U.S. Supreme Court MYERS v. BETHLEHEM SHIPBUILDING CORP., 303 U.S. 41 (1938)

[Page 303 U.S. 41, 44]

held the contrary. [Footnote 1] Because of the importance of the questions presented, the conflict in the lower courts and alleged conflict with our own decisions, we granted these writs of certiorari. 302 U.S. 667, 58 S.Ct. 26, 27, 82 L.Ed. --.

[Page 303 U.S. 41, 46]

On that day the corporation filed, in the federal court for Massachusetts, the bill in equity, herein numbered 181, against A. Howard Myers, acting regional director for the First Region, National Labor Relations Board, Edmund J. Blake, its regional attorney for the First Region, and Daniel M. Lyons, trial examiner, to enjoin them from holding 'a hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the plaintiff has engaged at its Fore River Plant in any so-called unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act, and from having any proceedings or taking any action whatsoever, at any time or times, with respect thereto.' There were prayers for a restraining order, an interlocutory injunction, and a permanent injunction; and also a prayer that the court declare that the National Labor Relations Act and 'defendants' actions and proposed actions thereunder' violate the Federal Constitution.

On May 4, 1936, another bill in equity, herein numbered 182, against the same defendants, seeking, on largely the same allegations of fact, substantially the same relief, was brought in the same court by Charles MacKenzie, James E. Manning, and Thomas E. Barker, employees of the Bethlehem Corporation and officers of the so-called Plan of Representation at the Fore River Plant. [Footnote 3]

[Page 303 U.S. 41, 48]

and its employees, and thus seriously impair the efficiency of its operations. [Footnote 4]

Second. The District Court is without jurisdiction to enjoin hearings because the power 'to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair practice affecting commerce' has been vested by Congress in the Board and the Circuit Court of Appeals, and Congress has declared: 'This power shall be exclusive, and shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise.' [Footnote 5] The grant of that exclusive power is constitutional, because the act provided for appropriate procedure before the Board and in the review by the Circuit Court of Appeals an adequate opportunity to secure judicial protection against possible illegal action on the part of the Board. No power to enforce an order is conferred upon the Board. To secure enforcement, the Board must apply to a Circuit Court of Appeals for its affirmance. And, until the Board's order has been affirmed by the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals, no penalty accrues for disobeying it. The independent right to apply to a Circuit Court of Appeals to have an order set aside

[Page 303 U.S. 41, 49]

is conferred upon any party aggrieved by the proceeding before the Board. The Board is even without power to enforce obedience to its subpoena to testify or to produce written evidence. To enforce obedience it must apply to a District Court; and to such an application appropriate defense may be made. [Footnote 6]

[Page 303 U.S. 41, 50]

is involved, but the Circuit Court of Appeals concludes that such finding was without adequate evidence to support it, or otherwise contrary to law, the Board's petition to enforce it will be dismissed, or the employer's petition to have it set aside will be granted. [Footnote 7] Since the procedure before the Board is appropriate and the judicial review so provided is adequate, Congress had power to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Board and the Circuit Court of Appeals. Anniston Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, , 343-346, 57 S.Ct. 816, 819, 820

Third. The corporation contends that, since it denies that interstate or foreign commerce is involved and claims that a hearing would subject it to irreparable damage, rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution will be denied unless it be held that the District Court has jurisdiction to enjoin the holding of a hearing by the Board. [Footnote 8] So to hold would, as the government insists, in effect substitute the District Court for the Board as the tribunal to hear and determine what Congress declared the Board exclusively should hear and determine in the first instance. The contention is at war with the long-settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the pre-

[Page 303 U.S. 41, 51]

scribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. [Footnote 9] That rule has been repeatedly acted on in cases where, as here, the contention is made that the administrative body lacked power over the subject matter. [Footnote 10]

Obviously, the rules requiring exhaustion of the administrative remedy cannot be circumvented by asserting that the charge on which the complaint rests is groundless and that the mere holding of the prescribed administrative hearing would result in irreparable damage. [Footnote 11] Lawsuits also often prove to have been ground-

[Page 303 U.S. 41, 52]

less; but no way has been discovered of relieving a defendant from the necessity of a trial to establish the fact.

Fourth. The Circuit Court of Appeals should have reversed the decrees for a preliminary injunction. It is true that ordinarily the decree of a District Court granting or denying a preliminary injunction will not be disturbed on appeal. But that rule of practice has no application where, as here, there was an insuperable objection to the maintenance of the suit in point of jurisdiction and where it clearly appears that the decree was the result of an improvident exercise of judicial discretion. [Footnote 12] Since the constitutionality of the act has been determined by our decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 108 A.L.R. 1352, and

[Page 303 U.S. 41, 53]

the defect in the bill is incapable of remedy by amendment, its dismissal should be directed. [Footnote 13]

Fifth. In No. 182, also, the Circuit Court of Appeals should have reversed the decree for a preliminary injunction and directed dismissal of the bill. The plaintiffs, officers of the so-called Plan of Representation of Employees, alleged, in addition to the facts already stated, that the employees are satisfied with their existing contracts of employment and desire to retain the existing plan without change; that the holding of the proposed hearing will discredit the plan and destroy its usefulness to the employees; that they will be deprived of their right to negotiate by the method of their choice, the value of which has been proved by years of operation; that alteration of the plan will cause dissatisfaction among the employees; that operation of plant will be disrupted by labor disturbances; that employment will be interrupted; and that the damage to the employees will be irreparable. These additional allegations furnish no reason why the Board should be prevented from exercising the exclusive initial jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress.

Decrees for preliminary injunction reversed, with direction to dismiss the bills.

Mr. Justice CARDOZO took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Footnotes

Footnote 1 E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Boland, 2 Cir., 85 F.2d 12; Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Schauffler, 4 Cir., 91 F.2d 730; Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 5 Cir., 84 F.2d 97; Clark v. Lindemann & Hoverson Co., 7 Cir., 88 F.2d 59; Pratt v. Oberman & Co., Inc., 8 Cir., 89 F.2d 786; Heller Bros. Co. v. Lind, 66 App. D.C. 306, 86 F.2d 862; compare Bowen v. James Vernor Co., 6 Cir., 89 F.2d 968; Carlisle Lumber Co. v. Hope, 9 Cir., 83 F.2d 92; Lyons v. Eagle- Picher Lead Co., 10 Cir., 90 F.2d 321.

Footnote 2 A Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business at Bethlehem, Pa.

Footnote 3 A substituted bill of complaint was filed May 7, 1936.

Footnote 4 It is alleged that in 1934 and 1935 the predecessor of the present National Labor Relations Board instituted somewhat similar action against the corporation. Although the proceedings were eventually dismissed, the hearings consumed a total of some 2,500 hours of working time of officials and employees and cost the corporation more than $15,000, none of which could be recovered.

Footnote 5 Compare House Committee Report, H.R. Rep. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 24: 'any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may claim a review of such order in the appropriate circuit court of appeals, or in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. It is intended here to give the party aggrieved a full, expeditious, and exclusive method of review in one proceeding after a final order is made. Until such final order is made the party is not injured, and cannot be heard to complain, as has been held in cases under the Federal Trade Commission Act.'

Footnote 6 See Section 11 of the Act and article II, sections 20 and 21, of the Rules and Regulations issued April 27, 1936. Compare Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160, 47 S.Ct. 553; E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Boland, 2 Cir., 85 F.2d 12.

Footnote 7 Section 10(f) of the Act 29 U.S.C.A. 160(f) provides: 'Upon such filing, the court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case of an application by the Board under subsection (e), and shall have the saem exclusive jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board; and the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall in like manner be conclusive.'

Footnote 8 In support of that contention the following cases were cited: Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289, 40 S.Ct. 527, 528; Bluefield Water Works Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679, 683, 43 S.Ct. 675; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 600, 51 S.Ct. 608, 612; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60, 64 S., 52 S.Ct. 285, 296, 297; State Corporation Commission v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561, 569, 54 S.Ct. 321, 324; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51, 52 S., 56 S.Ct. 720, 725, 726.

Footnote 9 The rule has been most frequently applied in equity where relief by injunction was sought. Pittsburgh &c. Ry. v. Board of Public Works, 172 U.S. 32, 44, 45 S., 19 S.Ct. 90; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 230, 29 S.Ct. 67; Dalton adding Machine Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 236 U.S. 699, 701, 35 S.Ct. 480; Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 265, 269, 270 S., 45 S.Ct. 80, 81; Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160, 174, 47 S.Ct. 553, 556; Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 274 U.S. 588, 592, 593 S., 47 S.Ct. 720, 722; Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R. Co. v. Risty, 276 U.S. 567, 575, 48 S.Ct. 396, 399; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Alabama Public Service Commission, 279 U.S. 560, 563, 49 S.Ct. 383, 384; Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461, 468, 471 S., 52 S. Ct. 617, 619, 620; United States v. Illinois Central Ry. Co ., 291 U.S. 457, 463, 464 S., 54 S.Ct. 471, 473, 474; Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163, 172, 55 S.Ct. 7, 10; compare Red 'C' Oil Mfg. Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U.S. 380, 394, 32 S.Ct. 152; Farncomb v. Denver, 252 U.S. 7, 12, 40 S.Ct. 271, 273; Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel District, 262 U.S. 710, 723, 43 S. Ct. 694, 698; McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U.S. 234, 238, 44 S.Ct. 50, 51; White v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 367, 374, 51 S.Ct. 115, 118; Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570, 575, 54 S. Ct. 277, 278; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 300, 304, 54 S.Ct. 383, 384. But because the rule is one of judicial administration-not merely a rule governing the exercise of discretion-it is applicable to proceedings at law as well as suits in equity. Compare First National Bank of Fargo v. Board of County Commissioners, 264 U.S. 450, 455, 44 S.Ct. 385, 387; Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 343, 57 S.Ct. 816, 819.

Footnote 10 Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State Corporation Commission, , 35 S.Ct. 480; Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160, 47 S.Ct. 553; Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 274 U.S. 588, 47 S.Ct. 720; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Alabama Public Service Commission, 279 U.S. 560, 49 S.Ct. 383. Compare Western & Atlantic R.R. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 267 U.S. 493, 496, 45 S.Ct. 409, 410, and casesited in note 1, supra.

Footnote 11 Such contentions were specifically rejected in Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 5 Cir., 84 F.2d 97; Clark v. Lindemann & Hoverson Co., 7 Cir., 88 F.2d 59; Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission, 8 Cir., 280 F. 45; Heller Bros. Co. v. Lind, 66 App.D.C. 306, 86 F.2d 862; and Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 52 App.D.C. 40, 280 F. 1014. Compare United States v. Los Angeles & S.L.R.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 314, 47 S.Ct. 413, 416; Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., , 47 S.Ct. 720; Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 236 U.S. 699, 35 S.Ct. 480; McChord v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 183 U.S. 483, 22 S.Ct. 165; Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp, 5 Cir., 74 F.2d 200, 201.

The cases cited by the corporation are not opposed. Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 39 A.L.R. 468; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 19 S.Ct. 77; Vicksburg Water Works Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65, 82, 22 S.Ct. 585; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 248, 38 S.Ct. 65, L.R.A.1918C, 497, Ann.Cas.1918B, 461; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592, 593 S., 43 S.Ct. 658, 663, 32 A.L. R. 300; City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24, 34, 54 S.Ct. 259, 262; Truax v. Raich, , 36 S.Ct. 7, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann.Cas.1917B, 283; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 215, 216 S., 44 S.Ct. 15, 17, 18.

Footnote 12 Meccano Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141, 40 S.Ct. 463, 465; Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., (semble), 47 S.Ct. 720; compare Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 43, 50, 51 S., 43 S.Ct. 466, 469; National Fire Insurance Co. v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331, 338, 50 S.Ct. 288, 291; Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229, 231, 49 S.Ct. 266; Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 587, 53 S.Ct. 731, 733, 88 A.L.R. 744.

Footnote 13 Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525, 17 S.Ct. 407; Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 494, 20 S.Ct. 708; Metropolitan Water Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 223 U.S. 519, 523, 32 S.Ct. 246; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Gray, 225 U.S. 205, 214, 32 S.Ct. 620; City and County of Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123, 136, 33 S.Ct. 657; compare In re Tampa Suburban R.R. Co., 168 U.S. 583, 588, 18 S.Ct. 177; Ex parte National Enameling & Stamping Co ., 201 U.S. 156, 162, 26 S.Ct. 404; Meccano Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141, 40 S.Ct. 463, 465.