Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. 610 (1934)
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U.S. Supreme Court EX PARTE BALDWIN, 291 U.S. 610 (1934)
[Page 291 U.S. 610, 612]
Messrs. Robert H. Kelley and Harry R. Jones, both of Houston, Tex., Edward J. White, of St. Louis, Mo., and Frank Andrews, of Houston, Tex., for petitioners.
Mr. Lon E. Blankenbecker, of Houston, Tex. (Mr. Richard W. Franklin, of Houston, Tex., of counsel), for respondents.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This petition for a writ of mandamus, filed in this Court by leave, prays that the federal court for Southern Texas and Thomas M. Kennerly, judge thereof, be commanded to take jurisdiction, on a petition for removal, of a suit instituted in a state court of Texas by Tyrrell-Garth Investment Company. The petitioners are the defendants in that suit. [Footnote 1] Two of them, Baldwin and Thompson, are the trustees in bankruptcy of the Missouri Pacific Railroad system and are operating it. They were appointed by orders of the federal court for Eastern Missouri entered in proceedings for reorganization under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act as amended March 3, 1933, c. 204, 1, 47 Stat. 1474 (11 USCA 205). The other two petitioners are Texas corporations-Houston North Shore Railway Company and Beaumont, Sour Lake & Western Railway Company-and are parts of the Missouri Pacific system. [Footnote 2]
[Page 291 U.S. 610, 613]
The federal court entered an order denying the petition for removed and returned the papers to the petitioners, on the ground that it appears from the petition for removal that the suit is not one in which it is sought to hold the trustees 'responsible in their own person and/or property but only in their representative capacity. See Ruff v. Gay (D.C.) 3 F.Supp. 264; Id. (C.C.A.) 67 F.(2d) 684.' The trustees claim that they are entitled to a writ of mandamus, because the suit in the state court is removable under section 33 of the Judicial Code as amended by Act of August 23, 1916, c. 399, 39 Stat. 532 (28 USCA 76), being an action against officers of a court 'of the United States on account of acts done under color of their office and in performance of their duties as such officers.' [Footnote 3]
[Page 291 U.S. 610, 616]
making further use of the lands for operation of the interurban railway or otherwise. [Footnote 6] The purpose of the amendment was evidently to confine the litigation in the state court to the issue of the right and title to the property, as distinguished from its use during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, in the hope of thereby removing the obvious interference with the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. But the exclusive jurisdiction acquired by the bankruptcy court through taking possession of the interurban railway under claim of title was not limited to the prevention of interference with the use of the land. Compare Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 11, 44 S.Ct. 232; Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 433, 44 S.Ct. 396. The jurisdiction extends also to the adjudication of questions respecting the title. White v. Schloerb, , 20 S.Ct. 1007; In re Eppstein (C.C.A.) 156 F. 42, 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 465. Compare Wabash Railroad v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S 38, 54, 28 S.Ct. 182; Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 153, 49 S.Ct. 84. 7
[Page 291 U.S. 610, 617]
lation of Congress. The power is expressly reserved to the bankruptcy court in Judicial Code 265 (28 USCA 379), which contains the general prohibition against staying proceedings in state courts. Nor is this power of the bankruptcy court affected by section 23(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 552, 11 USCA 46(a), which declares: 'The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction of all controversies at law and in equity, as distinguished from proceedings in bankruptcy, between trustees as such and adverse claimants concerning the property acquired or claimed by the trustees, in the same manner and to the same extent only as though bankruptcy proceedings had not been instituted and such controversies had been between the bankrupts and such adverse claimants.'
That section relates only to suits in which the trustees are plaintiffs. It has no restrictive effect on the right of trustees or receivers to protect their possession or title through proceedings in the bankruptcy court. [Footnote 8]
[Page 291 U.S. 610, 619]
Compare Isaacs v. Hobbs Timber & Tie Co., 282 U.S. 734, 738, 739 S., 51 S.Ct. 270; Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382, 42 S.Ct. 349.11 It is sufficient that the extraordinary remedy of mandamus should be denied, because the trustees may by the common remedy of injunction prevent any interference with the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Compare Ex parte Park Square Automobile Station, 244 U.S. 412, 414, 37 S.Ct. 732; Ex parte Riddle, , 41 S.Ct. 370; Ex parte Krentler- Arnold Hinge Last Co., 286 U.S. 533, 52 S.Ct. 621. Moreover, the bankruptcy court might, in the exercise of its discretion, conclude that it is desirable to have the litigation proceed in the state court. [Footnote 12]
Rule discharged. Footnotes
Footnote 1 There is another defendant in the state court suit (Johnson) who did not join in the petition for removal. The allegations concerning him are not here material.
Footnote 2 All the stock of these corporations is owned by New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Railway Company; and nearly all of the latter's voting stock is owned by the Missouri Pacific.
Footnote 3 Judicial Code 33 as amended (28 USCA 76) provides: 'When any civil suit ... is commenced in any court of a State ... against any officer of the courts of the United States for or on account of any act done under color of his office or in the performance of his duties as such officer ... the said suit ... may at any time before the trial or final hearing thereof be removed for trial into the district court ... in the district where the same is pending.'
Footnote 4 The contract provided for an easement subject to forfeiture for nonuser for the purpose of an interurban railroad. 'Nonuser' is defined as failure to operate the railroad for 30 successive days; and 'operation' as involving a passenger schedule over which first-class coaches must run over the entire line by electric or gas engines on a regular schedule of at least one train not less than every two hours of each day from 6 o'clock a.m. until 12 o'clock midnight.
Footnote 5 See In re Patterson Lumber Co. (D.C.) 228 F. 916; Id. (D.C.) 247 F. 578; In re Lookout Mountain Co. (D.C.) 50 F.(2d) 421. As to railroads, see section 77 added to the Bankruptcy Act by Act of March 3, 1933, c. 204, 1, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474 (11 USCA 205).
Footnote 6 From the answer to the petition for removal filed by the investment company in the federal court it appears that, after the filing of the petition for removal, and before action thereon by the federal court, the investment company had moved in the state court to dismiss so much of the prayer in its suit as seeks an injunction against the trustees in their official capacity and the two railway companies; and that the state court granted the motion 'without prejudice to the plaintiff hereafter to seek such injunction against said defendant railway companies when and if they shall be discharged from jurisdiction and control of' the federal court for Eastern Missouri. We have no occasion to consider the effect of the amendment so far as concerns the right of removal.
Footnote 7 Whitney v. Wenman, 198 U.S. 539, 25 S.Ct. 778; In re Rochford (C.C.A.) 124 F. 182, 186; In re Moody (D.C.) 131 F. 525; Fidelity Trust v. Gaskell (C.C.A.) 195 F. 865; In re Dialogue (D.C.) 241 F. 290; cases in note 8, infra.
Footnote 8 J.I. Case Plow Works v. Finks (C.C.A.) 81 F. 529; In re McCallum (D. C.) 113 F. 393; In re Lipman (D.C.) 201 F. 169; In re Williams (D.C.) 53 F.( 2d) 486.
Footnote 9 See, also, New River Coal Co. v. Ruffner Bros. (C.C.A.) 165 F. 881; Dickinson v. Willis (D.C.) 239 F. 171.
Footnote 10 Compare Buckhannon & N.R. Co. v. Davis (C.C.A.) 135 F. 707, 711; Love v. Louisville R. Co. (C.C.) 178 F. 507; Dickinson v. Willis (D.C.) 239 F. 171; Field v. Kansas City Refining Co. (C.C.A.) 296 F. 800; Id. (C. C.A.) 9 F.(2d) 213.
Footnote 11 Compare In re Zehner (D.C.) 193 F. 787; First Trust Co. v. Baylor ( C.C.A.) 1 F.(2d) 24, 27. See note 12, infra.
Footnote 12 McHenry v. La Socie te Francaise, 95 U.S. 58; In re Johnson (D.C.) 127 F. 618; In re Zehner (D.C.) 193 F. 787; First Trust Co. v. Baylor (C.C.A.) 1 F.(2d) 24, 27; In re Schulte-United (D.C.) 50 F.(2d) 243; In re Gas Products Co. (D.C.) 57 F.(2d) 342; compare In re Schermerhorn (C.C.A.) 145 F. 341; In re Locust Bldg. (D.C.) 272 F. 988; Field v. Kansas City Refining Co. (C.C.A.) 296 F. 800; Id. (C.C.A.) 9 F.( 2d) 213.
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