Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co., 306 U.S. 516 (1939)
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U.S. Supreme Court LOWDEN v. SIMONDS-SHIELDS-LONSDALE GRAIN CO., 306 U.S. 516 (1939)
[Page 306 U.S. 516, 517]
Messrs. Hale Houts, Dean Wood, Charles M. Miller, and Cyrus Crane, all of Kansas City, Mo., for petitioners.
Mr. Melville W. Borders, Jr., of Kansas City, Mo., for respondent.
Mr. Justice REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is here on certiorari to review the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirming a judgment of the district court for the respondent. Certiorari was granted for consideration of a federal question of substance, to wit, whether a carrier's charges for services, actually utilized by a shipper and authorized by a tariff requiring prior arrangements for the services, are uncollectable when the services are rendered on orders, preceded or accompanied by denials of legal liability. 305 U.S. 587, 59 S.Ct. 103, 83 L.Ed. --. Substantial conflict was alleged. [Footnote 1]
[Page 306 U.S. 516, 520]
in the district court to $.60 per car and asked judgment for $374.40.
The district court gave judgment for the respondent. Simonds-Shields- Lonsdale Grain Co. v. Lowden, D.C., 19 F.Supp. 438. The circuit court of appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. 8 Cir.,
The ruling of the Interstate Commerce Commission determines that the installation is a duty of the shipper and that the carrier can only receive sixty cents when it acts for the shipper in performing that duty. These are the essential provisions of the tariff. To facilitate the rendition of the service prior arrangements are required. The dominant elements are the responsibility for and the amount of the charge. These are fixed by the tariff. The letter of July 2, 1935, from the shippers required the installation of the grain doors and the respective orders for the separate cars, given thereafter, were given in the light of this demand for cars so equipped. We think this was an arrangement under the tariff. On July 2, 1935, the respondent clearly signified its desire for cars fully coopered and ready for loading. Its letter of that date was an unconditional request for the petitioners' services for a sufficiently specified period of time-'from and after July 1, 1935.' The announcement that respondent would decline to pay for them in no way qualified the request for tariff services, and cannot now stave off liability. The petitioners could disregard this advance disclaimer of liability and rely upon the courts to enforce observance of the tariff. Until changed, tariffs bind both carriers and shippers with the force of law. [Footnote 4] Under Section 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act the carrier cannot deviate from the rate specified in the tariff for any service in connection with the transportation of property. [Footnote 5] That section for
[Page 306 U.S. 516, 521]
bids the carrier from giving a voluntary rebate in any shape or form. This Court has had occasion recently to sustain action of the Commission aimed at carriers' practices resulting in collection of less than the tariff rate. [Footnote 6] It is equally important to aid the efforts of a carrier in collecting published charges in full. [Footnote 7] Involuntary rebates from tariff rates should be viewed with the same disapproval as voluntary rebates.
The respondent suggests that the suit must fail because based upon a tariff held by the Interstate Commerce Commission 'unreasonable and unlawful.' The Commission did not hold that tariff unlawful or wholly unreasonable. It clearly recognized the validity of a tariff charge for installation services rendered by carriers at the request of shippers, but found $1.00 per car unreasonable to the extent that it exceeded $.60. It awarded reparation to those who has paid $1.00 per car and authorized the carriers to waive collection of the amount over $.60 per car from shippers who had not paid. [Footnote 8] The only relief afforded respondent by the Commission's decision is a right to reparation for all payments over $.60 per car. [Footnote 9] The voluntary reduction of their claim by the petitioners is a sensible adjustment of their right to recover the tariff charge and of their obligation to make reparation to the extent that it is unreasonable.
It is unnecessary to consider various other contentions made by both the petitioners and the respondent.
Judgment reversed. Footnotes
Footnote 1 Cf. Wabash R. Co., v. Horn, 7 Cir.,
Footnote 2 28 U.S.C. 41(8), 28 U.S.C.A. 41(8). 'The district courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: ... Eighth. Of all suits and proceedings arising under any law regulating commerce.' See Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Rice, 247 U.S. 201, 203, 38 S.Ct. 429.
Footnote 3 Three commissioners dissented. The decision of the Commission is part of the record. A. J. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co., 236 U.S. 662, 664, 35 S.Ct. 444; cf. Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R ., 222 U.S. 506, 511, 512 S., 32 S.Ct. 114, 116.
Footnote 4 Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 222 U.S. 506, 509, 32 S.Ct. 114, 115; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Co., 230 U.S. 184, 197, 33 S.Ct. 893, 896, Ann.Cas.1915A, 315.
Footnote 5 Act of Feb. 4, 1887, 24 Stat. 379, 381, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 6(7 ), 49 U.S.C.A. 6(7).
Footnote 6 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, , 59 S.Ct. 284, January 3, 1939.
Footnote 7 Cf. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Fink, 250 U.S. 577, 40 S. Ct. 27; New York Cent. & H. Riv. R. Co. v. York & Whitney Co., 256 U.S. 406, 41 S.Ct. 509.
Footnote 8 Chicago Board of Trade v. Abilene & S.R. Co., 220 I.C.C. 753, 769.
Footnote 9 Cf. A. J. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co., 236 U.S. 662, 665, 35 S.Ct. 444, 445; Arizona Grocerty Co. v. Atchison T. & S.F. R. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 384, 52 S.Ct. 183, 184.
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