Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937)

U.S. Supreme Court, (November 08, 1937)

Docket number: 25

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Text:

U.S. Supreme Court COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA EX REL. SULLIVAN v. ASHE, 302 U.S. 51 (1937)

[Page 302 U.S. 51, 54]

or member.' This severity was mitigated by the statute. It forbade that judgment unless the breaking was by one committed for a capital offense. [Footnote 1] Breach and escape by one held for felony continued to be dealt with as felony; but, if committed by one confined for an inferior offense, was punishable as a high misdemeanor by fine and imprisonment. [Footnote 2] In harmony with that idea a number of States deal with that offense more severely when committed by one imprisoned for a heinous offense or a long term. [Footnote 3] Indeed, this Court has sustained classification for punishment of crimes by convicts upon the basis of the sentences being served at the time. In Finley v. California, 222 U.S. 28, 32 S.Ct. 13, it held that a statute prescribing the death penalty for the commission by life prisoners of assaults with intent to kill, lesser punishments being laid upon other convicts, was not repugnant to the equal protection clause.

[Page 302 U.S. 51, 55]

of earlier discipline effectively to deter or reform justify more drastic treatment. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623, 32 S.Ct. 583; McDonald v. Massachusetts, , 21 S.Ct. 389; Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677, 16 S.Ct. 179; Plumbly v. Commonwealth, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 413, 415; People v. Sickles, 156 N.Y. 541, 547, 51 N.E. 288. Save as limited by constitutional provisions safeguarding individual rights, a State may choose means to protect itself and its people against criminal violation of its laws. The comparative gravity of criminal offenses and whether their consequences are more or less injurious are matters for its determination. Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 510, 35 S.Ct. 649; Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 135, 136 S., 24 S.Ct. 49. It may inflict a deserved penalty merely to vindicate the law or to deter or to reform the offender or for all of these purposes. For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender. His past may be taken to indicate his present purposes and tendencies and significantly to suggest the period of restraint and the kind of discipline that ought to be imposed upon him.

Presumably, the sentence bring served at the time of prison breaking was determined upon due consideration of the pertinent facts. The judgment then pronounced is good evidence of the convict's natural or acquired vent of mind and his attitude toward the law and rights of others. The fact that he would and did break prison shows him still disposed to evil and determined to remain hostile to society. And that is sufficient to sustain the classification made by the Pennsylvania statute for punishment of prison breakers on the basis of their original sentences.

Affirmed. Footnotes

Footnote 1 'That none from henceforth that breaketh prison shall have judgment of life or member for breaking of prison only, except the cause for which he was taken and imprisoned did require such judgment, if he had been convict thereupon according to the law and custom of the realm, albeit in times past it hath been used otherwise.'

Footnote 2 See 4 Blackstone, p. 130; 1 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, c. 54; 2 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, c. 18; 2 Wharton Criminal Law (12th Ed.) 2019; Rex v. Haswell, R. & R. 458; Commonwealth v. Miller, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 61; Cf. Rex v. Fell, 1 Ld.Raym. 424; Kyle v. State, 10 Ala. 236; Commonwealth v. Homer, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 555, 558.

Footnote 3 Arizona, Revised Code 1928, 4539; Connecticut, Gen.Stats. (1930 Revision) 6173, 6175. Idaho, Code 1932, 17-803, 17-804. Indiana, Annotated Statutes, 1933, 10-1807. Maine, Revised Statutes, 1930, c. 133 , 16; c. 152, 45. Minnesota, Mason's Statutes 1927, 10007. New York, Penal Law, 1694. North Dakota, Compiled Laws 1913, 9351. Washington, Remington's Revised Statutes, 2342. Wisconsin, Statutes 1935, 346.40, 346.45.

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