United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1 <I>(per curiam)</I> (1976)

U.S. Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. MORRISON, 429 U.S. 1 (1976) 429 U.S. 1

[Page 429 U.S. 1, 2]

the ground that the search of his car violated the Fourth Amendment. He waived his right to a jury trial. The motion to suppress was heard during the trial on the merits, and the District Court denied the motion to suppress and found the respondent guilty as charged.

Approximately three months later, we held that a warrantless roving patrol search of vehicles for aliens, conducted without probable cause at a point removed from the border or its functional equivalent, violated the Fourth Amendment. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit thereafter held that Almeida-Sanchez should be applied retroactively and that its rationale encompasses searches conducted at fixed traffic checkpoints. United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353 (1973); United States v. Maddox, 485 F.2d 361 (1973).

Respondent's original motion to suppress was then reconsidered by the District Court[Footnote 1] in the light of King, supra, and Maddox, supra, and the following order was entered:

"[I]t is hereby

"ORDERED that the marihuana which is the subject matter of the charge herein shall be and is hereby suppressed.

"The Court will take appropriate action consistent with this Order if this Order is not appealed by the United States of America or if this Order is affirmed on appeal."

Thereupon the Government appealed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3731.[Footnote 2] While this appeal was pending in the

[Page 429 U.S. 1, 3]

Court of Appeals, we held in Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), that Almeida-Sanchez was not to be applied retroactively to Border Patrol searches conducted prior to June 21, 1973. After the Government moved for summary reversal of the District Court's suppression order, the Court of Appeals, without benefit of briefing or oral argument, dismissed the Government's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that double jeopardy would bar a retrial. The court, citing United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), felt that double jeopardy would bar because further proceedings involving "the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged . . ." would be required.

We cannot agree. In United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), we held:

"[W]hen a judge rules in favor of the defendant after a verdict of guilty has been entered by the trier of fact, the Government may appeal from that ruling without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id., at 352-353.

[Page 429 U.S. 1, 5]