U.S. Supreme Court, (December 14, 1938)
Docket number: 182, 183
/us/305/364/case.html
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir. - Notice: D.C. Circuit Local Rule 11(C) States that Unpublished Orders, Judgments, and Explanatory Memoranda May Not Be Cited as Precedents, But Counsel May Refer To Unpublished Dispositions When the Binding or Preclusive Effect of the Disposition, Rather Than Its Quality as Precedent, is Relevant. Richard C. Schleck, Trading as Brook Industrial Park, Petitioner, v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent., 953 F.2d 688 (D.C. Cir. 1992) Judgments, and Explanatory Memoranda May Not Be Cited as Precedents, But Counsel May Refer To Unpublished Dispositions When the Binding or Preclusive Effect of the Disposition, Rather Than Its Quality as Precedent, is Relevant. Richard C. Schleck, Trading as Brook Industrial Park, Petitioner, v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir. - National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner v. Wilder Mfg. Co., Inc., Respondent Textile Workers Union of America, Intervenor., 454 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1972) Petitioner v. Wilder Mfg. Co., Inc., Respondent Textile Workers Union of America, Intervenor.
U.S. Supreme Court FORD MOTOR CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 305 U.S. 364 (1939)
[Page 305 U.S. 364, 370] and the jurisdiction of the court has attached, no separate proceeding is needed on the part of the person thus brought into the court. The breadth of the jurisdiction conferred upon the court to set aside or modify in whole or in part the Board's order, or to permit new evidence to be taken, necessarily implies that the party proceeded against is entitled to raise all pertinent questions and to obtain any affirmative relief that is appropriate. Here, petitioner in the Board's proceeding had sought affirmative relief and had taken steps to establish that right. Considering the scope and purpose of the jurisdiction of the court in a proceeding under Section 10(e), and the position and rights of the person proceeded against, we are unable to conclude that the Board has an absolute right to withdraw its petition at its pleasure. We think that permission to withdraw must rest in the sound discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the circumstances of the particular case. [Footnote 3] [Page 305 U.S. 364, 373] It is familiar appellate practice to remand causes for further proceedings without deciding the merits, where justice demands that course in order that some defect in the record may be supplied. [Footnote 4] Such a remand may be made to permit further evidence to be taken or additional findings to be made upon essential points. [Footnote 5] So, when a District Court has not made findings in accordance with our controlling rule (Equity Rule 70 1/2, 28 U. S.C.A. following section 723) it is our practice to set aside the decree and remand the cause for further proceedings. [Footnote 6] The jurisdiction to review the orders of the Labor Relations Board is vested in a court with equity powers, and while the court must act within the bounds of the statute and without intruding upon the administrative province, it may adjust its relief to the exigencies of the case in accordance with the equitable principles governing judicial action. The purpose of the judicial review is consonant with that of the administrative proceeding itself,-to secure a just result with a minimum of technical requirements. The statute with respect to a judicial review of orders of the Labor Relations Board follows closely the statutory provisions in relation to the orders of the Federal Trade Commission, and as to the latter it is well established that the court may remand the cause to the Commission for further proceedings to the end that valid and essential findings may be made. Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568, 580, 583 S., 43 S.Ct. 210, 214; International Shoe Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U.S. 291, 297, 50 S.Ct. 89, 91; Federal Trade Commission v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 218, 53 S.Ct. 335, 337; Procter [Page 305 U.S. 364, 376] What findings or order would thus be made became a matter of conjecture and in any event these and the manner of arriving at them would be subject to any justified criticism. As the substantial question is presented by the order of June 10th, the writ of certiorari in No. 182 is dismissed. The order of June 10th in No. 183 is affirmed. It is so ordered. Writ of certiorari in No. 182 dismissed and order in 183 affirmed. Mr. Justice ROBERTS did not hear the argument and took no part in the consideration and decision of this case. Footnotes Footnote 1 Section 10(d), provides:'(d) Until a transcript of the record in a case shall have been filed in a court, as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any time, upon reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or order made or issued by it'. Footnote 2 Section 10(f) provides:'(f) Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole on in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any circuit court of appeals of the United States in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in ... by filing in such court a written petition praying that the order of the Board be modified or set aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith served upon the Board, and thereupon the aggrieved party shall file in the court a transcript of the entire record in the proceeding, certified by the Board, including the pleading and testimony upon which the order complained of was entered and the findings and order of the Board. Upon such filing, the court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case of an application by the Board under subsection (e), and shall have the same exclusive jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board: and the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall in like manner be conclusive'. Footnote 3 See Cooper v. I ewis, 2 Phillips, Ch. 177, 181; Bank v. Rose, 1 Rich Eq., S.C., 292, 294; Stevens v. The Railroads, C.C., 4 F. 97, 105; Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Union Rolling Mill Co., , 713-715, 3 S.Ct. 594, 600-602; City of Detroit v. Detroit City Rwy. Co., C.C., 55 F. 569, 572, 573; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Central Transportation Co., 171 U.S. 138, 146, 18 S.Ct. 808, 811; Ex parte Skinner & Eddy Corporation, 265 U.S. 86, 93, 94 S., 44 S.Ct. 446, 447, 448; United Motor Service v. Tropic Aire, 8 Cir.,Try vLex for FREE for 3 days
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