3 Harvey v. Bettis (C.C.A.) 35 F.(2d) 349; Donaldson v. Roksament Stone Co. (C.C.) 178 F. 103; Bliss v. Atlantic Handle Co. (D.C.) 212 F. 190; Omelian v. American Cap Front Co. (D.C.) 195 F. 539, 540. Compare Tosh v. West Kentucky Coal Co. (C.C.A.) 252 F. 44, 48. Footnote 4 Compare United States Playing-Card Co. v. Spalding (C.C.) 92 F. 368, 369. Footnote 5 Louisville Trust Co. v. Cincinnati (C.C.A.) 76 F. 296; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Tacoma (D.C.) 219 F. 775, 776; Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Des Moines (D.C.) 224 F. 620, 624; Williamson v. Clay Center (C.C.A.) 237 F. 329, 335. Compare Dull v. Blackman, 169 U.S. 243, 18 S.Ct. 333; Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 32 S.Ct. 641, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 875; Postal Telegraph Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476, 38 S.Ct. 566; Doctor Jack Pot Mining Co. v. Marsh (D.C.) 216 F. 261, Footnote 6 The City states that it was not, and could not have been made, a party to the quo warranto proceedings; that the fact that quo warranto proceedings are brought by the State in its sovereign capacity is not a mere matter of form, but is of the essence of the proceeding; and that it is public not personal in nature, regardless of the person who furnishes the information upon which the action is based. In support of this proposition the City cited State v. Maccabees, 109 Ohio St. 454, 142 N.E. 888; State v. Conservancy District, 100 Ohio St. 483, 128 N.E. 87; Hardin- Wyandot Co. v. Upper Sandusky, 93 Ohio St. 428, 113 N.E. 402; Thompson v. Watson, 48 Ohio St. 552, 31 N.E. 742; State v. Craig, 21 Ohio Cir.Ct.R. 175. Footnote 7 Louisville Trust Co. v. Cincinnati (C.C.A.) 76 F. 296; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Tacoma (D.C.) 219 F. 775; Illinois Trust Co. v. Des Moines (D. C.) 224 F. 620; Williamson v. Clay Center (C.C.A.) 237 F. 329; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Marlboro Cotton Mills (C.C.A.) 282 F. 811; Seay v. Hawkins (C.C.A.) 17 F. (2d) 710; but compare Denton v. Baker (C.C.A.) 93 F. 46. Footnote 8 Also compare National Surety Co. v. State Bank (C.C.A.) 120 F. 593, 61 L.R.A. 394. Footnote 9 In Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co. et al. v. State of Ohio ex rel. Pontius, Prosecuting Attorney, , 38 S.Ct. 196, L.R.A. 1918E, 865, a proceeding in quo warranto, in which the Traction Company alone was named as defendant, it appears from the record in this court, that the Cleveland Trust Company, trustee under a mortgage, moved in the Supreme Court of Ohio for leave to be made a party and to file an answer; that consent thereto was given; that thereafter motion was allowed; and that the answer was filed and replied to.Try vLex for FREE for 3 days
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