U.S. Supreme Court STATE OF MINNESOTA v. U.S., 305 U.S. 382 (1939)

[Page 305 U.S. 382, 387]

The exemption of the United States from being sued without its consent extends to a suit by a state. Compare Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331, 342, 27 S.Ct. 388, 391; Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 568, 571 S., 572, 56 S.Ct. 848, 853, 854, 855. Compare Minnesota v. Hitchcock, , 382-387, 22 S.Ct. 650, 654, 655; Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60, 26 S.Ct. 568. Hence Minnesota cannot maintain this suit against the United States unless authorized by some act of Congress.

Minnesota contends that the United States is not an indispensable party. It argues that since the second paragraph of Section 3 of the Act of March 3, 1901, provides that 'the money awarded as damages shall be paid to the allottee', the United States has no interest in the land or its proceeds after the condemnation is begun. [Footnote 2] Under Section 5 of the General Allotment Act, Act of February 8, 1887, c. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 389, U.S.C. Title 25, 348, 25 U.S.C.A. 348, the Indians' interest in these allotted lands was subject to restraints on alienation;3 and by Section 2 of the Indian Reorganization Act, Act of June 18, 1934, c. 576, 48 Stat. 984, U.S.C. Title 25, 462, 25 U.S.C.A. 462, restraints on alienation were extended. The clause quoted may not be interpreted as freeing the allottee's land from the restraint imposed by

[Page 305 U.S. 382, 388]

other acts of Congress. As the parcels here in question were restricted lands, the interest of the United States continues throughout the condemnation proceedings. In its capacity as trustee for the Indians it is necessarily interested in the outcome of the suit-in the amount to be paid. That it is interested, also, in what shall be done with the proceeds is illustrated by the Act of June 30, 1932, c. 333, 47 Stat. 474, U.S.C. Title 25, 409a, 25 U.S.C.A. 409a, under which the Secretary of the Interior may determine that the proceeds of the condemnation of restricted Indian lands shall be reinvested in other lands subject to the same restrictions. [Footnote 4]

[Page 305 U.S. 382, 389]

ferred by Congress, no officer of the United States has power to give to any court jurisdiction of a suit against the United States. Compare Case v. Terrell, 11 Wall. 199, 202; Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433, 435-439; Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 232, 233 S., 8 S.Ct. 82, 85; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255, 270, 16 S. Ct. 754, 760; United States v. Garbutt Oil Co., , 533-535, 58 S.Ct. 320, 323. If Congress did not grant permission to bring this condemnation proceeding in a state court, the federal court was without jurisdiction upon its removal. For jurisdiction of the federal court on removal is, in a limited sense, a derivative jurisdiction. Where the state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties, the federal court acquires none, although in a like suit originally brought in a federal court it would have had jurisdiction. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 383, 42 S.Ct. 349, 351; General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 288, 43 S.Ct. 106, 117.

Third. Minnesota contends that Congress authorized suit in a court of the state by providing in the second paragraph of Section 3 of the Act of March 3, 1901, quoted above, for 'condemnation of' lands allotted in severalty to Indians 'in the same manner as land owned in fee.' But the paragraph contains no permission to sue in the court of a state. It merely authorizes condemnation for 'any public purpose under the laws of the State or Territory where located.' There are persuasive reasons why that statute should not be construed as authorizing suit in a state court. It relates to Indian lands under trust allotments-a subject within the exclusive control of the federal government. The judicial determination of controversies concerning such lands has been commonly committed exclusively to federal courts. [Footnote 5]

[Page 305 U.S. 382, 390]

Minnesota asserted in support of its interpretation of the paragraph that by long established administrative practice such condemnation proceedings are brought in the state court and without making the United States a party. [Footnote 6] The assertion was denied by the Government. As the brief of neither counsel furnished adequate data as to the administrative practice, they were requested at the oral argument to furnish the data thereafter. From the report then submitted by the Solicitor General it appears that throughout a long period the Secretary of the Interior has insisted in Minnesota and in other States, that condemnation suits must be brought in a federal court and that the United States must be made a party defendant. [Footnote 7]

[Page 305 U.S. 382, 391]

As the lower court had no jurisdiction of this suit, we have no occasion to consider whether, as a matter of substantive law, the lack of assent by the Secretary of the Interior precluded maintenance of the condemnation proceeding.

Affirmed. Footnotes

Footnote 1 The fee of the United States is not a dry legal title divorced from substantial powers and responsibilities with relation to the land. United States v. Rickert, , 23 S.Ct. 478; compare Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 286, 31 S.Ct. 578; Brader v. James, 246 U.S. 88, 38 S.Ct. 285. In the case of patents in fee with restraints on alienation it is established that an alienation of the Indian's interest in the lands by judicial decision in a suit to which the United States is not a party has no binding effect but that the United States may sue to cancel the judgment and set aside the conveyance made pursuant thereto. Bowling and Miami Investment Co. v. United States, 233 U.S. 528, 34 S.Ct. 659; Privett v. United States, 256 U.S. 201, 41 S.Ct. 455; Sunderland v. United States, 266 U.S. 226, 45 S.Ct. 64. In the stronger case of a trust allotment, it would seem clear that no effective relief can be given in a proceeding to which the United States is not a party and that the United States is therefore an indispensable party to any suit to establish or acquire an interest in the lands. Compare McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U.S. 458, 27 S.Ct. 346.

Footnote 2 The extent of the restraints on alienation contained in Section 5 of the General Allotment Act was clarified and modified to some extent by subsequent legislation. E.g., Act of May 27, 1902, c. 888, 7, 32 Stat. 245, 275; Act of May 8, 1906, c. 2348, 34 Stat. 182; Act of March 1, 1907, c. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015, 1018; Act of May 29, 1908, c. 216, 35 Stat. 444; Act of June 25, 1910, c. 431, 1-5, 36 Stat. 855, 856; Act of May 18, 1916, c. 125, 39 Stat. 123, 127; U.S.C. Title 25, 349, 372, 373, 378, 379, 394, 403, 404, 405, 408, 25 U.S.C.A. 349, 372, 373, 378, 379, 394, 403, 404, 405, 408. Under Section 4 of the Indian Reorganization Act, applicable to all Indian Reservations unless a majority of the adult Indian vote against its application, the transferability of restricted Indiana lands is greatly limited. Act of June 18, 1934, c. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 985, U.S.C. Title 25, 464, 25 U.S.C.A. 464.

Footnote 3 Compare the Act of March 1, 1907, c. 2285, 34 Stat. 1018, U.S.C. Title 25, 405, 25 U.S.C.A. 405; Act of June 25, 1910, c. 431, 4, 8, 36 Stat. 856-57, U.S.C. Title 25, 403, 406, 25 U.S.C.A. 403, 406.

Footnote 4 Whenever any nontaxable land of a restricted Indian of the Five Civilized Tribes or of any other Indian tribe is sold to any State, county, or municipality for public-improvement purposes, or is acquired, under existing law, by any State, county, or municipality by condemnation or other proceedings for such public purposes, or is sold under existing law to any other person or corporation for other purposes, the money received for said land may, in the discretion and with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, be reinvested in other lands selected by said Indian, and such land so selected and purchased shall be restricted as to alienation, lease or incumbrance, and nontaxable in the same quantity and upon the same terms and conditions as the nontaxable lands from which the reinvested funds were derived, and such restrictions shall appear in the conveyance.' See also note 6, infra.

Footnote 5 Compare McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U.S. 458, 27 S.Ct. 346; 28 Stat. 305, 31 Stat. 760, U.S.C. Title 25, 345, 25 U.S.C.A. 345. The United States argues that a statute granting permission to sue the United States must be construed to apply only to the federal courts unless there is an explicit reference to the state tribunals, citing Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255, 270, 16 S.Ct. 754, 760; United States v. Inaba, D.C. 291 F. 416, 418; United States v. Deasy, D.C., 24 F. 2d 108, 110. This is not universally true even as to suits against the United States itself. United States v. Jones, , 3 S.Ct. 346. And in many instances the state courts have been held to have jurisdiction of suits against the instrumentalities and officers of the United States which directly affect its property interests without such specific statutory authorization. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 554, 41 S.Ct. 593; Sloan Shipyards Corporation v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 258 U.S. 549, 568, 569 S., 42 S.Ct. 386, 388, 389; Olson v. United States Spruce Production Corporateion, , 45 S.Ct. 357; Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 235-237, 55 S.Ct. 705, 708, 709. Compare Davis v. L. N. Dantzler Lumber Co., 261 U.S. 280, 43 S.Ct. 349, 28 A.L.R. 834.

Footnote 6 In 35 Land Decisions 648 the Acting Secretary of the Interior handed down on June 29, 1907, an opinion which recognized, without any discussion, the validity of a condemnation proceeding brought under the second paragraph of the Act of March 3, 1901, in a state court, it not appearing that the United States was joined as a party.

Footnote 7 See also Regulation 69 1/2 of the Regulations of the Department of the Interior, 'Concerning Rights of Way over Indian Lands,' adopted in the general revision of April 7, 1938, which provides: 'As the holder of the legal title to allotted Indian lands held in trust, the United States must be made a party to all such condemnation suits and the action must be brought in the appropriate federal district court, the procedure, however, to follow the provisions of the State law on the subject, so far as applicable.'