U.S. Supreme Court PEOPLE OF STATE OF NEW YORK EX REL. BRYANT v. ZIMMERMAN, 278 U.S. 63 (1928)

278 U.S. 63

PEOPLE OF STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. BRYANT v. ZIMMERMAN et al.

No. 2. Submitted Oct. 11, 1927. Decided Nov. 19, 1928.[ People of State of New York ex rel. Bryant v. [Page 278 U.S. 63, 67]

court of last resort of a state 'where is drawn, in question the validity of a statute of any state, on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.' It is under this provision that a review is invoked.

There are various ways in which the validity of a state statute may be drawn in question on the ground that it is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. No particular form of words or phrases is essential, but only that the claim of invalidity and the ground therefor be brought to the attention of the state court with fair precision and in due time. And if the record as a whole shows either expressly or by clear intendment that this was done, the claim is to be regarded as having been adequately presented. [Footnote 2]

[Page 278 U.S. 63, 70]

Our jurisdiction to review the decision is questioned also because of the nature of the case, it being a proceeding in habeas corpus brought to obtain the discharge of one who is held in custody to answer a charge of violating a state statute alleged to be invalid by reason of its conflict with the Constitution of the United States. But we think our jurisdiction is in this regard so well established by prior decisions and long- continued practice that it is not debatable.

In the early case of Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 563, 568, 597, 614, this court held after must consideration that a proceeding in habeas corpus in a state court to obtain the release of one held in custody upon a criminal charge, where the detention is alleged to be in violation of the Constitution of the United States, is a 'suit' within the meaning of the jurisdictional statute, and that an order of the state court of last resort refusing to discharge him is a final judgment in that suit and subject to review by this court. That holding has been respected and given effect in an unbroken line of later decisions, all of which in their material facts and surroundings were like the case now before us. [Footnote 5] It also has been followed in other cases related in principle. 6

[Page 278 U.S. 63, 76]

granted special privileges so that the legislature may well consider them beneficent rather than harmful agencies.'

The third court (241 N. Y. 405, 150 N. E. 497, 43 A. L. R. 909), after recognizing 'the potentialities of evil in secret societies' and observing that 'the danger of certain organizations has been judicially demonstrated'-meaning in that state-said: 'Benevolent orders, labor, unions and college fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their existence.'

We assume that the Legislature had before it such information as was readily available, including the published report of a hearing before a committee of the House of Representatives of the Fifty-Seventh Congress relating to the formation, purposes, and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. [Footnote 8] If so it was advised-putting aside controverted evidence-that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time, with additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its membership was limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to the Constitution of the United States, in another exacted of its members an oath to shield and preserve 'white supremacy,' and in still another declared any person actively opposing its principles to be 'a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth'; that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving for political power, and assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state, and national af-

[Page 278 U.S. 63, 78]

tions 53, 54, 55, and 56 of article 5-A of the Civil Rights Law.' These sections are printed below. [Footnote 9] It then alleged: 'That said imprisonment and restraint is illegal in this, to wit: That the Magistrate was without jurisdiction to issue the warrant, or cause his arrest, inasmuch as chapter 664 of the Laws of 1923, is unconstitutional and void and of no force or effect.'

[Page 278 U.S. 63, 84]

It must now be accepted as settled doctrine in this court that one is not deprived of any federal right merely by being put on trial for violating a state statute which conflicts with the Federal Constitution. Nor is one deprived of his federal right solely because he may be imprisoned after conviction of violating a state statute admittedly in conflict with the Federal Constitution.

It follows that when the petition for habeas corpus alleged that plaintiff in error was imprisoned under a charge of violating a state statute said to be unconstitutional and void, no real federal question was raised. The legality of his imprisonment did not depend at all upon the validity of the act which it was said he had violated. His right was to an orderly hearing upon the charge, with the privilege of ultimate review here. And as the habeas corpus proceeding never involved any substantial question arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, we have no jurisdiction to review it.

Undoubtedly, cases like this have been entertained here in the past. But, since it has become settled law that mere imprisonment and trial under a charge based upon an unconstitutional state statute does not deprive one of his liberty without due process of law, we should deny further jurisdiction. There is no longer any controverted federal question essential to decision of the cause.

This view is aided by consideration of the serious and manifest evil which will follow a different course. Certainly, we should not undertake to determine the validity of a state statute in advance of trial upon the merits simply because some prisoner sees fit to sue out a writ of habeas corpus upon the alleged ground of conflict between the statute and Federal Constitution. Footnotes

Footnote 1 The acts of January 32, 1928, c. 14, 45 Stat. 54, and April 26, 1928, c. 440, 45 Stat. 466 (28 USCA 861a, 861b), substituted an appeal for a writ of error. See Revised Rules, 275 U. S. Appendix, pp. 630, 646, 647.

Footnote 2 Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368, 392, 398; Nielson v. Lagow, 12 How. 98, 109, 110; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44, 56; Green Bay, etc., Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 172 U.S. 58, 67, 68 S., 19 S. Ct. 97; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U.S. 592, 598, 599 S., 37 S. Ct. 462; Whiteney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 360, 47 S. Ct. 641.

Footnote 3 Crowell v. Randell, supra; Chapman v. Goodnow, 123 U.S. 540, 548, 8 S. Ct. 211; Bell's Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 236, 10 S. Ct. 533; Walter A. Wood Co. v. Skinner, 139 U.S. 293, 295, 11 S. Ct. 528; Roby v. Colehour, , 159-160, 13 S. Ct. 47; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Starbird, supra, page 601 of 243 U. S. (37 S. Ct. 462).

Footnote 4 Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall, 590, 633; Philadelphia Fire Association v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 116, 7 S. Ct. 108; San Jose Land & Water Co. v. San Jose Ranch Co., 189 U.S. 177, 179, 180 S., 23 S. Ct. 487; Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How. 98, 109, 110.

Footnote 5 Smith v. Alabama, , 8 S. Ct. 564; Osborne v. Florida, 164 U.S. 650, 17 S. Ct. 214; Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 26 S. Ct. 144; Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 29 S. Ct. 10; Flaherty v. Hanson, 215 U.S. 515, 30 S. Ct. 179; Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288, 32 S. Ct. 286; Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 35 S. Ct. 501.

Footnote 6 Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 658; Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 16 S. Ct. 1076; Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 181-182, 27 S. Ct. 459. And see Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 464; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138; Mt. Vernon Cotton Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 36 S. Ct. 234; Detroit & Mackinac Ry. Co. v. Michigan R. R. Comm., 240 & M. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 45 S. Ct. 47, & M. By. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 45 S. Ct. 47.

Footnote 7 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 77, et seq.; Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130. 139; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 133; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 171; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551, 552 S.; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657, 661, 13 S. Ct. 721; In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116, 117, 14 S. Ct. 1082.

Footnote 8 House Committee Hearings, 1921, vol. 302. See, also, The Challenge of the Klan, by Stanley Frost; The Ku Klux Klan, by John M. Mecklin.

Footnote 9 'Section 53. Copies of Documents and Statements to be Filed.-Every existing membership corporation, and every existing unincorporated association having a membership of twenty or more persons, which corporation or association requires an oath as a prerequisite or condition of membership, other than a labor union or a benevolent order mentioned in the benevolent orders law, within thirty days after this article takes effect, and every such corporation or association hereafter organized, within ten days after the adoption thereof, shall file with the secretary of state a sworn copy of its constitution, by-laws, rules, regulations and oath of membership, together with a roster of its membership, and a list of its officers for the current year. Every such corporation and association shall, in case its constitution, by-laws, rules, regulations or oath of membership or any part thereof, be revised, changed or amended, within ten days after such revision or amendment file with the secretary of state a sworn copy of such revised, changed or amended constitution, by- law, rule, regulation or oath of membership. Every such corporation or association shall within thirty days after a change has been made in its officers file with the secretary of state a sworn statement showing such change. Every such corporation or association shall at intervals of six months file with the secretary of state a sworn statement showing the names and addresses of such additional members as have been received in such corporation or association during such interval.'Section 54. Resolutions Concerning Political Matters.-Every such corporation or association shall, within ten days after the adoption thereof, file in the office of the secretary of state every resolution, or the minutes of any action of such corporation or association, providing for concerted action of its members or of a part thereof to promote or defeat legislation, federal, state or municipal, or to support or to defeat any candidate for political office.

'Section 55. Anonymous Communications Prohibited.-It shall be unlawful for any such corporation or association to send, deliver, mail or transmit to any person in this state who is not a member of such corporation or association any anonymous letter, document, leaflet or other written or printed matter, and all such letters, documents, leaflets or other written or printed matter, intended for a person not a member of such corporation or association, shall bear on the same the name of such corporation or association and the names of the officers thereof together with the addresses of the latter.'Section 56. Offenses; Penalties.-Any corporation or association violating any provision of this article shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars. Any officer of such corporation or association and every member of the board of directors, trustees or other similar body, who violates any provision of this article or permits or acquiesces in the violation of any provision of this article by any such corporation shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person who becomes a member of any such corporation or association, or remains a member thereof, or attends a meeting thereof, with knowledge that such corporation or association has failed to comply with any provision of this article, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.'