Virginian R. Co. v. Railway Employees, 300 U.S. 515 (1937)
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U.S. Supreme Court VIRGINIAN RAILWAY CO. V. FEDERATION , 300 U.S. 515 (1937)
[Page 300 U.S. 515 , 540]
prevent its employees from exercising their right to choose their own representative; that for that purpose, following the certification, by the National Mediation Board, of the Federation, as the duly authorized representative of petitioner's mechanical department employees, petitioner had organized the Independent Shop Craft Association of its shop craft employees, and had sought to induce its employees to join the independent association, and to put it forward as the authorized representative of petitioner's employees. [Footnote 1]
[Page 300 U.S. 515 , 545]
It is, we think, not open to doubt that Congress intended that this requirement be mandatory upon the railroad employer, and that its command, in a proper case, be enforced by the courts. The policy of the Transportation Act of encouraging voluntary adjustment of labor disputes, made manifest by those provisions of the act which clearly contemplated the moral force of public opinion as affording its ultimate sanction, was, as we have seen, abandoned by the enactment of the Railway Labor Act. Neither the purposes of the later act, as amended, nor its provisions when read, as they must be, in the light of our decision in the Railway Clerks Case, supra, lend support to the contention that its enactments, which are mandatory in form and capable of enforcement by judicial process, were intended to be without legal sanction. [Footnote 3]
Experience had shown, before the amendment of 1934, that when there was no dispute as to the organizations authorized to represent the employees, and when there was willingness of the employer to meet such representative for a discussion of their grievances, amicable adjustment of differences had generally followed and strikes had been avoided. [Footnote 4] On the other hand, a prolific source of dispute had been the maintenance by the railroads of company unions and the denial by railway management
[Page 300 U.S. 515 , 553]
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 119, 121, 275, 276; Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 278, 170.
The decree is authorized by the statute and was granted in an appropriate exercise of the equity powers of the court.
Second. Constitutionality of section 2 of the Railway Labor Act (45 U. S.C.A. 151a, 152). (A) Validity Under the Commerce Clause. The power of Congress over interstate commerce extends to such regulations of the relations of rail carriers to their employees as are reasonably calculated to prevent the interruption of interstate commerce by strikes and their attendant disorders. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 347, 348, L.R.A.1917E, 938, Ann.Cas.1918A, 1024. The Railway Labor Act , 2 (45 U.S.C.A. 151a), declares that its purposes, among others, are 'to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein,' and 'to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.' The provisions of the act and its history, to which reference has been made, establish that such are its purposes, and that the latter is in aid of the former. What has been said indicates clearly that its provisions are aimed at the settlement of industrial disputes by the promotion of collective bargaining between employers and the authorized representative of their employees, and by mediation and arbitration when such bargaining does not result in agreement. It was for Congress to make the choice of the means by which its objective of securing the uninterrupted service of interstate railroads was to be secured, and its judgment, supported as it is by our long experience with industrial disputes, and the history of railroad labor relations, to which we have referred, is not open to review here. [Footnote 7] The means chosen are appro-
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or acts as may be expressly complained of in the bill of complaint or petition filed in such case and as shall be expressly included in * * * findings of fact made and filed by the court.' The evident purpose of this section, as its history and context show, was not to preclude mandatory injunctions, but to forbid blanket injunctions against labor unions, which are usually prohibitory in form, and to confine the injunction to the particular acts complained of and found by the court. We deem it unnecessary to comment on other similar objections, except to say that they are based on strained and unnatural constructions of the words of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and conflict with its declared purpose, section 2 ( 29 U.S.C.A. 102), that the employee 'shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.'
It suffices to say that the Norris-LaGuardia Act can affect the present decree only so far as its provisions are found not to conflict with those of section 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. 152, subd. 9), authorizing the relief which has been granted. Such provisions cannot be rendered nugatory by the earlier and more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See the Railway Clerks Case, supra, 281 U.S. 548, 571, 434; cf. Callahan v. United States, 285 U.S. 515, 518, 455; City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 22; International Alliance v. Rex Theatre Corp. (C.C.A.) 73 F.(2d) 92, 93.
Affirmed. Footnotes
[Footnote *] State Report Title: Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, Railway Employees Department of American Federation of Labor[ Virginian Railway Co. v. Federation (1937) ]
Footnote 1 The court found that after the certification by the Mediation Board 'the defendant, by and through its officers, agents and servants, undertook by means of the circulation of a petition or petitions addressed to the National Mediation Board to have the certification of the National Mediation Board aforesaid altered, changed or revoked so as to deprive its Mechanical Department employes of the right to representation by said System Federation No. 40, Railway Employes Department of the American Federation of Labor, so designated as aforesaid, and thereafter did cause to be organized the Independent Shop Crafts Association by individual Mechanical Department employes by circulating or causing to be circulated applications for membership in said Independent Shop Crafts Association notwithstanding the certification as aforesaid by the National Mediation Board of said System Federation No. 40, Railway Employes Department of the American Federation of Labor, as the authorized representative of its Mechanical Department employes, * * *'
Footnote 2 Section 2 of the act, as amended in 1934 (45 U.S.C.A. 151a), declares that its purposes, among others, are '(2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization' and '(3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this Act (chapter).' The section was also amended to provide that 'neither party shall in any way interfere with, influence, or coerce the other in its choice of representatives,' section 2, Third (45 U. S.C.A. 152, subd. 3), and that 'it shall be unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, or to use the funds of the carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor organization * * * or to influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce them to join or remain or not to join or remain members of any labor organization,' section 2, Fourth (45 U.S.C.A. 152, subd. 4).
Footnote 3 The 1934 amendment imposed various other obligations upon the carrier, to which criminal penalties were attached (section 2, Tenth (45 U. S.C.A. 152, subd. 10)) e.g., prohibitions against helping unions, by contributions of funds, or assistance in the collection of dues, section 2, Fourth (45 U.S.C.A. 152, subd. 4); against requiring employees to promise to join or not to join a labor union, section 2, Fifth (45 U.S.C.A . 152, subd. 5); against changing rates of pay, etc., without specifying a conference upon thirty days' notice, section 2, Seventh (45 U.S.C.A. 152, subd. 7); and see the requirement that the carrier post notices that all disputes will be determined in accordance with the act, section 2, Eighth (45 U.S.C.A. 152, subd. 8).
Footnote 4 In the first two years after the enactment of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 363 cases concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions were submitted to the United States Board of Mediation, and about 25 per cent. of these were withdrawn by the parties. Yet, during the same period, more than 600 direct and voluntary settlements were negotiated. See United States Board of Mediation, First Annual Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1927, pp. 10, 11; Second Annual Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1928, pp. 11, 58, 59. Compare National Mediation Board, Second Annual Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1936, at p. 1: 'For every dispute submitted to * * * these Boards, there were many others considered and settled in conferences between representatives of carriers and of the employees as required by section 2, second, of the Act.'
See, also, testimony of William M. Leiserson, Chairman of the National Mediation Board until February 1, 1937, at Hearing by National Labor Relations Board in the case of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (No. 419, October Term, 1936): 'If we have a threat of a strike now (on the railroads) it might be on a big fundamental question, like wages and hours, and we usually find we can settle those by arbitration or otherwise. * * * But if the issues involved were discrimination or discharge of men because they had joined the organization, or the question would be the right of the organization to represent them, we could not have settled those strikes.' See Governmental Protection of Labor's Right to Organize, National Labor Relations Board, Division of Economic Research, Bull. No. 1, August, 1936, pp. 17Ä18.
Footnote 5 See, also, statement by Representative Crosser, in charge of the bill on the floor, in Hearings, House Committee on Rules, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 9861, pp. 10Ä11, 13: 'The purpose of the bill is * * * ( inter alia) to outlaw the attempt that has been made in numerous instances by employers who control alleged labor unions, and thereby to use a slang phrase, to 'gum up the works'. * * * We have had 8 years of operation of this act, and we have prevented any strikes. But strikes have been threatened because of the defects which have been found in this bill.'
Under the 1926 act disputes over the designation of employee representatives could be dealt with by the old United States Mediation Board only by agreement of the parties. The carriers agreed to an election conducted by the Board but nine times in six years, see testimony of William M. Leiserson, Chairman of National Mediation Board until February 1, 1937, at Hearing by National Labor Relations Board in the case of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (No. 419, October Term, 1936); Governmental Protection of Labor's Right to Organize, National Labor Relations Board, Division of Economic Research, Bull. No. 1, August, 1936, p. 50. The 1934 amendment was followed by a large increase in the number of representation disputes submitted to the National Mediation Board. See infra, Note 7.
Footnote 6 (Note 35a.) 'The Government interprets the negative obligations imposed by the statute and decree as having the following effect:'When the majority of a craft or class has (either by secret ballot or otherwise) selected a representative, the carrier cannot make with anyone other than the representative a collective contract (i.e., a contract which sets rates of pay, rules, or working conditions), whether the contract covers the class as a whole or a part thereof. Neither the statute nor the decree prevents the carrier from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring individuals on whatever terms the carrier may by unilateral action determine. In hirings of that sort the individual does not deal in a representative capacity with the carrier and the hiring does not set general rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. Of course, as a matter of voluntary action, not as a result of the statute or the decree, the carrier may contract with the duly designated representative to hire individuals only on the terms of a collective understanding between the carrier and the representative; but any such agreement would be entirely voluntary on the carrier's part and would in no sense be compelled.'If the majority of a craft or class has not selected a representative, the carrier is free to make with anyone it pleases and for any group it pleases contracts establishing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.'
Footnote 7 There was evidence available to Congress that the labor policy embodied in the Railway Labor Act had been successful in curbing strikes. In the eight years subsequent to the passage of the 1926 act, there were only two small railroad strikes. Since the 1934
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