Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors of Jefferson Cty., 282 U.S. 19 (1930)

U.S. Supreme Court, (November 24, 1930)

Docket number: 11

/us/282/19/case.html
Permanent Link: http://supreme.vlex.com/vid/klein-tax-supervisors-jefferson-cty-20016539
Id. vLex: VLEX-20016539

Click here to download this article in graphic format (Acrobat Reader)

Document language

Request manual translation

Search in this document

Document options

Cited by:

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Cir. - in the Matter of Beck Industries, Inc., in Proceedings for the Reorganization of a Corporation, Debtor. Jack Feldman Et Al., Appellants, v. Trustees of Beck Industries, Inc., Appellees., 479 F.2d 410 (2nd Cir. 1973)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Cir. - James J. Boyle and Katherine Boyle, His Wife, Annie Egner and Fred Egner, Her Husband, Catherine B. Kip and Edward Kip, Her Husband, Joseph Keane and Hudson County National Bank, Executors of the Estate of Regina T. Boyle, Deceased, James Mcmahon, James Boyle and Hudson County National Bank, Executors of the Estate of John F. Boyle, Jr., Deceased, Appellants, v. United States of America., 355 F.2d 233 (3rd Cir. 1966)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Cir. - in the Matter of Parkview-Gem, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Debtor. Parkview-Gem, Inc., Appellee, v. Sam Stein Et Al., Appellants., 516 F.2d 807 (8th Cir. 1975)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Cir. - Frederick H. Foglesong, Elizabeth C. Foglesong, and Frederick H. Foglesong Co., Inc., Petitioners-Appellants, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee., 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980)

U.S. Supreme Court - Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Cir. - Sidney S. Arst Co., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, Defendant-Third/Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael Rand Arst and Donald Takacs, Third/Party Defendants-Appellees., 25 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 1994)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Cir. - E. Keith Owens, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee., 568 F.2d 1233 (6th Cir. 1977)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Cir. - Darlene Miller and Jr'S Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc., an Indiana Corporation; and Glen Theatre, Inc., an Indiana Corporation, Gayle Sutro, and Carla Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Civil City of South Bend, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees., 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990)

See all citations to this document

Text:

U.S. Supreme Court KLEIN v. BOARD OF TAX SUP'RS OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, KY., 282 U.S. 19 (1930)

282 U.S. 19

KLEIN v. BOARD OF TAX SUP'RS OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, KY. No. 11. Argued Oct. 29, 30, 1930. Decided Nov. 24, 1930.

Messrs. Edmund F. Trabue and Homer W. Batson, both of Louisville, Ky., for appellant.

Messrs. M. B. Holifield, of Mayfield, Ky., and Samuel B. Kirby, Jr., of Louisville, Ky., for appellee.[ Klein v. Board of Tax Sup'rs of Jefferson County, Ky. 282 U.S. 19 (1930) ]

[Page 282 U.S. 19, 24]

reasonable effort to do justice to all in view of the way all our other assessments are made.'

The appellant, pursuing his notion that shares of stock represent an interest in the property of the corporation insists that if taxed at all he should be taxed only in the ratio of the property in the State of the entire property of the corporation; that to tax him for the whole value is to tax property outside of the jurisdiction of the State. But it leads nowhere to call a corporation a fiction. If it is a fiction it is a fiction created by law with intent that it should be acted on as if true. The corporation is a person and its ownership is a nonconductor that makes it impossible to attribute an interest in its property to its members. Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U.S. 267, 273, 28 S. Ct. 288. The stockholders in some circumstances can call on the corporation to account, but that is a very different thing from having an interest in the property by means of which the corporation is enabled to settle the account. The principle of justice that leads to the exemption that has been dealt with could not be insisted upon as a matter of constitutional right and it is reasonable for the legislature to confine it to well marked cases, rather than to press it to a logical extreme. Of course it does not matter here that in an earlier year the exemption was greater than now.

It in alleged as a distinct point of objection, though perhaps less earnestly pressed, that appellant's stock was assessed at its full selling price whereas land was taxed at seventy-five per cent of its sale value. There is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment that requires land and stock to be taxed at the same rate or by the same tests and the Court of Appeals thinks that the Board of Tax Commissioners 'judged that seventy-five per cent of the sale values represented about fairly the cash value of real estate.' Whether this be so or not we see no constitutional ground for complaint.

Judgment affirmed.