U.S. Supreme Court ALABAMA POWER CO. v. ICKES, 302 U.S. 464 (1938)

[Page 302 U.S. 464, 476]

tioner is a corporation organized under the laws of Alabama, having its principal office and corporate domicile in that state. Respondent Ickes is the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, duly appointed by the President of the United States in pursuance of law. The other respondents are subordinate officers and agents of the same Emergency Administration, or officers connected with its operations.

Petitioner, under its charter, has the right to manufacture, supply, and sell electrical energy throughout the state of Alabama. Among other communities served by its system are the four municipalities here involved, from each of which it has a nonexclusive franchise giving it the right to construct, maintain, and operate within the municipality an electricity- distribution system. Petitioner is a taxpayer of each of the municipalities, of the counties in which they are located, and of the state, with respect to petitioner's properties and operations; and it also is a taxpayer of the United States with respect thereto.

Each of the municipalities is authorized under state law to construct and operate municipal electric plants and distribution systems, and to engage in competition with petitioner. Each is authorized to issue bonds for the purpose of financing the construction of such plants and to receive grants for that purpose; to mortgage its plant or any part of it; and to pledge all or any part of the revenues derived from the operation of the plant as security for the loan. [Footnote 3] In each municipality an election was held prior to the making of the loan agreements, at which it was determined by a majority of the qualified voters that the municipality should engage in the electric business. The District Court further found- 'Each of the municipalities involved in this suit determined to enter into the electric distribution business of

[Page 302 U.S. 464, 485]

this is fundamental; for the competition contemplated there was unlawful while that of the municipalities contemplated here is entirely lawful.

We deem it unnecessary to review the many other cases cited by petitioner where suits against officials have been sustained. An examination of them will disclose the presence of fraud, coercion, malice, conspiracy, or some other element or condition of controlling force-none of which, as shown by the findings which we have accepted as unassailable, exists in the present case.

Decrees affirmed.

Mr. Justice BLACK concurs in the result. Footnotes

Footnote 1 Chapter 90, 48 Stat. 195, 200, 40 U.S.C.A. 401 et seq.

Footnote 2 Chapter 48, 49 Stat. 115, 119, 15 U.S.C.A. 728 note.

Footnote 3 See Oppenheim v. City of Florence, 229 Ala. 50, 155 So. 859.