U.S. Supreme Court, (April 01, 1935)
Docket number: 534
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U.S. Supreme Court NORRIS v. STATE OF ALABAMA, 294 U.S. 587 (1935)
[Page 294 U.S. 587, 593] posed upon the red lines, that is, that they were written after the lines had been drawn. The expert was not cross-examined and no testimony was introduced to contradict him. [Footnote 1] In denying the motion to quash, the trial judge expressed the view that he would not 'be authorized to presume that somebody had committed a crime' or to presume that the jury board 'had been unfaithful to their duties and allowed the books to be tampered with.' His conclusion was that names of negroes were on the jury roll. [Page 294 U.S. 587, 595] brushed aside. There is no ground for an assumption that the names of these negroes were not on the preliminary list. The inference to be drawn from the testimony is that they were on that preliminary list, and were designated on that list as the names of negroes, and that they were not placed on the jury roll. There was thus presented a test of the practice of the commissioners. Something more than mere general asseverations was required. Why were these names excluded from the jury roll? Was it because of the lack of statutory qualifications? Were the qualifications of negroes actually and properly considered? The testimony of the commissioner on this crucial question puts the case in a strong light. That testimony leads to the conclusion that these or other negroes were not excluded on account of age, or lack of esteem in the community for integrity and judgment, or because of disease or want of any other qualification. The commissioner's answer to specific inquiry upon this point was that negroes were 'never discussed.' We give in the margin quotations from his testimony. [Footnote 2] [Page 294 U.S. 587, 599] acter and sound judgment, who is not an habitual drunkard, who isn't afflicted with a permanent disease or physical weakness which would render him unfit to discharge the duties of a juror, and who can read English, and who has never been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.' In the light of the testimony given by defendant's witnesses, we find it impossible to accept such a sweeping characterization of the lack of qualifications of negroes in Morgan county. It is so sweeping, and so contrary to the evidence as to the many qualified negroes, that it destroys the intended effect of the commissioner's testimony. In Neal v. Delaware, supra, decided over fifty years ago, this Court observed that it was a 'violent presumption,' in which the state court had there indulged, that the uniform exclusion of negroes from juries, during a period of many years, was solely because, in the judgment of the officers, charged with the selection of grand and petit jurors, fairly exercised, 'the black race in Delaware were utterly disqualified by want of intelligence, experience, or moral integrity, to sit on juries.' Such a presumption at the present time would be no less violent with respect to the exclusion of the negroes of Morgan county. And, upon the proof contained in the record now before us, a conclusion that their continuous and total exclusion from juries was because there were none possessing the requisite qualifications, cannot be sustained. We are concerned only with the federal question which we have discussed, and in view of the denial of the federal right suitably asserted, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS did not hear the argument and took no part in the consideration and decision of this case. Footnotes Footnote 1 The books containing the jury roll in question were produced on the argument at this bar and were examined by the Court. Footnote 2 'Q. Did you ever exclude from the jury rolls any negroes because you found first, he was a man under twenty-one years old or over sixty- five, and he was excluded by reason of his age; secondly because he was a person who wasn't esteemed in the community for being a decent and honorable citizen, for good sound common sense and judgment, did you ever see or hear of them not going to take that negro because he wasn't esteemed in the community for good sense and judgment? A. No, sir.'Q. Did you ever have occasion to say, I can't take that negro because he is a fellow that has a disease which may affect or does affect, his mentality, did you ever say that to yourself, with reference to any particular negro? A. No, sir, negroes was never discussed.'Q. Did you ever say to yourself as a jury commissioner in compiling those lists, I am not going to take that negro because he has been convicted before of a crime involving moral turpitude, have you ever excluded a negro on that ground, did you ever find any negro that came within that category, under your personal knowledge in Jackson County? A. I couldn't recall any, no, sir, I don't know.'Q. Have you ever known of any negro in Jackson County who was excluded by reason of the fact that he could not read English, and that negro at the same time wasn't a free holder or house holder, did you ever say I can't take that negro because he is prohibited under the rules from serving by reason of that provision? A. No, sir.'Q. Or anybody in your presence? A. It never was discussed.'Q. You had been a jury commissioner how long? A. I was on it under Bibb Graves administration, 1928, 1929, 1930.'Q. Three years? A. Yes, sir.'Q. And you never had occasion to exclude any negro in Jackson County by reason of the disqualifying provisions I have just called to your attention? A. Not to my personal knowledge, no, sir.'Try vLex for FREE for 3 days
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