U.S. Supreme Court ALDERMAN v. UNITED STATES, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) 394 U.S. 165

ALDERMAN ET AL. v. UNITED STATES. ON MOTION TO MODIFY ORDER OF REMAND TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO. No. 133 October Term, 1967. Certiorari denied October 9, 1967. Rehearing and certiorari granted and case decided January 29, 1968. Motion to modify argued May 2, 1968. Reargued October 14, 1968. Order of January 29, 1968, withdrawn, rehearing and certiorari granted, and case decided March 10, 1969.*

[Footnote *] Together with No. 11, Ivanov v. United States, and No. 197, Butenko v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, argued October 14, 1968.

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electronic eavesdropping,[Footnote 1] we granted the petition for rehearing over the objection of the United States that "no overheard conversation in which any of the petitioners participated is arguably relevant to this prosecution." In our per curiam opinion, 390 U.S. 136 (1968), we refused to accept the ex parte determination of relevance by the Department of Justice in lieu of adversary proceedings in the District Court, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings.

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standing to object to the Government's use of the fruits of illegal surveillance.[Footnote 2]

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Ivanov petition to raise an issue similar to that which was presented in No. 133, O. T. 1967.[Footnote 3] Following the first argument in Alderman (sub nom. Kolod v. United States), the petitions for certiorari of both Ivanov and Butenko were granted, limited to questions nearly identical to those involved in the reargument of the Alderman case.[Footnote 4]

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by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. Coconspirators and codefendants have been accorded no special standing.

Thus in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942), testimony induced by disclosing to witnesses their own telephonic communications intercepted by the Government contrary to 47 U.S.C. 605 was held admissible against their coconspirators. The Court equated the rule under 605 with the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment.[Footnote 5] Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), came to like conclusions. There, two defendants were tried together; narcotics seized from a third party were held inadmissible against one defendant because they were the product of statements made by him at the time of his unlawful arrest. But the same narcotics were found to be admissible against the codefendant because "[t]he seizure of this

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heroin invaded no right of privacy of person or premises which would entitle [him] to object to its use at his trial. Cf. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114." Wong Sun v. United States, supra, at 492.

The rule is stated in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960):

"In order to qualify as a `person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure' one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else. . . .

"Ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he allege, and if the allegation be disputed that he establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy."[Footnote 6]

This same principle was twice acknowledged last Term. Mancusi v. DeForte, (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).[Footnote 7]

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the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.

We do not deprecate Fourth Amendment rights. The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value which law enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who flout the rules escape unscathed. In this respect we are mindful that there is now a comprehensive statute making unauthorized electronic surveillance a serious crime.[Footnote 8] The general rule under the statute is that official eavesdropping and wiretapping are permitted only with probable cause and a warrant. Without experience showing the contrary, we should not assume that this new statute will be cavalierly disregarded or will not be enforced against transgressors.

Of course, Congress or state legislatures may extend the exclusionary rule and provide that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible against anyone for any purpose.[Footnote 9] But for constitutional purposes, we are not now

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its use against him, not because he had any interest in the seized items as "effects" protected by the Fourth Amendment, but because they were the fruits of an unauthorized search of his house, which is itself expressly protected by the Fourth Amendment.[Footnote 10] Nothing seen or found on the premises may legally form the basis for an arrest or search warrant or for testimony at the homeowner's trial, since the prosecution would be using the fruits of a Fourth Amendment violation. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

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saw or carried away, but would be free to use against him everything they overheard except his own conversations. And should police overhear third parties describing narcotics which they have discovered in the owner's desk drawer, the police could not then open the drawer and seize the narcotics, but they could secure a warrant on the basis of what they had heard and forthwith seize the narcotics pursuant to that warrant.[Footnote 11]

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invaded when the police enter and install a listening device in his house as they are when the entry is made to undertake a warrantless search for tangible property; and the prosecution as surely employs the fruits of an illegal search of the home when it offers overheard third-party conversations as it does when it introduces tangible evidence belonging not to the homeowner, but to others. Nor do we believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends to the home or to overrule the existing doctrine, recognized at least since Silverman, that conversations as well as property are excludable from the criminal trial when they are found to be the fruits of an illegal invasion of the home. It was noted in Silverman, 365 U.S., at 511-512, that

"This Court has never held that a federal officer may without warrant and without consent physically entrench into a man's office or home, there secretly observe or listen, and relate at the man's subsequent criminal trial what was seen or heard."

The Court proceeded to hold quite the contrary. We take the same course here. III. The remaining aspect of these cases relates to the procedures to be followed by the District Court in resolving the ultimate issue which will be before it - whether the evidence against any petitioner grew out of his illegally overheard conversations or conversations occurring on his premises.[Footnote 12] The question as stated in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), is "`whether,

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granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'" See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).

The Government concedes that it must disclose to petitioners any surveillance records which are relevant to the decision of this ultimate issue. And it recognizes that this disclosure must be made even though attended by potential danger to the reputation or safety of third parties or to the national security - unless the United States would prefer dismissal of the case to disclosure of the information. However, the Government contends that it need not be put to this disclose-or-dismiss option in the instant cases because none of the information obtained from its surveillance is "arguably relevant" to petitioners' convictions, in the sense that none of the overheard conversations arguably underlay any of the evidence offered in these cases. Although not now insisting that its own evaluation of relevance should be accepted automatically and without judicial scrutiny, the United States urges that the records of the specified conversations be first submitted to the trial judge for an in camera examination. Any record found arguably relevant by the judge would be turned over to the petitioner whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, and that petitioner would then have the opportunity to use the disclosed information in his attempt to show that the Government has used tainted evidence to convict him. Material not arguably relevant would not be disclosed to any petitioner.[Footnote 13]

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Although this may appear a modest proposal, especially since the standard for disclosure would be "arguable" relevance, we conclude that surveillance records as to which any petitioner has standing to object should be turned over to him without being screened in camera by the trial judge. Admittedly, there may be much learned from an electronic surveillance which ultimately contributes nothing to probative evidence. But winnowing this material from those items which might have made a substantial contribution to the case against a petitioner is a task which should not be entrusted wholly to the court in the first instance. It might be otherwise if the trial judge had only to place the transcript or other record of the surveillance alongside the record evidence and compare the two for textual or substantive similarities. Even that assignment would be difficult enough for the trial judge to perform unaided. But a good deal more is involved. An apparently innocent phrase, a chance remark, a reference to what appears to be a neutral person or event, the identity of a caller or the individual on the other end of a telephone, or even the manner of speaking or using words may have special significance to one who knows the more intimate facts of an accused's life. And yet that information may be wholly colorless and devoid of meaning to one less well acquainted with all relevant circumstances. Unavoidably, this is a matter of judgment, but in our view the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court to identify those records which might have contributed to the Government's case.[Footnote 14]

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The United States concedes that when an illegal search has come to light, it has the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that its evidence is untainted. But at the same time petitioners acknowledge that they must go forward with specific evidence demonstrating taint. "[T]he trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the trial court that its proof had an independent origin." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). With this task ahead of them, and if the hearings are to be more than a formality and petitioners not left entirely to reliance on government testimony, there should be turned over to them the records of those overheard conversations which the Government was not entitled to use in building its case against them.

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factual materials, and after consideration of the many and subtle interrelationships which may exist among the facts reflected by these records. As the need for adversary inquiry is increased by the complexity of the issues presented for adjudication, and by the consequent inadequacy of ex parte procedures as a means for their accurate resolution, the displacement of well-informed advocacy necessarily becomes less justifiable.

Adversary proceedings will not magically eliminate all error, but they will substantially reduce its incidence by guarding against the possibility that the trial judge, through lack of time or unfamiliarity with the information contained in and suggested by the materials, will be unable to provide the scrutiny which the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule demands. It may be that the prospect of disclosure will compel the Government to dismiss some prosecutions in deference to national security or third-party interests. But this is a choice the Government concededly faces with respect to material which it has obtained illegally and which it admits, or which a judge would find, is arguably relevant to the evidence offered against the defendant.[Footnote 15]

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assumed that much of this he will already know, and disclosure should therefore involve a minimum hazard to others. In addition, the trial court can and should, where appropriate, place a defendant and his counsel under enforceable orders against unwarranted disclosure of the materials which they may be entitled to inspect. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16 (e). We would not expect the district courts to permit the parties or counsel to take these orders lightly.

None of this means that any defendant will have an unlimited license to rummage in the files of the Department of Justice. Armed with the specified records of overheard conversations and with the right to cross-examine the appropriate officials in regard to the connection between those records and the case made against him, a defendant may need or be entitled to nothing else. Whether this is the case or not must be left to the informed discretion, good sense, and fairness of the trial judge. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-342 (1939).[Footnote 16] IV. Accordingly, in No. 133, O. T. 1967, the motion of the United States is denied to the extent that it requests an initial in camera inspection of the fruits of any unlawful

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by the use of evidence so obtained, it will enter new final judgments of conviction based on the existing record as supplemented by its further findings, thereby preserving to all affected parties the right to seek further appropriate appellate review. If, on the other hand, the District Court concludes in such further proceedings that there was a violation of any petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights and that the conviction of the petitioner was tainted by such violation, it would then become its duty to accord such petitioner a new trial.

Vacated and remanded.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, while joining the opinion of the Court, concurs in Part II of the opinion of MR. JUSTICE FORTAS and would hold that the protection of the Fourth Amendment includes also those against whom the investigation is directed.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART. I join MR. JUSTICE HARLAN'S separate opinion, except insofar as it would authorize in camera proceedings in the Ivanov and Butenko cases. I would apply the same standards to all three cases now before us, agreeing to that extent with the opinion of the Court.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents, adhering to his dissent in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364-374 (1967).

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

FootnotesFootnote 1 In its brief on reargument, the Government suggests that no electronic surveillance was conducted at places owned by Alderisio, but rather was carried out only at premises owned by his associates or by firms which employed him. The Government also contends that Alderisio himself did not have desk space at the subject premises. Finally, the Government asserts that Alderman neither participated in any conversation overheard nor had any interest in the places which were the object of the surveillance. These allegations by the Government will have to be considered by the District Court in the first instance, and we express no opinion now on their merit.

Footnote 2 In our order of June 17, 1968, restoring the Government's motion to the calendar for reargument, -920, we requested counsel to include the following among issues to be discussed in briefs and oral argument:

"(1) Should the records of the electronic surveillance of petitioner Alderisio's place of business be subjected to in camera inspection by the trial judge to determine the necessity of compelling the Government to make disclosure of such records to petitioners, and if so to what extent?

"(2) If in camera inspection is authorized or ordered, by what standards (for example, relevance and considerations of injury to persons or to reputations) should the trial judge determine whether the records are to be turned over to petitioners?

"(3) What standards are to be applied in determining whether each petitioner has standing to object to the use against him of the information obtained from the electronic surveillance of petitioner Alderisio's place of business? More specifically, does petitioner Alderisio have standing to object to the use of any or all information obtained from such electronic surveillance whether or not he was present on the premises or party to a particular overheard conversation? Also, does petitioner Alderman have standing to object to the use against him of any or all information obtained from the electronic surveillance of petitioner Alderisio's business establishment?"

Footnote 3 The United States admits overhearing conversations of each petitioner, but where the surveillance took place and other pertinent details are unknown. In its brief the Government states:

"In some of the instances the installation had been specifically approved by the then Attorney General. In others the equipment was installed under a broader grant of authority to the F. B. I., in effect at that time, which did not require specific authorization. . . . [P]resent Department of Justice policy would call for specific authorization from the Attorney General for any use of electronic equipment in such cases."

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electronic surveillance will probably differ markedly from those situations in the criminal law where in camera procedures have been found acceptable to some extent. Dennis v. United States, (1966) (disclosure of grand jury minutes subject to in camera deletion of "extraneous material"); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 354 (1959) (whether the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500, requires disclosure of document to the defense); Roviaro v. United States, (1957) (disclosure of informant's identity). In the Dennis case the Court noted that ordinarily "[t]rial judges ought not be burdened with the task or the responsibility of examining sometimes voluminous grand jury testimony," and that it is not "realistic to assume that the trial court's judgment as to the utility of material for impeachment or other legitimate purposes, however conscientiously made, would exhaust the possibilities." 384 U.S., at 874-875.

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difficult to imagine cases in which the danger of unauthorized disclosure of important information would clearly outweigh the risk that an error may be made by the trial judge in determining whether a particular conversation is arguably relevant to the pending prosecution. It may well be, for example, that the number of conversations at issue is very small. Yet though the Court itself recognizes that "the need for adversary inquiry is increased by the complexity of the issues presented for adjudication," ante, at 184, it nevertheless leaves no room for an informed decision by the trial judge that the risk of error on the facts of a given case is insubstantial. Since the number of espionage cases is small, there is no chance whatever that these decisions will be made in a hurried fashion or that they will not be subjected to the most searching scrutiny on appeal. Of course, if any of the conversations should be found arguably relevant, their disclosure should be required before the prosecution is permitted to continue.

In sum, I would require the Government to turn over to Alderman and Alderisio only the records of those conversations in which each defendant participated, and I would leave the way open for a preliminary in camera screening procedure in the Ivanov and Butenko cases.

[Footnote 1] I also am unable to accept my Brother FORTAS' suggestion that standing be accorded to any defendant who can show that an illegal search or seizure was directed against him. As my Brother FORTAS himself recognizes in stopping short of an extreme position that rejects all standing limitations, a proper decision on this issue cannot only consider the fact that a broadened standing rule may add marginally to the impact of the exclusionary rule on unconstitutional police conduct. Rather, one must also consider that my Brother FORTAS' rule permits a defendant to invade the privacy of others to hear conversations in which he did not participate. Moreover, the rule would entail very substantial administrative difficulties. In the majority of cases, I would imagine that the police plant a bug with the expectation that it may well produce leads to a large number of crimes. A lengthy hearing would, then, appear to be necessary in order to determine whether the police knew of an accused's criminal activity at the time the bug was planted and whether the police decision to plant a bug was motivated

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by an effort to obtain information against the accused or some other individual. I do not believe that this administrative burden is justified in any substantial degree by the hypothesized marginal increase in Fourth Amendment protection.

[Footnote 2] The Court suggests, ante, at 177, n. 10, that I am wrong in finding that the traditional grant of standing to the property owner may properly be grounded on the simple fact of the owner's dominion

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over all physical objects on his premises. The majority argues that even though a particular object (say a packet of narcotics) is not described in a valid search warrant, it may nevertheless be seized if the police find the narcotics in their search for the other evidence of crime. It follows from this, says the Court, that the householder's possessory interest in the seized property is not a sufficient basis for standing. But this argument ignores the fact that an accused may have standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim and yet lose on the merits. In the case the Court hypothesizes, the householder has standing because he has lost possession of an object formerly under his control. However, he loses on the merits because the police seizure was reasonable under the circumstances.

[Footnote 3] Thus, unlike the Court, I find it quite easy to distinguish "between the situation where a document belonging to a third party and containing his own words is seized from the premises of another without a warrant and the situation where the third party's words are spoken and overheard by electronic surveillance." Ante, at 179, n. 11. While the absent owner can read the document when he returns to his home, he cannot summon back the words that were spoken in his absence. In the one case, the owner is personally aggrieved by the police action; in the other case, he is not.

[Footnote 4] It seems clear that, under the Katz rationale, a person is personally aggrieved by electronic surveillance not only when he is actually speaking but also when he is listening to the confidences of others.

[Footnote 5] This is not to say, of course, that the property owner could not bring a civil action to have the illegal listening device removed from his premises. He simply could not hear what the listening device had recorded, if none of his own conversations had been overheard.

[Footnote 6] As the Court points out, ante, at 168, n. 1, the Government denies that electronic surveillance took place on property owned by Alderisio. Rather, the premises were owned either by firms which employed Alderisio or by "business associates."

[Footnote 7] I have not thought it necessary to deal with the subsidiary question of the standing of any of these petitioners to challenge at trial any evidence submitted against them that is alleged to be a fruit of a bugged conversation in which they participated. I agree that this is a question that should be left to the District Court for determination in the first instance at the hearing on remand.

[Footnote 8] As the Court's justification of its "property" rule seems to center exclusively on the right of homeowners to protest intrusions into their homes it may well be that the rights of owners of business premises should be stringently limited.

[Footnote 9] I would not, however, go so far as my Brother FORTAS, who would appear to require an in camera proceeding in any case in which the Government claims that a turnover would be prejudicial to the national security. I believe that this special procedure is

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It is a fundamental principle of our constitutional scheme that government, like the individual, is bound by the law. We do not subscribe to the totalitarian principle that the Government is the law, or that it may disregard the law even in pursuit of the lawbreaker. As this Court said in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961), "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."2

The Fourth Amendment to our Constitution prohibits "unreasonable" governmental interference with the fundamental facet of individual liberty: "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." Mr. Justice Jackson recognized the central importance of the Fourth Amendment in his dissenting opinion in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-181 (1949):

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States. In that case, the Court expressly recognized that only a proscription of the use of unlawfully seized material could properly implement the constitutional prohibition. It acknowledged that other remedies were not effective sanctions. Id., at 651-653. See also Weeks v. United States, supra, at 393; Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41-47 (1949) (dissenting opinion); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). As this Court said in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1954), "The Government cannot violate the Fourth Amendment . . . and use the fruits of such unlawful conduct to secure a conviction. . . . [T]hese methods are outlawed, and convictions obtained by means of them are invalidated, because they encourage the kind of society that is obnoxious to free men."3

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obedience to law may be required for suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence. But if the Court is not prepared to repudiate the holding, stated in Jones, that something more must be shown to compel suppression than a claim of prejudice based only on "the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else," 362 U.S., at 261, it should at least follow Jones faithfully and completely.

Jones represented a substantial step towards full implementation of the Fourth Amendment. The case involved a charge of illegal possession of narcotics, and it held that mere lawful presence on the premises searched gave "standing" to challenge the legality of the search.9 It rejected the view "generally" held by courts of appeals "that the movant [must] claim either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched" in order to have the seized property suppressed. Ibid. It explicitly rejected the use of property concepts to determine whether the movant had the necessary "interest" or "standing" to obtain exclusion of the unlawfully seized evidence. See id., at 266.

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hold that after certification by the Attorney General that specific portions of unlawfully obtained materials are sensitive, the trial judge may find that their disclosure to the defendant or his counsel would substantially injure national security interests, and he may determine in camera whether the materials are arguably relevant to the defendant's prosecution.

[Footnote 1] The Court leaves the scope of the interest that the defendant must have in the "premises" to be determined in future litigation.

[Footnote 2] Mr. Justice Brandeis elaborated this point more than 40 years ago:

"In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means - to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal - would bring terrible retribution. . . ." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).

See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968); Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 128 (1942) (dissenting opinion); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 149 (1954) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting); Comment, The Benanti Case: State Wiretap Evidence and the Federal Exclusionary Rule, 57 Col. L. Rev. 1159, 1167-1168 (1957).

[Footnote 3] We pointed out last Term that "[a] ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial . . . has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which procured the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur." Terry v. Ohio, supra, n. 2, at 13. See Irvine v. California, supra, n. 2, at 150 (dissenting opinion).

[Footnote 4] See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).

[Footnote 5] Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 Neb. L. Rev. 483, 539, 540 (1963); Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree - A Plea for Relevant Criteria, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1136, 1140-1141 (1967). Others have attributed the standing requirement simply to a hostility towards the exclusionary rule on the part of the courts. See, e. g., Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 471 (1952).

[Footnote 6] Mapp v. Ohio, (1961), was a 5-to-4 decision. My Brother BLACK concurred only on the basis that the Fifth Amendment's ban against self-incrimination, operating in conjunction with the Fourth Amendment, required the exclusionary rule. See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).

[Footnote 7] The California Supreme Court has recognized that it is not inconsistent to hold that any person may object to the use against him of evidence obtained by an illegal search or seizure, while at the same time allowing only a person who has been made to incriminate himself to suppress his confession and its fruits. Compare People v. Martin, supra, n. 4, with People v. Varnum, 66 Cal. 2d 808, 427 P.2d 772 (1967).

[Footnote 8] See generally Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. 359, 368 (1941); Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1950); Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. Ill. L. F. 78, 105. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 Duke L. J. 319, 335; Broeder, supra, n. 5, at 540; Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 579, 649-650, n. 352 (1968); Comment, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 Yale L. J. 144, 157 (1948); Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and Seizure, 1965 Wash. U. L. Q. 488; Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 342 (1967). But see Edwards, supra, n. 5, at 472; Weeks, Standing to Object in the Field of Search and Seizure, 6 Ariz. L. Rev. 65 (1964); Comment, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 567, 581 (1957).

[Footnote 9] I assume that the Court today intends to incorporate at least this direct holding of Jones.

[Footnote 10] Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211, provides that a law enforcement officer seeking prior judicial authorization for interception of wire or oral communications shall include, among other things, in his application to the court "a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted . . . ." 82 Stat. 218 (18 U.S.C. 2518 (1) (b) (1964 ed., Supp. IV)). Examination of such applications should facilitate the task of deciding at whom a particular investigation was directed. See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55-59 (1967), in which we held that the Fourth Amendment requires, as a precondition of judicial authorization of an eavesdrop, that the conversations sought to be seized be described with particularity.

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