Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 562 U.S. (2011)
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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010 NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 1
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (1989 version) requires, among other things, that auto manufacturers install seatbelts on the rear seats of passenger vehicles. They must install lap-and-shoulder belts on seatsnext to a vehicle's doors or frames. But they have a choiceabout what to install on rear inner seats (say, middle seatsor those next to a minivan's aisle). There they can installeither (1) simple lap belts or (2) lap-and-shoulder belts. 54Fed. Reg. 46257-46258 (1989); 49 CFR §571.208 (1993),promulgated pursuant to the National Traffic and MotorVehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act), 80 Stat. 718, 15 U. S. C.§1381 et seq. (1988 ed.) (recodified without substantivechange at 49 U. S. C. §30101 et seq. (2006 ed.)).The question presented here is whether this federalregulation pre-empts a state tort suit that, if successful,would deny manufacturers a choice of belts for rear innerseats by imposing tort liability upon those who choose toinstall a simple lap belt. We conclude that providingmanufacturers with this seatbelt choice is not a significantobjective of the federal regulation. Consequently, the 2 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. Opinion of the Court regulation does not pre-empt the state tort suit
I
In 2002, the Williamson family, riding in their 1993Mazda minivan, was struck head on by another vehicle.Thanh Williamson was sitting in a rear aisle seat, wearinga lap belt; she died in the accident. Delbert and AlexaWilliamson were wearing lap-and-shoulder belts; theysurvived. They, along with Thanh's estate, subsequentlybrought this California tort suit against Mazda. Theyclaimed that Mazda should have installed lap-and-shoulder belts on rear aisle seats, and that Thanh diedbecause Mazda equipped her seat with a lap belt instead.The California trial court dismissed this tort claim onthe basis of the pleadings. And the California Court ofAppeal affirmed. The appeals court noted that in Geier v.American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000), thisCourt considered whether a different portion of (an olderversion of) Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208(FMVSS 208)-a portion that required installation ofpassive restraint devices-pre-empted a state tort suitthat sought to hold an auto manufacturer liable for failureto install a particular kind of passive restraint, namely,airbags. We found that the federal regulation intended toassure manufacturers that they would retain a choice ofinstalling any of several different passive restraint devices. And the regulation sought to assure them that theywould not have to exercise this choice in favor of airbags.For that reason we thought that the federal regulationpre-empted a state tort suit that, by premising tort liability on a failure to install airbags, would have deprived themanufacturers of the choice that the federal regulationhad assured them. Id., at 874-875. The court saw considerable similarity between this caseand Geier. The federal regulation at issue here givesmanufacturers a choice among two different kinds of Opinion of the Court seatbelts for rear inner seats. And a state lawsuit thatpremises tort liability on a failure to install a particularkind of seatbelt, namely, lap-and-shoulder belts, would ineffect deprive the manufacturer of that choice. The courtconcluded that, as in Geier, the federal regulation preempts the state tort suit. 167 Cal. App. 4th 905, 84 Cal.Rptr. 3d 545 (2008). The Williamsons sought certiorari. And we grantedcertiorari in light of the fact that several courts haveinterpreted Geier as indicating that FMVSS 208 pre-emptsstate tort suits claiming that manufacturers should haveinstalled lap-and-shoulder belts, not lap belts, on rearinner seats. Carden v. General Motors Corp., 509 F. 3d227 (CA5 2007); Roland v. General Motors Corp., 881 N. E.2d 722 (Ind. App. 2008); Heinricher v. Volvo Car Corp., 61Mass. App. 313, 809 N. E. 2d 1094 (2004). II In Geier, we considered a portion of an earlier (1984)version of FMVSS 208. That regulation required manufacturers to equip their vehicles with passive restraintsystems, thereby providing occupants with automaticaccident protection. 49 Fed. Reg. 28983 (1984). But thatregulation also gave manufacturers a choice among several different passive restraint systems, including airbagsand automatic seatbelts. Id., at 28996. The questionbefore the Court was whether the Act, together with theregulation, pre-empted a state tort suit that would haveheld a manufacturer liable for not installing airbags. 529
U. S., at 865. By requiring manufacturers to install airbags (in order to avoid tort liability) the tort suit wouldhave deprived the manufacturers of the choice amongpassive restraint systems that the federal regulation gavethem. See Hillsborough County v. Automated MedicalLaboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 713 (1985) ("[S]tate lawscan be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by 3 4 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. Opinion of the Court federal statutes").We divided this basic pre-emption question into threesubsidiary questions. 529 U. S., at 867. First, we askedwhether the statute's express pre-emption provision preempted the state tort suit. That statutory clause says that"no State" may "establish, or . . . continue in effect . . . anysafety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance" of a motor vehicle or item of equipment "which is notidentical to the Federal standard." 15 U. S. C. §1392(d)(1988 ed.) (emphasis added). We had previously held thata word somewhat similar to "standard," namely, "requirements" (found in a similar statute) included within itsscope state "common-law duties," such as duties created bystate tort law. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 502-503 (1996) (plurality opinion); id., at 503-505 (BREYER, J.,concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at509-512 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissentingin part). But we nonetheless held that the state tort suitin question fell outside the scope of this particular preemption clause. That is primarily because the statute alsocontains a saving clause, which says that "[c]ompliancewith" a federal safety standard "does not exempt anyperson from any liability under common law." 15 U. S. C.§1397(k) (emphasis added). Since tort law is ordinarily"common law," we held that "the presence of the savingclause," makes clear that Congress intended state tortsuits to fall outside the scope of the express pre-emptionclause. Geier, 529 U. S., at 868. Second, we asked the converse question: The savingclause at least removes tort actions from the scope of theexpress pre-emption clause. Id., at 869. But does it domore? Does it foreclose or limit "the operation of ordinarypre-emption principles insofar as those principles instructus to read" federal statutes as pre-empting state laws(including state common-law standards) that "actuallyconflict" with the federal statutes (or related regulations)? Opinion of the Court Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). We concludedthat the saving clause does not foreclose or limit the operation of "ordinary pre-emption principles, grounded inlongstanding precedent." Id., at 874. These two holdings apply directly to the case before us.We here consider (1) the same statute, 15 U. S. C. §1381 etseq.; (2) a later version of the same regulation, FMVSS208; and (3) a somewhat similar claim that a state tortaction conflicts with the federal regulation. In light ofGeier, the statute's express pre-emption clause cannot preempt the common-law tort action; but neither can thestatute's saving clause foreclose or limit the operation ofordinary conflict pre-emption principles. We consequentlyturn our attention to Geier's third subsidiary question,whether, in fact, the state tort action conflicts with thefederal regulation
III
Under ordinary conflict pre-emption principles a statelaw that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment andexecution of the full purposes and objectives" of a federallaw is pre-empted. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67(1941). See ibid. (federal statute can pre-empt a statestatute); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504(1992) (federal statute can pre-empt a state tort suit);Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S.141 (1982) (federal regulation can pre-empt a state statute); Geier, supra (federal regulation can pre-empt a statetort suit). In Geier we found that the state law stood as an" 'obstacle' to the accomplishment" of a significant federalregulatory objective, namely, the maintenance of manufacturer choice. 529 U. S., at 886. We must decide whetherthe same is true here. A At the heart of Geier lies our determination that giving 5 6 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. Opinion of the Court auto manufacturers a choice among different kindsof passive restraint devices was a significant objective ofthe federal regulation. We reached this conclusion onthe basis of our examination of the regulation, includingits history, the promulgating agency's contemporaneousexplanation of its objectives, and the agency's currentviews of the regulation's pre-emptive effect.The history showed that the Department of Transportation (DOT) had long thought it important to leave manufacturers with a choice. In 1967 DOT required manufacturers to install manual seat belts. Geier, supra, at 875;
32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2415 (1967). Because many car occu-pants did not "buckle up," DOT began to require passiveprotection, such as airbags or automatic seatbelts, butwithout "favor[ing] or "expect[ing]" the use of airbags.Geier, supra, at 875 (internal quotation marks omitted); 35Fed. Reg. 16927 (1970). DOT subsequently approved theuse of ignition interlocks, which froze the ignition until theoccupant buckled the belt, as a substitute for passiverestraints. Geier, supra, at 876; 37 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1972).But the interlock devices were unpopular with the public,and Congress soon forbade the agency to make them ameans of compliance. Geier, supra, at 876; Motor Vehicleand Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, §109, 88 Stat.1482 (previously codified at 15 U. S. C. §1410(b) (1988ed.)). DOT then temporarily switched to the use of demonstration projects, but later it returned to mandatingpassive restraints, again leaving manufacturers with achoice of systems. Geier, supra, at 876-877; see 49 Fed.Reg. 28962 (1984).DOT's contemporaneous explanation of its 1984 regulation made clear that manufacturer choice was an important means for achieving its basic objectives. The 1984regulation gradually phased in passive restraint requirements, initially requiring manufacturers to equip only10% of their new fleets with passive restraints. DOT Opinion of the Court explained that it intended its phasing period partly to givemanufacturers time to improve airbag technology and todevelop "other, better" passive restraint systems. Geier,529 U. S., at 879. DOT further explained that it hadrejected an " 'all airbag' " system. Ibid. It was worriedthat requiring airbags in most or all vehicles would causea public backlash, like the backlash against interlockdevices. Ibid. DOT also had concerns about the safety ofairbags, for they could injure out-of-place occupants, particularly children. Id., at 877-878. And, given the cost ofairbags, vehicle owners might not replace them whennecessary, leaving occupants without passive protection.Ibid. The regulation therefore "deliberately sought variety-a mix of several different passive restraint systems."Id., at 878. DOT hoped that this mix would lead to betterinformation about the devices' comparative effectivenessand to the eventual development of "alternative, cheaper,and safer passive restraint systems." Id., at 879. Finally, the Solicitor General told us that a tort suit thatinsisted upon use of airbags, as opposed to other federallypermissible passive restraint systems, would "stan[d] asan obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of theseobjectives." Id., at 883 (quoting Brief for United States asAmicus Curiae in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,
O. T. 1999, No. 98-1811, pp. 25-26 (hereinafter UnitedStates Brief in Geier) (internal quotation marks omitted)).And we gave weight to the Solicitor General's view in lightof the fact that it " 'embodie[d] the Secretary's policy judgment that safety would best be promoted if manufacturersinstalled alternative protection systems in their fleetsrather than one particular system in every car.' " 529
U. S., at 881 (quoting United States Brief in Geier 25-26).Taken together, this history, the agency's contemporaneous explanation, and the Government's current understanding of the regulation convinced us that manufacturerchoice was an important regulatory objective. And since 8 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. Opinion of the Court the tort suit stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment ofthat objective, we found the tort suit pre-empted
B
We turn now to the present case. Like the regulation inGeier, the regulation here leaves the manufacturer with achoice. And, like the tort suit in Geier, the tort suit herewould restrict that choice. But unlike Geier, we do notbelieve here that choice is a significant regulatory objective. We concede that the history of the regulation before usresembles the history of airbags to some degree. In 1984,DOT rejected a regulation that would have required theuse of lap-and-shoulder belts in rear seats. 49 Fed. Reg.15241. Nonetheless, by 1989 when DOT promulgated thepresent regulation, it had "concluded that several factorshad changed." 54 Fed. Reg. 46258.DOT then required manufacturers to install a particularkind of belt, namely, lap-and-shoulder belts, for rear outerseats. In respect to rear inner seats, it retained manufacturer choice as to which kind of belt to install. But its1989 reasons for retaining that choice differed considerably from its 1984 reasons for permitting manufacturers achoice in respect to airbags. DOT here was not concernedabout consumer acceptance; it was convinced that lap-and-shoulder belts would increase safety; it did not fear additional safety risks arising from use of those belts; it hadno interest in assuring a mix of devices; and, though itwas concerned about additional costs, that concern wasdiminishing.In respect to consumer acceptance, DOT wrote that if "people who are familiar with and in the habit ofwearing lap/shoulder belts in the front seat findlap/shoulder belts in the rear seat, it stands to reasonthat they would be more likely to wear those beltswhen riding in the rear seat." 53 Fed. Reg. 47983 Opinion of the Court 9
R. Recht, Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic SafetyAdmin., to Roger Matoba (Dec. 28, 1994), App. to ReplyBrief for Petitioners 2 ("With respect to your concernsabout the safety of shoulder safety belts which cross anaisle, I note that such belts do not in fact prevent rear-ward passengers from exiting the vehicle. Such passengers may . . . g[o] under or over the belt. They may alsomove the belt aside").The more important reason why DOT did not requirelap-and-shoulder belts for rear inner seats was that itthought that this requirement would not be cost-effective.The agency explained that it would be significantly moreexpensive for manufacturers to install lap-and-shoulderbelts in rear middle and aisle seats than in seats next tothe car doors. Ibid. But that fact-the fact that DOTmade a negative judgment about cost effectiveness-cannot by itself show that DOT sought to forbid common-law tort suits in which a judge or jury might reach adifferent conclusion. For one thing, DOT did not believe that costs wouldremain frozen. Rather it pointed out that costs werefalling as manufacturers were "voluntarily equipping moreand more of their vehicles with rear seat lap/shoulderbelts." Ibid. For another thing, many, perhaps most, Opinion of the Court federal safety regulations embody some kind of cost-effectiveness judgment. While an agency could base adecision to pre-empt on its cost-effectiveness judgment, weare satisfied that the rulemaking record at issue herediscloses no such pre-emptive intent. And to infer fromthe mere existence of such a cost-effectiveness judgmentthat the federal agency intends to bar States from imposing stricter standards would treat all such federal standards as if they were maximum standards, eliminating thepossibility that the federal agency seeks only to set forth aminimum standard potentially supplemented throughstate tort law. We cannot reconcile this consequence witha statutory saving clause that foresees the likelihood of acontinued meaningful role for state tort law. Supra, at 4. Finally, the Solicitor General tells us that DOT's regulation does not pre-empt this tort suit. As in Geier, "theagency's own views should make a difference." 529 U. S.,at 883. "Congress has delegated to DOT authority to implement the statute; the subject matter is technical; andthe relevant history and background are complex andextensive. The agency is likely to have a thoroughunderstanding of its own regulation and its objectivesand is 'uniquely qualified' to comprehend the likelyimpact of state requirements." Ibid. There is "no reason to suspect that the Solicitor General'srepresentation of DOT's views reflects anything other than'the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter.' " Id., at 884 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452,462 (1997)).Neither has DOT expressed inconsistent views on thissubject. In Geier, the Solicitor General pointed out that"state tort law does not conflict with a federal 'minimumstandard' merely because state law imposes a more stringent requirement." United States Brief in Geier 21 (cita-11 12 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. Opinion of the Court tion omitted). And the Solicitor General explained that astandard giving manufacturers "multiple options for thedesign of" a device would not pre-empt a suit claiming thata manufacturer should have chosen one particular option,where "the Secretary did not determine that the availability of options was necessary to promote safety." Id., at 22;see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Wood v.General Motors Corp., O. T. 1989, No. 89-46, p. 15. Thislast statement describes the present case. In Geier, then, the regulation's history, the agency'scontemporaneous explanation, and its consistently heldinterpretive views indicated that the regulation sought tomaintain manufacturer choice in order to further significant regulatory objectives. Here, these same considerations indicate the contrary. We consequently concludethat, even though the state tort suit may restrict themanufacturer's choice, it does not "stan[d] as an obstacleto the accomplishment . . . of the full purposes and objectives" of federal law. Hines, 312 U. S., at 67. Thus, theregulation does not pre-empt this tort action. The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed. It is so ordered. JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration ordecision of this case. SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 1 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ _________________
DELBERT WILLIAMSON, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE [February 23, 2011] JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring. As the Court notes, this is not the first case in which theCourt has encountered the express pre-emption provisionand saving clause of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 718, 15 U. S. C. §1381 etseq. (1988 ed.) (recodified without substantive change at49 U. S. C. §30101 et seq. (2006 ed. and Supp. III)). InGeier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000),the Court concluded that the "saving clause (like theexpress pre-emption provision) does not bar the ordinaryworking of conflict pre-emption principles," id., at 869, andtherefore engaged in an implied pre-emption analysis.The majority and dissent in Geier agreed that "a courtshould not find pre-emption too readily in the absence ofclear evidence of a conflict." Id., at 885. I agree with the majority's resolution of this case andwith its reasoning. I write separately only to emphasizethe Court's rejection of an overreading of Geier that hasdeveloped since that opinion was issued. Geier does not stand, as the California Court of Appeal,167 Cal. App. 4th 905, 918-919, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545, 555-556 (2008), other courts, and some of respondents' amiciseem to believe, for the proposition that any time anagency gives manufacturers a choice between two or moreoptions, a tort suit that imposes liability on the basis of 2 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring one of the options is an obstacle to the achievement of afederal regulatory objective and may be pre-empted.*Rather, Geier turned on the fact that the agency, via Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, "deliberatelysought variety-a mix of several different passive restraint systems." 529 U. S., at 878; ante, at 7. As theUnited States notes, "a conflict results only when theSafety Act (or regulations implementing the Safety Act)does not just set out options for compliance, but also provides that the regulated parties must remain free tochoose among those options." Brief for United States asAmicus Curiae 8. In other words, the mere fact that anagency regulation allows manufacturers a choice betweenoptions is insufficient to justify implied pre-emption;courts should only find pre-emption where evidence existsthat an agency has a regulatory objective-e.g., obtaininga mix of passive restraint mechanisms, as in Geier-whoseachievement depends on manufacturers having a choicebetween options. A link between a regulatory objectiveand the need for manufacturer choice to achieve thatobjective is the lynchpin of implied pre-emption whenthere is a saving clause. Absent strong indications from the agency that it needsmanufacturers to have options in order to achieve a "significant . . . regulatory objective," ante, at 5, state tortsuits are not "obstacle[s] to the accomplishment . . . of thefull purposes and objectives" of federal law, Hines v.Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). As the majorityexplains, the agency here gave no indication that its safetygoals required the mixture of seatbelt types that resultedfrom manufacturers' ability to choose different options. ------ *See, e.g., Carden v. General Motors Corp., 509 F. 3d 227, 230-232(CA5 2007); Griffith v. General Motors Corp., 303 F. 3d 1276, 1282(CA11 2002); Heinricher v. Volvo Car Corp., 61 Mass. App. 313, 318-319, 809 N. E. 2d 1094, 1098 (2004). SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring Ante, at 8-12 (distinguishing the regulatory record in thiscase from that in Geier).Especially in light of the "statutory saving clause thatforesees the likelihood of a continued meaningful role forstate tort law," ante, at 11, respondents have not carriedtheir burden of establishing that the agency here "deliberately sought variety" to achieve greater safety, Geier, 529
U. S., at 878. Therefore, the Williamsons' tort suit doesnot present an obstacle to any "significant federal regulatory objective," ante, at 5, and may not be pre-empted.For these reasons, I concur. 3 THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 1
DELBERT WILLIAMSON, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL.ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE [February 23, 2011] JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.The Court concludes that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act) and FederalMotor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (FMVSS 208) do notpre-empt the Williamsons' state tort lawsuit. I agree. ButI reach this result by a more direct route: the Safety Act'ssaving clause, which speaks directly to this question andanswers it. See 49 U. S. C. §30103(e). I The plain text of the Safety Act resolves this case.Congress has instructed that "[c]ompliance with a motorvehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter doesnot exempt a person from liability at common law." Ibid.This saving clause "explicitly preserv[es] state common-law actions." Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009)(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 18).Here, Mazda complied with FMVSS 208 when it chose toinstall a simple lap belt. According to Mazda, the Williamsons' lawsuit alleging that it should have installed alap-and-shoulder seatbelt instead is pre-empted. Thatargument is foreclosed by the saving clause; the Williamsons' state tort action is not pre-empted.The majority does not rely on the Safety Act's savingclause because this Court effectively read it out of the 2 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment statute in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S.861 (2000). In Geier, the Court interpreted the savingclause as simply cancelling out the statute's express preemption clause with respect to common-law tort actions.This left the Court free to consider the effect of conflictpre-emption principles on such tort actions. See id., at869. But it makes no sense to read the express pre-emptionclause in conjunction with the saving clause. See id., at898 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The express pre-emptionclause bars States from having any safety "standard applicable to the same aspect of performance" as a federalstandard unless it is "identical" to the federal one.§30103(b). That clause pre-empts States from establishing "objective rule[s] prescribed by a legislature or anadministrative agency" in competition with the federalstandards; it says nothing about the tort lawsuits that arethe focus of the saving clause. Id., at 896.* Read independently of the express pre-emption clause, the savingclause simply means what it says: FMVSS 208 does notpre-empt state common-law actions. II As in Geier, rather than following the plain text of thestatute, the majority's analysis turns on whether the tortlawsuit here " 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives' "of FMVSS 208. Ante, at 5 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz,312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941)). I have rejected purposes-andobjectives pre-emption as inconsistent with the Constitu------- * See also Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U. S. 51, 63-64 (2002)(addressing a similar express pre-emption clause and saving clause inthe Federal Boat Safety Act, and holding that it is "perfectly rational"for Congress to bar state "administrative and legislative regulations"while allowing "private damages remedies" to compensate accidentvictims). THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment tion because it turns entirely on extratextual "judicialsuppositions." Wyeth, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 22); seealso Haywood v. Drown, 556 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (dissenting opinion) (slip op., at 26-27). Pre-emption occurs "by direct operation of the Supremacy Clause," Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U. S. 491, 501(1984), which "requires that pre-emptive effect be givenonly to those federal standards and policies that are setforth in, or necessarily follow from, the statutory text thatwas produced through the constitutionally required bicameral and presentment procedures." Wyeth, 555 U. S.,at ___ (slip op., at 5) (opinion of THOMAS, J.). In short,pre-emption must turn on the text of a federal statute orthe regulations it authorizes. See id., at ___ (slip op., at
6); see also Geier, supra, at 911 (Stevens, J., dissenting).Purposes-and-objectives pre-emption-which by designroams beyond statutory or regulatory text-is thus whollyillegitimate. It instructs courts to pre-empt state lawsbased on judges' "conceptions of a policy which Congresshas not expressed and which is not plainly to be inferredfrom the legislation which it has enacted." Hines, supra,at 75 (Stone, J., dissenting); Geier, supra, at 907 (opinionof Stevens, J.) (expressing concern about judges "runningamok with our potentially boundless (and perhaps inadequately considered) [purposes-and-objectives pre-emptiondoctrine]"); see also Wyeth, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 13-
21) (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (recounting the history of thedoctrine).The majority's purposes-and-objectives pre-emptionanalysis displays the inherent constitutional problem withthe doctrine. The Court begins with FMVSS 208, whichallowed manufacturers to install either simple lap or lapand-shoulder seatbelts in the rear aisle seat of 1993 mini-vans. The majority then turns to what it considers theprimary issue: whether "that choice [was] a significantregulatory objective." Ante, at 8 (emphasis added). Put 3 4 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment more plainly, the question is whether the regulators reallywanted manufacturers to have a choice or did not reallywant them to have a choice but gave them one anyway. To answer that question, the majority engages in a"freewheeling, extratextual, and broad evaluatio[n] of the'purposes and objectives' " of FMVSS 208. Wyeth, supra, at___ (slip op., at 23) (opinion of THOMAS, J.). The Courtwades into a sea of agency musings and Governmentlitigating positions and fishes for what the agency mayhave been thinking 20 years ago when it drafted the relevant provision. After scrutinizing the 1989 Federal Register, a letter written in 1994, and the Solicitor General'spresent-day assurances, the Court finds that Departmentof Transportation liked the idea of lap-and-shoulder seat-belts in all seats, but did not require them, primarily forcost-efficiency reasons and also because of some concernfor ingress-egress around the belt mounts. Ante, at 8-11.From all of this, the majority determines that althoughthe regulators specifically and intentionally gave manufacturers a choice between types of seatbelts, that choicewas not a "significant regulatory objective" and so does notpre-empt state tort lawsuits. That the Court in Geier reached an opposite conclusionreveals the utterly unconstrained nature of purposes-andobjectives pre-emption. There is certainly "considerablesimilarity between this case and Geier." Ante, at 2. Justas in this case, Geier involved a choice offered to carmanufacturers in FMVSS 208: whether to install airbags.Ante, at 8. And just as in this case, the Court in Geierrelied on "history, the agency's contemporaneous explanation, and the Government's current understanding" todetermine the significance of that choice. Ante, at 7-8.Yet the Geier Court concluded that "giving auto manufacturers a choice among different kinds of passive restraintdevices was a significant objective of the federal regulation," ante, at 6, and thus found the Geiers' lawsuit pre-THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 5 empted.The dispositive difference between this case and Geier-indeed, the only difference-is the majority's "psychoanalysis" of the regulators. United States v. Public Util.Comm'n of Cal., 345 U. S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J.,concurring) (describing reliance on legislative history).The majority cites no difference on the face of FMVSS 208between the airbag choice addressed in Geier and theseatbelt choice at issue in this case. According to the majority, to determine whether FMVSS208 pre-empts a tort suit, courts apparently must embarkon the same expedition undertaken here: sifting throughthe Federal Register, examining agency ruminations, andasking the Government what it currently thinks. Preemption is then proper if the court decides that the regulators thought the choice especially important, but not if thechoice was only somewhat important. This quest roves farfrom the Safety Act and analyzes pre-emption based on aformless inquiry into how strongly an agency felt aboutthe regulation it enacted 20 years ago."[F]reeranging speculation about what the purposes ofthe [regulation] must have been" is not constitutionallyproper in any case. Wyeth, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 15)(opinion of THOMAS, J.). The Supremacy Clause commands that the "[l]aws of the United States," not theunenacted hopes and dreams of the Department of Transportation, "shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U. S.Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. The impropriety is even more obvious here because the plain text of the Safety Act resolvesthis case. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.
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