U.S. Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. CALIFORNIA CO-OPERATIVE CANNERIES, 279 U.S. 553 (1929)

279 U.S. 553

UNITED STATES v. CALIFORNIA CO-OPERATIVE CANNERIES. No. 375. Argued April 16, 1929. Decided May 20, 1929.

Mr. Alfred A. Wheat, of Washington, D. C., for the United states.

Mr. Nelson T. Hartson, of Washington, D. C., for respondent.[ United States v. California Co-Operative Canneries 279 U.S. 553 (1929) ]

[Page 279 U.S. 553, 556]

Canneries, which, long after the entry of the consent decree was allowed to intervene under the following circumstances.

On April 29, 1922, the Canneries made a motion for leave to file an intervening petition. The petition accompanying the motion alleged that the consent decree interferes with the performance by Armour & Co. of a contract theretofore made with it, by which Armour agreed to buy large quantities of California canned fruit. The petition charged that the decree is void because the Supreme Court of the District lacked jurisdiction; and it prayed that the decree be vacated. The Supreme Court denied leave to intervene. The Canneries appealed to the Court of Appeals. That court, so far as appears, did not consider the question whether, in view of the Expediting Act (15 USCA 28, 29), it had jurisdiction on appeal. It did not refer to the decisions which hold that an order denying leave to intervene is not appealable, In re Cutting, 94 U.S. 15; Credits Commutation Co. v. United States, , 20 S. Ct. 636; Ex parte Leaf Tobacco Board of Trade, 222 U.S. 578, 581, 32 S. Ct. 833; In re Engel-hard, , 34 S. Ct. 358; City of New York v. Consolidated Gas Co., 253 U.S. 219, 40 S. Ct. 511; New York v. New York Telephone Co., 261 U.S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 372, except where he who seeks to intervene has a direct and immediate interest in a res which is the subject of the suit, compare French v. Gapen, 105 U.S. 509, 524-526; Smith v. Gale, 144 U.S. 509, 12 S. Ct. 674; Leary v. United States, 224 U.S. 567, 32 S. Ct. 599, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1029; Swift v. Black Panther Oil & Gas Co. (C. C. A.) 244 F. 20, 30. Nor did it refer to the settled rule of practice that intervention will not be allowed for the purpose of impeaching a decree already made. [Footnote 1] On June 2, 1924, it reversed the order of the

[Page 279 U.S. 553, 560]

judgment and mandate the Court of Appeals departed from the limits of admissible discretion.

REVERSED.

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND and Mr. Justice STONE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Footnotes

Footnote 1 See Forbes v. Railroad, Fed. Cas. No. 4,926; Coffin v. Chattanooga Water & Power Co. (C. C.) 44 F. 533; Lombard Investment Co. v. Seaboard Mfg. Co. (C. C.) 74 F. 325, 327; Land Title & Trust Co. v. Asphalt Co. of America (C. C.) 114 F. 484; State Trust Co. v. Kansas City, etc., Co. (C. C.) 120 F. 398, 407-408. This rule of practice is embodied in Equity Rule 37. See Hutchinson v. Philadelphia & G. S. S. Co. (D. C.) 216 F. 795; Hopkins v. Lancaster (D. C.) 254 F. 190; Cauffiel v. Lawrence (D. C.) 256 F. 714; King v. Barr (C. C. A.) 262 F. 56; Mueller v. Adler (C. C. A.) 292 F. 138; In re Veach (C. C. A.) 4 F. (2d) 334; Union Trust Co. v. Jones (C. C. A.) 16 F.(2d) 236; Board of Drainage Com'rs v. Lafayette Bank (C. C. A.) 27 F.(2d) 286. Compare Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kansas City R. R. (C. C.) 53 F. 182, 186; United States v. Northern Securities Co. (C. C.) 128 F. 808; Horn v. Pere Marquette R. R. (C. C.) 151 F. 626, 634; United States v. McGee (C. C.) 171 F. 209; Jennings v. Smith (D. C.) 242 F. 561, 564; Adler v. Seaman (C. A.) 266 F. 828.

Footnote 2 Section 2. 'That in every suit in equity pending or hereafter brought in any Circuit (District) Court of the United States under ... ( the Anti-Trust Act), wherein the United States is complainant, ... an appeal from the final decree of the Circuit (District) Court will lie only to the Supreme Court and must be taken within sixty days from the entry thereof. ...'