U.S. Supreme Court SOUTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY DEPT. v. BARNWELL BROS. INC., 303 U.S. 177 (1938)

303 U.S. 177

SOUTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT et al. v. BARNWELL BROS., Inc., et al. No. 161. Argued Jan. 4, 1938. Decided Feb. 14, 1938.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing March 14, 1938

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of South Carolina.[ South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. Inc. 303 U.S. 177 (1938) ]

[Page 303 U.S. 177, 186]

fact aimed at interstate commerce, or by its necessary operation is a means of gaining a local benefit by throwing the attendant burdens on those without the state. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489, 498, 7 S.Ct. 592; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622, 626, 23 S.Ct. 229.3 It was to end these practices that the commerce clause was adopted. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 187; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 438, 439; Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, supra; State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232, 280; State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, 289, 297, 298; Cook v. Pennsylvania, , 574; Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 142 U.S. 217, 12 S.Ct. 121, 163; Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522, 55 S.Ct. 497, 500, 101 A.L.R. 55; II Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, 308; III Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, 478, 547, 548; The Federalist, No. XLII; 1 Curtis, History of the Constitution, 502; Story on the Constitution, 259. The commerce clause has also been thought to set its own limitation upon state control of interstate rail carriers so as to preclude the subordination of the efficiency and convenience of interstate traffic to local service requirements. [Footnote 4]

[Page 303 U.S. 177, 188]

local regulation of rivers, harbors, piers, and docks, quarantine regulations, and game laws, which, Congress not acting, have been sustained even though they materially interfere with interstate commerce. [Footnote 5]

[Page 303 U.S. 177, 196]

that if all the states had adopted a single standard none, in the light of its own experience and in the exercise of its judgment upon all the complex elements which enter into the problem, could change it.

Only a word need be said as to the width limitation. While a large part of the highways in question are from 18 to 20 feet in width, approximately 100 miles are only 16 feet wide. On all the use of a 96-inch truck leaves but a narrow margin for passing. On the road 16 feet wide it leaves none. The 90-inch limitation has been in force in South Carolina since 1920, and the concrete highways which it has built appear to be adopted to vehicles of that width. The record shows without contradiction that the use of heavy loaded trucks on the highways tends to force other traffic off the concrete surface onto the shoulders of the road adjoining its edges, and to increase repair costs materially. It appears also that as the width of trucks is increased it obstructs the view of the highway, causing much inconvenience and increased hazard in its use. It plainly cannot be said that the width of trucks used on the highways in South Carolina is unrelated to their safety and cost of maintenance, or that a 90-inch width limitation, adopted to safeguard the highways of the state, is not within the range of the permissible legislative choice.

The regulatory measures taken by South Carolina are within its legislative power. They do not infringe the Fourteenth Amendment, and the resulting burden on interstate commerce is not forbidden.

REVERSED.

Mr. Justice CARDOZO and Mr. Justice REED took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Footnotes

Footnote 1 'Section 4. Weight.-No person shall operate on any highway any motor truck or semi-trailer truck (sic) whose gross weight, including load, shall exceed 20,000 pounds.''Section 6. Width.-No person shall operate on any highway any motor truck or semi-trailer motor truck whose total outside width, including any part of body or load, shall exceed 90 inches.'

Footnote 2 State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect is to gain for those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without, or to burden those out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those within, have been thought to impinge upon the constitutional prohibition even though Congress has not acted. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 497, 498 S.; Wabash, St. L. & P.R. Co. v. Illinois, , 575-578, 7 S.Ct. 4; Bowman v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 498, 8 S.Ct. 689, 1062; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U.S. 650, 659, 16 S.Ct. 934, with which compare Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347, 358, 7 S.Ct. 1126; Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, , 49 S.Ct. 1, with which compare Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct. 600, and New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 29 S.Ct. 10; Baldwin v. G.A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 524, 55 S.Ct. 497, 501, 101 A.L.R. 55; see Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, , 27 et seq., 30 S.Ct. 190.

Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, that when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state. See Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, 315; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 731; Escanaba & L.M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 683, 2 S.Ct. 185; Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, 173 U.S. 285, 294, 19 S.Ct. 465; cf. Pound v. Turck, , 464; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 205, 5 S.Ct. 826; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489, 499, 7 S.Ct. 592.

Footnote 3 Footnote 2, supra.

Footnote 4 See Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, , 16 S.Ct. 1096; Cleveland, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U.S. 514, 20 S.Ct. 722; Mississippi R. Comm. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 203 U.S. 335, 27 S.Ct. 90; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328, 28 S.Ct. 121; Herndon v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 218 U.S. 135, 30 S.Ct. 633; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Wisconsin, 237 U.S. 220, 35 S.Ct. 560; St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Missouri, 254 U.S. 535, 41 S.Ct. 192. Compare Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U.S. 427, 17 S.Ct. 627; Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, 173 U.S. 285, 19 S.Ct. 465; Gulf, C. & S.F. R. Co. v. Texas, 246 U.S. 58, 38 S.Ct. 236, where statutes requiring local service no greater than necessary for fair accommodation of local needs were held constitutional. Although the states have usually been allowed to impose burdens on interstate railroads in the interest of local safety, Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 8 S.Ct. 564; Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96, 9 S.Ct. 28; New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628, 17 S.Ct. 418; Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453, 31 S.Ct. 275; St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518, 36 S.Ct. 443; cf. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 16 S. Ct. 1086, an unnecessarily harsh restriction, even though it is in the interest of safety, has been held to be unconstitutional. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310, 37 S.Ct. 640, L.R.A.1917F, 1184.

Footnote 5 Among the state regulations materially affecting interstate commerce which this Court has upheld, Congress not acting, are those which sanction obstructions in navigable rivers, Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236; Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572; Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 7 S.Ct. 313; cf. Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U.S. 288, 8 S.Ct. 113; approve the erection of bridges over navigable streams, Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Escanaba & L.M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 2 S.Ct. 185; Cardwell v. American River Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205, 5 S.Ct. 423; Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 S.Ct. 811; Lake Shore & M. S.R. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 365, 17 S.Ct. 357; require payment of fees as an incident to use of harbors, Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299; Pacific Mail S.S. Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 32 S.Ct. 626; Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm., 296 U.S. 261, 56 S.Ct. 194; cf. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691; control the location of docks, Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U.S. 410, 23 S.Ct. 472; impose wharfage charges, Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80; Cincinnati, P.B.S. & P. Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559, 169; Parkersburg & O. River Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 2 S.Ct. 732; Ouachita & M. River Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U.S. 444, 7 S.Ct. 907; establish inspection and quarantine laws, Turner v. Maryland, 107 U.S. 38, 2 S.Ct. 44; Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. v Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 6 S.Ct. 1114; Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina Board of Agriculture, 171 U.S. 345, 18 S.Ct. 862; Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U.S. 198, 21 S.Ct. 594; Smith v. St. Louis & S.W.R. Co., 181 U.S. 248, 21 S.Ct. 603; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 23 S.Ct. 92; New Mexico ex rel. McLean & Co. v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 203 U.S. 38, 27 S.Ct. 1; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251, 28 S.Ct. 485, 14 Ann.Cas. 1101; Red 'C' Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 222 U.S. 380, 32 S.Ct. 152; Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 32 S.Ct. 715; Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158, 39 S.Ct. 35; Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 53 S.Ct. 611; cf. Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 10 S.Ct. 862; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 11 S. Ct. 213; and regulate the taking or exportation of domestic game, Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct. 600; New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 29 S.Ct. 10; cf. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13, 49 S.Ct. 1, 4, holding invalid a local regulation ostensibly designed to conserve a natural resource but whose purpose and effect were to benefit Louisiana enterprise at the expense of businesses outside the state.