Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U.S. 478 (1939)
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U.S. Supreme Court BALDWIN v. SCOTT COUNTY MILLING CO., 307 U.S. 478 (1939)
[Page 307 U.S. 478, 485]
the legally established rate. See 10(3) and (4). Involuntary rebates as well as those that are voluntary are prohibited. Lowden et al. v. Simonds- Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co. 306 U.S. 516, 59 S.Ct. 612; Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Fink, 250 U.S. 577, 582, 40 S.Ct. 27, 28; New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. York & Whitney Co., , 41 S.Ct. 509. By accepting delivery of the coal, respondent became bound to pay the tariff charges. As the commission has found them not unreasonable but lawful, respondent is without right to retain the amount it collected upon the claim that they were excessive.
The retention by respondent of money collected under the findings and order that the commission later set aside and vacated clearly would be repugnant to the policy and provisions of the Act.
2. The facts on which the state court held it would be inequitable to require respondent to refund may be briefly stated. Respondent employed an expert to represent it before the commission and promised to pay him one- half the amount covered as reparation. Upon collection, it promptly paid as agreed. When petitioners asked refund, more than five years had elapsed and suit to recover back the fee was barred by the statute of limitations. Respondent used the other half to pay dividends and for other corporate purposes. As above indicated, the court held the payment to be voluntary and rested its ruling on that fact. But as shown above it was not voluntary; it was demanded by respondent and compelled by the Act, findings, and reparation order. Moreover, equitable considerations may not serve to justify failure of carrier to collect, or retention by shipper of, any part of lawful tariff charges. Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Fink, supra; New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. York & Whitney Co., supra.
Reversed. Footnotes
Footnote 1 The applicable rule is V: Reparation Statements-Formal Claims for Reparation Based Upon Findings of the Commission. See Rules of Practice Before the Commission, revised to April 1, 1936.
Footnote 2 'If, after hearing on a complaint made as provided in section 13 of this chapter, the commission shall determine that any party complainant is entitled to an award of damages under the provisions of this chapter for a violation thereof, the commission shall make an order directing the carrier to pay to the complainant the sum to which he is entitled on or before a day named.' 49 U.S.C. 16(1), 49 U.S.C.A. 16(1).
Footnote 3 'If a carrier does not comply with an order for the payment of money within the time limit in such order, the complainant, or any person for whose benefit such order was made, may file in the district court of the United States for the district in which he resides or in which is located the principal operating office of the carrier, or through which the road of the carrier runs, or in any State court of general jurisdiction having jurisdiction of the parties, a petition setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims damages, and the order of the commission in the premises. Such suit in the district court of the United States shall proceed in all respects like other civil suits for damages, except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the commission shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and except that the petitioner shall not be liable for costs in the district court nor for costs at any subsequent stage of the proceedings unless they accrue upon his appeal. If the petitioner shall finally prevail he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of the suit.' 49 U.S.C. 16(2), 49 U.S.C.A. 16(2).
Footnote 4 'After a decision, order, or requirement has been made by the commission in any proceeding any party thereto may at any time make application for rehearing of the same, or any matter determined therein, and it shall be lawful for the commission in its discretion to grant such a rehearing if sufficient reason therefor be made to appear. Applications for rehearing shall be governed by such general rules as the commission may establish. No such application shall excuse any carrier from complying with or obeying and decision, order, or requirement of the commission, or operate in any manner to stay or postpone the enforcement thereof, without the special order of the commission. In case a rehearing is granted the proceedings thereupon shall conform as nearly as may be to the proceedings in an original hearing, except as the commission may otherwise direct; and if, in its judgment, after such rehearing and the consideration of all facts, including those arising since the former hearing, it shall appear that the original decision, order, or requirement is in any respect unjust or unwarranted, the commission may reverse, change, or modify the same accordingly. Any decision, order, or requirement made after such rehearing, reversing, changing, or modifying the original determination shall be subject to the same provisions as an original order.' 49 U.S.C. 16a, 49 U.S.C.A. 16a.
Footnote 5 Nineteenth Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, page 12.
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