United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936)

U.S. Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. WOOD, 299 U.S. 123 (1936)

299 U.S. 123

UNITED STATES v. WOOD.* No. 34. Argued Oct. 20, 1936. Decided Dec. 7, 1936.

* Rehearing denied 299 U.S. 624, 57 S.Ct. 319, 81 L.Ed. --.[ United States v. Wood 299 U.S. 123 (1936) ]

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corporation. On his trial twelve prospective jurors were called. Their examination showed that one was the holder of a 'bonus certificate'; others were employed as clerks in governmental departments, one in the United States Weather Bureau, another in the Federal Emergency Administration, a third in the Treasury Department, and a fourth in the Navy Yard. Another prospective juror was a housewife who received a Civil War pension. Each of these persons was challenged for cause upon the ground of interest in the United States government. The challenge was disallowed. Counsel for defendant then exhausted his three peremptory challenges and when the jury was finally selected there remained as jurors, despite a reiterated challenge for cause, the recipient of the Civil War pension and the two clerks employed in the Treasury Department and the Navy Yard respectively.

The action of the trial court was taken under the Act of August 22, 1935, which provides that persons of this description shall be eligible for jury service. [Footnote 1] On appeal,

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polls, for disqualification of a juror. Challenges to the polls were either 'principal' or 'to the favor,' the former being upon grounds of absolute disqualification, the latter for actual bias. The government quotes the statements of early commentators from Fitzherbert to Hargrave, indicating that a principal challenge was not allowed in crown cases upon the ground that the prospective juror was a servant of the crown, and that a challenge for that reason, if permitted at all, was to the favor. [Footnote 2] The government reviews the early cases in support of this conclusion. [Footnote 3] It is not necessary to set forth these authorities in detail as there seems to be no controversy as to their purport. We give in the margin the analysis presented by respondent's counsel. [Footnote 4] Their re sume is as follows:

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not challengeable, as that 'he should favor the King by reason of his obedience';5 or, as put by Lord Coke, 'because in respect of his allegiance he ought to favor the king more.' [Footnote 6] Hargrave, expressing dissatisfaction with the reason assigned by Lord Coke, observed: 'But a better principle to found the rule upon was not unobvious; namely, that from the extensive variety of the king's connections with his subjects through tenures and offices, if favour to him was to prevail as an exception to a juror, it might lead to an infinitude of objections, and so operate as a serious obstruction to justice in suits in which he is a party.' [Footnote 7] The discussion of the reason for the rule affirms its existence.

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It will be observed that the employment was in the very department to the affairs of which the alleged conspiracy related. But the decision took a broader range and did not rest upon that possible distinction. The Court was not aided by a careful or comprehensive presentation of the English precedents and it was not shown that the courts of Maryland had passed upon the point. The above-mentioned statement of Blackstone was cited for the proposition 'that one is not a competent juror in a case if he is master, servant, steward, counsellor or attorney of either party.' The Court also cited the decision in Block v. State, 100 Ind. 357, 362, which was said to follow that rule of the common law. In that case the juror was a deputy of the prosecuting attorney. The latter, as the state court said, 'was, by analogy and for all practical purposes, the plaintiff in the prosecution' and the deputy 'had become and was the employee and subordinate of the prosecuting attorney' and therefore 'impliedly biased' ( Id., 100 Ind. 357, at page 364).8 In the Crawford Case this Court also referred to the decisions cited in the dissenting opinion in the court below (30 App.D.C. 1, at page 33) to the effect that 'a clerk or employee of a private party or of a corporation is not qualified to sit as a juror,' and it was said that while the cases cited were civil cases, the rule applied to criminal cases as well. [Footnote 9] The rule

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as effective in the case of felonies as in that of misdemeanors. Id., 281 U.S. 276, at page 309, 50 S.Ct. 253, 262, 70 A.L.R. 263.

The Sixth Amendment does not preclude legislation making women qualified to serve as jurors in criminal prosecutions although that was not permitted at common law. Tynan v. United States (C.C.A.) 297 F. 177, 178, 179; Hoxie v. United States (C.C.A.) 15 F.(2d) 762. Although aliens are within the protection of the Sixth Amendment, the ancient rule under which an alien might have a trial by jury de medietate linguae, 'one half denizens and the other aliens'-in order to insure impartiality-no longer obtains. [Footnote 10] Congress has reduced the number of peremptory challenges of the accused. This number which was 'settled by the common law' at thirty-five and fixed by the statute 22 Hen. VIII, c. 14, at twenty (4 Bl.Com. 354) has been reduced in the case of felonies, other than treason or capital offences, to ten. 28 U.S.C. 424 (28 U.S.C.A. 424) Code D.C., tit. 6, 366. In Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586, 40 S.Ct. 28, 29, 30, we said on this point: 'There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured. The number of challenges is left to be regulated by the common law or the enactments of Congress.' And the same was held to be true of the authority of Congress to treat several defendants, for this purpose, as one party. It is not necessary to multiply illustrations of the familiar principle which while safeguarding the essence of the constitutional requirements permits readjustments of procedure consistent with their spirit and purpose.

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tude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula. State courts enforcing similar requirements of state constitutions as to trial by jury have held that legislatures enjoy a reasonable freedom in establishing qualifications for jury service, although these involve a departure from common law rules. This principle was thus stated by the Court of Appeals of New York in Stokes v. People, 53 N.Y. 164, 173, 13 Am. Rep. 492: 'While the Constitution secures the right of trial by an impartial jury, the mode of procuring and impaneling such jury is regulated by law, either common or statutory, principally the latter, and it is within the power of the legislature to make, from time to time, such changes in the law as it may deem expedient, taking care to preserve the right of trial by an impartial jury.' And in Brown v. State, 62 N.J. Law, 666, 678, 42 A. 811, 814, the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey enunciated the same doctrine: 'The provision in our constitution (article 1, 8) that the accused should have a right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury, secured to the accused a right to a trial by an impartial jury, by an express constitutional provision. The means by which an impartial jury should be obtained are not defined. In neither of the constitutional provisions on this subject is there any requirement with respect to challenges, or to the qualifications of jurors, or the mode in which the jury shall be selected. These subjects were left in the discretion of the legislature, with no restriction or limitation, except that the accused should have the right to be tried by an impartial jury.'

One of the grounds of principal challenge at common law was that a juror was 'related to either party within the ninth degree, though it is only by marriage.' [Footnote 11] It appears that this restriction has been reduced in a num-

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ber of states to degrees from the third to the sixth. [Footnote 12] The common-law rule with respect to jurors who have formed an opinion upon the subject of the controversy has been liberalized by legislation which meets the essential condition of impartiality while taking account of modern conditions. [Footnote 13] The disqualification of taxpayers in cases where a municipality is interested has been removed by statute in may states. [Footnote 14] In Commonwealth v. Reed, 1 Gray (Mass.) 472, the court held that action of that sort was not a violation of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights ( Const. pt. 1, art. 29) securing to every citizen 'the right to be tried by judges as free, impartial and independent, as the lot of humanity will admit.' The court thought that an exemption 'from an interest which is only theoretic or imaginary, or which is so remote and trifling and insignificant, that it may fairly be supposed to be incapable of affecting the judgment or of influencing the conduct of an individual, is not essential.' And referring to the particular contention as to the interest of a taxpayer of a town in the penalties demanded, the court added: 'Such an interest as arises from that cause is remote and minute; and it may well devolve upon the legislature to determine if it ought to disable an otherwise impartial citizen from serving in the capacity of a juror. The rule established by such authority must, in general, be the guide by which courts of law will be controlled.'

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absolute disqualification of governmental employees to serve as jurors in criminal cases is essential to the impartiality of the jury. The government stresses the factual situation in the District of Columbia before the enactment of the statute before us. Respondent replies that a large proportion of governmental employees are in any event disqualified because of legal residence elsewhere. But after making every allowance for that class, it is still true that in the District of Columbia there is a numerous body of persons15 who, except for the fact of governmental employment, would be eligible for service as jurors and whose service, by reason of their intelligence and character, would be highly desirable. That fact is emphasized by the congressional committees which recommended the passage of the act. [Footnote 16] They stated, after referring to the exemptions then existing: 'These exemptions take from those who would otherwise be qualified some of the best jurymen available and makes the empanneling of a jury much more difficult.' The bill was recommended by the bar association of the district, by the district commissioners and by the corporation counsel. [Footnote 17] It is manifest that the act was passed to meet a public need and that no interference with the actual impartiality of the jury was contemplated. The enactment itself is tantamount to a legislative declaration that

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cient rule or because of a conclusive presumption of bias against an accused, would constitute a serious reproach to the competency and efficiency of the administration of the system of jury trials.

What has been said applies with equal force to the provisions of the statute qualifying those who receive governmental pensions and gratuities.

Fourth. Respondent also raises the question of the validity of the statute under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. For the reasons already given, we find nothing arbitrary or capricious in the legislative action.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

REVERSED.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS, Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND, and Mr. Justice BUTLER are of opinion that the case is controlled by our decision in Crawford v. United States, , 29 S.Ct. 260, 15 Ann.Cas. 392, and that the rule there laid down should not now be departed from. They think the opinion of the court below is sound, and that its judgment should be affirmed.

Mr. Justice STONE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Footnotes

Footnote 1 The provision is as follows:'All executive and judicial officers of the Government of the United States and of the District of Columbia, all officers and enlisted men of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard of the United States in active service, those connected with the police and fire departments of the United States and of the District of Columbia, counselors and attorneys at law in actual practice, ministers of the gospel and clergymen of every denomination, practicing physicians and surgeons, keepers of hospitals, asylums, almshouses, or other charitable institutions created by or under the laws relating to the District of Columbia, captains and masters and other persons employed on vessels navigating the waters of the District of Columbia shall be exempt from jury duty, and their names shall not be placed on the jury lists.'All other persons, otherwise qualified according to law whether employed in the service of the Government of the United States or of the District of Columbia, all officers and enlisted men of the National Guard of the District of Columbia, both active and retired, all officers and enlisted men of the Military, Naval, Marine, and Coast Guard Reserve Corps of the United States, all notaries public, all postmasters and those who are the recipients or beneficiaries of a pension or other gratuity from the Federal or District Government or who have contracts with the United States or the District of Columbia, shall be qualified to serve as jurors in the District of Columbia and shall not be exempt from such service: Provided, That employees of the Government of the United States or of the District of Columbia in active service who are called upon to sit on juries shall not be paid for such jury service but their salary shall not be diminished during their term of service by virtue of such service, nor shall such period of service be deducted from any leave of absence authorized by law.'

This act amended the prior provision known as section 217 of the Code of Law for the District of Columbia approved March 3, 1901 (Code D.C.1929 tit. 18, 360), which provided:'Exemption from jury service.-All executive and judicial officers, salaried officers of the Government of the United States and of the District of Columbia, all officers and enlisted men of the National Guard for the District of Columbia, both active and retired, and those connected with the police or fire departments, counselors and attorneys at law in actual practice, ministers of the gospel and clergymen of every denomination, practicing physicians and surgeons, keepers of hospitals, asylums, almshouses, or other charitable institutions created by or under the laws relating to the District, captains and masters and other persons employed on vessels navigating the waters of the District shall be exempt from jury duty, and their names shall not be placed on the jury lists.'

Footnote 2 Fitzherbert, Abridgment, Challenge, 17, 63, 65, folios 172, 173 ( 1577 Ed.); Brooke, Abridgment, Challenge, 154, 155, folio 126; Staunforde, Pleas of the Crown, 162; Coke upon Littleton, I, 156a-156b; Hale, Pleas of the Crown, II, 271; Rolle, Abridgment, II, 645-646; Duncombe, Trials per Pais (9th Ed.) pp. 166, 167, 175, 189, 196, 203; Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, II, c. 43, 32, 33; Bacon, Abridgment, V, Juries, 355; Viner, Abridgments, XXI, Trial, 243; Hargrave's Coke upon Littleton, I, 156; Chitty, Criminal Law, I, 539.

Footnote 3 Year Books, 19 Ass. 62, pl. 6, 4 Henry VII, 8, P. pl. 6; 4 Henry VII, 3, H. pl. 5; King v. Jenney (1509) Keilw. 97, 72 Eng.Rpt. 261; Rex v. Genney (1508) Keilw. 102a, 72 Eng.Rpt. 266; Reg. v. Tutchin, 14 St.Tr. 1095, 1101 (1816 Ed.); Rex v. Hampden (1683) 9 St.Tr. 1054, 1057-1061; Rex v. Parkyns (1695) 13 St.Tr. 163; Rex v. Rowan (1793) 22 St.Tr. 1034, 1037- 1039; Rex v. Kirwan (1812) 31 St.Tr. 543; The King v. Edmonds (1821) 4 B. & Ald. 471, 106 Eng.Rpt. 1009; Reg. v. Lacey (1848) 3 Cox, Cr.C. 517, 519.

Footnote 4 Respondent's brief states: 'The following gives a rough analysis of the Government's authorities on the right to challenge a King's Servant:

Challenge Challenge "Author In Principal To Favor"Fitzherbert No Yes "Chief Justice Brooke No No "Staunforde No Yes "Coke No No "Lord Hale No Yes "Chief Justice Rolle No Yes "Duncombe No No "Hawkins Doubtful Doubtful "Matthew Bacon Doubtful Doubtful "Viner No Yes "Hargrave No No "Chitty Doubtful Yes

Footnote 5 Fitzherbert, op. cit. 63.

Footnote 6 Coke, op. cit. I, 156a.

Footnote 7 Hargrave, op. cit. I, 156.

Footnote 8 See, also, Zimmerman v. State, 115 Ind. 129, 17 N.E. 258; Gaff v. State, 155 Ind. 277, 58 N.E. 74, 80 Am.St.Rep. 235; Evans v. State, 13 Ga. App. 700, 79 S.E. 916; State v. Golubski (Mo.App.) 45 S.W.(2d) 873.

Footnote 9 But see as to various officers held to be qualified, when not found to have actual bias: Jackson v. State, 74 Ala. 26, 29 (coroner); Pate v. State, 158 Ala. 1, 3, 48 So. 388 (deputy sheriff); Spittorff v. State, 108 Ind. 171, 172, 8 N.E. 911 (bailiff); O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, 221, 222 (coroner); State v. Adams, 20 Iowa 486 (county supervisor); State v. McDonald, 59 Kan. 241, 244, 52 P. 453 (school district officers); State v. Carter, 106 La. 407, 30 So. 895 (constable); State v. Petit, 119 La. 1013, 44 So. 848 (deputy sheriff); State v. Foster, 150 La. 971, 985, 986, 91 So. 411 (deputy sheriff); Fellows' Case, 5 Me. 333, 334 (constable); State v. Wright, 53 Me. 328, 344, 345 (coroner); People v. Lange, 90 Mich. 454, 455, 51 N.W. 534 (justices of the peace); Classinger v. State, 24 Ohio St. 206 ( justice of the peace); State v. Cosgrove, 16 R.I. 411, 16 A. 900 ( constable); Burns v. State, 12 Tex.App. 269, 277, 278 (deputy sheriff); Mingo v. State, 61 Tex.Cr.R. 14, 15, 133 S.W. 882 (deputy sheriff); compare Chapman v. State, 66 Tex.Cr.R. 489, 491, 147 S.W. 580; State v. Parker, 104 Vt. 494, 497, 498, 162 A. 696 (deputy sheriff); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 45, 46, 13 S.E. 304 (city treasurer and councilman).

Footnote 10 See United States v. Cartacho, Fed.Cas.No.14,738; Respublica v. Mesca, 1 Dall. 73; People v. McLean, 2 Johns.(N.Y.) 381; Thompson & Merriam on Juries, 16, 17, and cases and statutes there cited.

Footnote 11 Chitty, op. cit. I, 541; Coke, op. cit. 157a; 3 Bl.Com. 363.

Footnote 12 See, for example, the provisions of state codes or general laws in Alabama, Code 1923, 8610; Arkansas, Crawford & Moses' Dig. 6334; Florida, Comp.Gen.Laws 1927, 4359; Indiana, Burns' Ann.St.1933, 9-1504, subd. 4; Louisiana, Code Prac. art. 507, subd. 1; Missouri, Mo.St.Ann. 8771, p. 4704; Tennessee, Code 1932, 10007; Vermont, P.L. 1237.

Footnote 13 See Stokes v. People, supra; Spies v. Illinois (Ex parte Spies), 123 U.S. 131, 167-169, 8 S.Ct. 21; Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433-435, 7 S.Ct. 614.

Footnote 14 Coke, op. cit. I, 157a, 157b; Wood v. Stoddard, 2 Johns.(N.Y.) 194; Diveny v. City of Elmira, 51 N.Y. 506, 509, 510; Thompson and Merriam, op. cit. 179.

Footnote 15 The court below estimates that 'in the District of Columbia more than a hundred thousand government employees will be qualified as jurors if the statute is valid.' 65 App.D.C. 330, 83 F.(2d) 587, page 592.

Footnote 16 H.R.Rep.No.1421; Sen.Rep.No.1297; 74th Cong., 1st sess.

Footnote 17 Cong.Rec., 74th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 79, pt. 12, p. 13401. The bill was drafted by a committee consisting of the president of the district bar association, the president of the Federation of Citizens' Associations, the chairman of the Traffic Committee of the Board of Trade, the president of the Federation of Civic Associations, a member of the Public Utilities Commission, and representatives of the district government. Sen.Rep.No. 1347.