U.S. Supreme Court NATIONAL LABOR R. BOARD v. COLUMBIAN E. & STAMPING CO., INC., 306 U.S. 292 (1939)

[Page 306 U.S. 292, 302]

was to arrange a meeting between the company and the Union in order to bring about collective bargaining; that the president agreed with the conciliators to meet the Union and the conciliators at a date to be set; but that several days thereafter (when the company had obtained other employees and was operating under the protection of the militia) the president--again acting for the company-called the conciliators and flatly refused to meet further with them or the Union. The Court finds only a single link missing in the chain of evidence showing that the company refused to bargain with the Union, i.e., that there was no evidence to justify the Board's finding that the president of the company was aware the conciliators had approached the company at the request of the Union. But the 'courts cannot pick and choose bits of evidence to make findings of fact contrary to the findings of' an administrative body. [Footnote 2] And the story in this record discloses a broad basis for the inference that the company did know it was actually refusing the Union's request.

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evoke, and should not require, punctilious observance of legalistic formalities and social exactness in discussions relative to the settlement of the strike. It is difficult to imagine that-during several hours of conversation between the conciliators and the company's president concerning a future meeting of Union and company-the conciliators refrained from reference to the Union's request that the conciliators arrange such a future meeting. In a realistic view, the company's statement of July 23 to the conciliators, that it would meet with them and the Union, clearly indicated the company's acceptance of the fact that the conciliators were appearing for the Union. The company's declaration to the conciliators, several days later, that it would not meet with the Union or the conciliators, equally represents the company's recognition and acceptance of the fact that the conciliators were a means of dealing with the Union.

Not only did the Labor Board find the evidence sufficient to show that the company refused to bargain with the Union on or about July 23, but the court below reached the same conclusion. The rule is well settled that findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts will not 'be disturbed unless plainly without support.' [Footnote 3] This rule equally applies when an administrative body and a lower court-as here-concur on findings of fact,4 and the rule is even more persuasive where, as in the Act creating the Labor Board, it is provided that 'The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.' The majority opinion5 of the Court of Appeals in this case said:

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'There shall be no stoppage of work by either party to this contract, pending decision by the Committee of Arbitration.' Solely because it believed the Union had violated its contract, the court below declined to enforce the Board's order, and held that the company could not be made responsible for its own violation of the Act.

In this, I believe the court below was in error. A disagreement over the terms of a contract governing employer-employee relations is a labor dispute within the terms of the Act. Such a disagreement can-as it did here-produce industrial strife which the Act was expressly designed to prevent. Had Congress provided that violation of a private contract would deprive employees and the public of the benefits of the law, a different question would be presented. But Congress did not so provide and, in addition, the Union did not violate its contract. It contracted not to strike 'pending decision by the Committee of Arbitration' but there was no decision 'pending.' There was no arbitration pending because the company would not arbitrate. If the contract was broken, it was the company-not the Union-that broke it.

I believe the judgment of the court below should be reversed and that the Board's order should be enforced.

Mr. Justice REED joins in this dissent. Footnotes

Footnote 1 National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc ., 303 U.S. 261, 271, 58 S.Ct. 571, 576, 115 A.L.R. 307.

Footnote 2 Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112, 117, 58 S.Ct. 113, 115, 116; Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Co., 291 U.S. 67, 73, 54 S.Ct. 315, 318; cf., Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 314, 54 S.Ct. 423, 427.

Footnote 3 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 178, 58 S.Ct. 849, 851; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 14, 47 S.Ct. 1, 6; Virginian Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 542, 57 S.Ct. 592, 596.

Footnote 4 Illinois Central, etc., Railroad v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 206 U.S. 441, 466, 27 S.Ct. 700, 709.

Footnote 5 Three judges sat in the court below. One wrote the opinion for the majority; the second judge concurred in the conclusion of that opinion; the third judge dissented but expressly found that there was evidence to support the findings that the company refused to bargain collectively with its employees.

Footnote 6 'In any case in which a satisfactory settlement of a dispute arising under this contract cannot be reached, such dispute shall be referred to a Committee of Arbitration composed of two persons selected by the Management, two persons selected by the Union, and fifth person to be selected by these four, who shall reach a decision which shall be final and binding upon both parties to this contract. There shall be no stoppage of work by either party to this contract, pending decision by the Committee of Arbitration.'